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author | Peter Dettman <peter.dettman@bouncycastle.org> | 2024-03-04 18:19:31 +0700 |
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committer | Peter Dettman <peter.dettman@bouncycastle.org> | 2024-03-04 18:19:31 +0700 |
commit | ff0e63681de4e7e215ce05dfc5d58c23adde2e04 (patch) | |
tree | de8e6152c4fa7841056158b830707bf73246c00d /crypto | |
parent | Refactor RSA engines (diff) | |
download | BouncyCastle.NET-ed25519-ff0e63681de4e7e215ce05dfc5d58c23adde2e04.tar.xz |
Factor out TlsRsaKeyExchange to address timing issue
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsRsaKeyExchange.cs | 222 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/src/tls/crypto/impl/bc/BcDefaultTlsCredentialedDecryptor.cs | 64 |
2 files changed, 228 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsRsaKeyExchange.cs b/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsRsaKeyExchange.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c214196a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsRsaKeyExchange.cs @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +using System; +using System.Diagnostics; + +using Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Parameters; +using Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Utilities; +using Org.BouncyCastle.Math; +using Org.BouncyCastle.Security; +using Org.BouncyCastle.Utilities; + +namespace Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Tls +{ + public static class TlsRsaKeyExchange + { + public static byte[] DecryptPreMasterSecret(byte[] encryptedPreMasterSecret, RsaKeyParameters privateKey, + int protocolVersion, SecureRandom secureRandom) + { + if (Arrays.IsNullOrEmpty(encryptedPreMasterSecret)) + throw new ArgumentException("cannot be null or empty", nameof(encryptedPreMasterSecret)); + + if (!privateKey.IsPrivate) + throw new ArgumentException("must be an RSA private key", nameof(privateKey)); + + BigInteger modulus = privateKey.Modulus; + int bitLength = modulus.BitLength; + if (bitLength < 512) + throw new ArgumentException("must be at least 512 bits", nameof(privateKey)); + + if ((protocolVersion & 0xFFFF) != protocolVersion) + throw new ArgumentException("must be a 16 bit value", nameof(protocolVersion)); + + secureRandom = CryptoServicesRegistrar.GetSecureRandom(secureRandom); + + /* + * Generate 48 random bytes we can use as a Pre-Master-Secret if the decrypted value is invalid. + */ + byte[] result = new byte[48]; + secureRandom.NextBytes(result); + + try + { + BigInteger input = ConvertInput(modulus, encryptedPreMasterSecret); + byte[] encoding = RsaBlinded(privateKey, input, secureRandom); + + int pkcs1Length = (bitLength - 1) / 8; + int plainTextOffset = encoding.Length - 48; + + int badEncodingMask = CheckPkcs1Encoding2(encoding, pkcs1Length, 48); + int badVersionMask = -(Pack.BE_To_UInt16(encoding, plainTextOffset) ^ protocolVersion) >> 31; + int fallbackMask = badEncodingMask | badVersionMask; + + for (int i = 0; i < 48; ++i) + { + result[i] = (byte)((result[i] & fallbackMask) | (encoding[plainTextOffset + i] & ~fallbackMask)); + } + + Arrays.Fill(encoding, 0x00); + } + catch (Exception) + { + /* + * Decryption should never throw an exception; return a random value instead. + * + * In any case, a TLS server MUST NOT generate an alert if processing an RSA-encrypted premaster + * secret message fails, or the version number is not as expected. Instead, it MUST continue the + * handshake with a randomly generated premaster secret. + */ + } + + return result; + } + + private static int CAddTo(int len, int cond, byte[] x, byte[] z) + { + Debug.Assert(cond == 0 || cond == -1); + + int c = 0; + for (int i = len - 1; i >= 0; --i) + { + c += z[i] + (x[i] & cond); + z[i] = (byte)c; + c >>= 8; + } + return c; + } + + /** + * Check the argument is a valid encoding with type 2 of a plaintext with the given length. Returns 0 if + * valid, or -1 if invalid. + */ + private static int CheckPkcs1Encoding2(byte[] buf, int pkcs1Length, int plaintextLength) + { + // The header should be at least 10 bytes + int errorSign = pkcs1Length - plaintextLength - 10; + + int firstPadPos = buf.Length - pkcs1Length; + int lastPadPos = buf.Length - 1 - plaintextLength; + + // Any leading bytes should be zero + for (int i = 0; i < firstPadPos; ++i) + { + errorSign |= -buf[i]; + } + + // The first byte should be 0x02 + errorSign |= -(buf[firstPadPos] ^ 0x02); + + // All pad bytes before the last one should be non-zero + for (int i = firstPadPos + 1; i < lastPadPos; ++i) + { + errorSign |= buf[i] - 1; + } + + // Last pad byte should be zero + errorSign |= -buf[lastPadPos]; + + return errorSign >> 31; + } + + private static BigInteger ConvertInput(BigInteger modulus, byte[] input) + { + int inputLimit = (modulus.BitLength + 7) / 8; + + if (input.Length <= inputLimit) + { + BigInteger result = new BigInteger(1, input); + if (result.CompareTo(modulus) < 0) + return result; + } + + throw new DataLengthException("input too large for RSA cipher."); + } + + private static BigInteger Rsa(RsaKeyParameters privateKey, BigInteger input) + { + return input.ModPow(privateKey.Exponent, privateKey.Modulus); + } + + private static byte[] RsaBlinded(RsaKeyParameters privateKey, BigInteger input, SecureRandom secureRandom) + { + BigInteger modulus = privateKey.Modulus; + int resultSize = (modulus.BitLength + 7) / 8; + + if (!(privateKey is RsaPrivateCrtKeyParameters crtKey)) + return BigIntegers.AsUnsignedByteArray(resultSize, Rsa(privateKey, input)); + + BigInteger e = crtKey.PublicExponent; + Debug.Assert(e != null); + + BigInteger r = BigIntegers.CreateRandomInRange(BigInteger.One, modulus.Subtract(BigInteger.One), + secureRandom); + BigInteger blind = r.ModPow(e, modulus); + BigInteger unblind = BigIntegers.ModOddInverse(modulus, r); + + BigInteger blindedInput = blind.ModMultiply(input, modulus); + BigInteger blindedResult = RsaCrt(crtKey, blindedInput); + BigInteger offsetResult = unblind.Add(BigInteger.One).ModMultiply(blindedResult, modulus); + + /* + * BigInteger conversion time is not constant, but is only done for blinded or public values. + */ + byte[] blindedResultBytes = BigIntegers.AsUnsignedByteArray(resultSize, blindedResult); + byte[] modulusBytes = BigIntegers.AsUnsignedByteArray(resultSize, modulus); + byte[] resultBytes = BigIntegers.AsUnsignedByteArray(resultSize, offsetResult); + + /* + * A final modular subtraction is done without timing dependencies on the final result. + */ + int carry = SubFrom(resultSize, blindedResultBytes, resultBytes); + CAddTo(resultSize, carry, modulusBytes, resultBytes); + + return resultBytes; + } + + private static BigInteger RsaCrt(RsaPrivateCrtKeyParameters crtKey, BigInteger input) + { + // + // we have the extra factors, use the Chinese Remainder Theorem - the author + // wishes to express his thanks to Dirk Bonekaemper at rtsffm.com for + // advice regarding the expression of this. + // + BigInteger e = crtKey.PublicExponent; + Debug.Assert(e != null); + + BigInteger p = crtKey.P; + BigInteger q = crtKey.Q; + BigInteger dP = crtKey.DP; + BigInteger dQ = crtKey.DQ; + BigInteger qInv = crtKey.QInv; + + // mP = ((input mod p) ^ dP)) mod p + BigInteger mP = input.Remainder(p).ModPow(dP, p); + + // mQ = ((input mod q) ^ dQ)) mod q + BigInteger mQ = input.Remainder(q).ModPow(dQ, q); + + // h = qInv * (mP - mQ) mod p + BigInteger h = mP.Subtract(mQ).ModMultiply(qInv, p); + + // m = h * q + mQ + BigInteger m = h.Multiply(q).Add(mQ); + + // defence against Arjen Lenstra’s CRT attack + BigInteger check = m.ModPow(e, crtKey.Modulus); + if (!check.Equals(input)) + throw new InvalidOperationException("RSA engine faulty decryption/signing detected"); + + return m; + } + + private static int SubFrom(int len, byte[] x, byte[] z) + { + int c = 0; + for (int i = len - 1; i >= 0; --i) + { + c += z[i] - x[i]; + z[i] = (byte)c; + c >>= 8; + } + return c; + } + } +} diff --git a/crypto/src/tls/crypto/impl/bc/BcDefaultTlsCredentialedDecryptor.cs b/crypto/src/tls/crypto/impl/bc/BcDefaultTlsCredentialedDecryptor.cs index 6f4d10c78..d7d9f7595 100644 --- a/crypto/src/tls/crypto/impl/bc/BcDefaultTlsCredentialedDecryptor.cs +++ b/crypto/src/tls/crypto/impl/bc/BcDefaultTlsCredentialedDecryptor.cs @@ -1,11 +1,7 @@ using System; using Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto; -using Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Encodings; -using Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Engines; using Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Parameters; -using Org.BouncyCastle.Security; -using Org.BouncyCastle.Utilities; namespace Org.BouncyCastle.Tls.Crypto.Impl.BC { @@ -40,15 +36,12 @@ namespace Org.BouncyCastle.Tls.Crypto.Impl.BC throw new ArgumentException("'privateKey' type not supported: " + privateKey.GetType().FullName); } - this.m_crypto = crypto; - this.m_certificate = certificate; - this.m_privateKey = privateKey; + m_crypto = crypto; + m_certificate = certificate; + m_privateKey = privateKey; } - public virtual Certificate Certificate - { - get { return m_certificate; } - } + public virtual Certificate Certificate => m_certificate; public virtual TlsSecret Decrypt(TlsCryptoParameters cryptoParams, byte[] ciphertext) { @@ -63,55 +56,10 @@ namespace Org.BouncyCastle.Tls.Crypto.Impl.BC protected virtual TlsSecret SafeDecryptPreMasterSecret(TlsCryptoParameters cryptoParams, RsaKeyParameters rsaServerPrivateKey, byte[] encryptedPreMasterSecret) { - SecureRandom secureRandom = m_crypto.SecureRandom; - - /* - * RFC 5246 7.4.7.1. - */ ProtocolVersion expectedVersion = cryptoParams.RsaPreMasterSecretVersion; - /* - * Generate 48 random bytes we can use as a Pre-Master-Secret, if the PKCS1 padding check should fail. - */ - byte[] fallback = new byte[48]; - secureRandom.NextBytes(fallback); - - byte[] M = Arrays.Clone(fallback); - try - { - Pkcs1Encoding encoding = new Pkcs1Encoding(new RsaBlindedEngine(), fallback); - encoding.Init(false, new ParametersWithRandom(rsaServerPrivateKey, secureRandom)); - - M = encoding.ProcessBlock(encryptedPreMasterSecret, 0, encryptedPreMasterSecret.Length); - } - catch (Exception) - { - /* - * This should never happen since the decryption should never throw an exception and return a random - * value instead. - * - * In any case, a TLS server MUST NOT generate an alert if processing an RSA-encrypted premaster secret - * message fails, or the version number is not as expected. Instead, it MUST continue the handshake with - * a randomly generated premaster secret. - */ - } - - /* - * Compare the version number in the decrypted Pre-Master-Secret with the legacy_version field from the - * ClientHello. If they don't match, continue the handshake with the randomly generated 'fallback' value. - * - * NOTE: The comparison and replacement must be constant-time. - */ - int mask = (expectedVersion.MajorVersion ^ M[0]) - | (expectedVersion.MinorVersion ^ M[1]); - - // 'mask' will be all 1s if the versions matched, or else all 0s. - mask = (mask - 1) >> 31; - - for (int i = 0; i < 48; i++) - { - M[i] = (byte)((M[i] & mask) | (fallback[i] & ~mask)); - } + byte[] M = Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Tls.TlsRsaKeyExchange.DecryptPreMasterSecret(encryptedPreMasterSecret, + rsaServerPrivateKey, expectedVersion.FullVersion, m_crypto.SecureRandom); return m_crypto.CreateSecret(M); } |