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-rw-r--r--src/Olm.cpp137
1 files changed, 103 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/src/Olm.cpp b/src/Olm.cpp

index ff4c883b..d9447031 100644 --- a/src/Olm.cpp +++ b/src/Olm.cpp
@@ -123,7 +123,17 @@ handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEven if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomEncrypted)) { try { olm::OlmMessage olm_msg = j_msg; - handle_olm_message(std::move(olm_msg)); + cache::client()->query_keys( + olm_msg.sender, + [olm_msg](const UserKeyCache &userKeys, mtx::http::RequestErr e) { + if (e) { + nhlog::crypto()->error( + "Failed to query user keys, dropping olm " + "message"); + return; + } + handle_olm_message(std::move(olm_msg), userKeys); + }); } catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) { nhlog::crypto()->warn( "parsing error for olm message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2)); @@ -197,7 +207,7 @@ handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEven } void -handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) +handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKeys) { nhlog::crypto()->info("sender : {}", msg.sender); nhlog::crypto()->info("sender_key: {}", msg.sender_key); @@ -209,7 +219,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) if (cipher.first != my_key) { nhlog::crypto()->debug( "Skipping message for {} since we are {}.", cipher.first, my_key); - continue; + return; } const auto type = cipher.second.type; @@ -231,6 +241,57 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) if (!payload.is_null()) { mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents device_event; + // Other properties are included in order to prevent an attacker from + // publishing someone else's curve25519 keys as their own and subsequently + // claiming to have sent messages which they didn't. sender must correspond + // to the user who sent the event, recipient to the local user, and + // recipient_keys to the local ed25519 key. + std::string receiver_ed25519 = payload["recipient_keys"]["ed25519"]; + if (receiver_ed25519.empty() || + receiver_ed25519 != olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) { + nhlog::crypto()->warn( + "Decrypted event doesn't include our ed25519: {}", + payload.dump()); + return; + } + std::string receiver = payload["recipient"]; + if (receiver.empty() || receiver != http::client()->user_id().to_string()) { + nhlog::crypto()->warn( + "Decrypted event doesn't include our user_id: {}", + payload.dump()); + return; + } + + // Clients must confirm that the sender_key and the ed25519 field value + // under the keys property match the keys returned by /keys/query for the + // given user, and must also verify the signature of the payload. Without + // this check, a client cannot be sure that the sender device owns the + // private part of the ed25519 key it claims to have in the Olm payload. + // This is crucial when the ed25519 key corresponds to a verified device. + std::string sender_ed25519 = payload["keys"]["ed25519"]; + if (sender_ed25519.empty()) { + nhlog::crypto()->warn( + "Decrypted event doesn't include sender ed25519: {}", + payload.dump()); + return; + } + + bool from_their_device = false; + for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) { + if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key) { + if (key.keys.at("ed25519:" + device_id) == sender_ed25519) { + from_their_device = true; + break; + } + } + } + if (!from_their_device) { + nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event isn't sent from a device " + "listed by that user! {}", + payload.dump()); + return; + } + { std::string msg_type = payload["type"]; json event_array = json::array(); @@ -242,7 +303,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) if (temp_events.empty()) { nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted unknown event: {}", payload.dump()); - continue; + return; } device_event = temp_events.at(0); } @@ -276,17 +337,20 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(e8->content); } else if (auto roomKey = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::RoomKey>>(&device_event)) { - create_inbound_megolm_session(*roomKey, msg.sender_key); + create_inbound_megolm_session( + *roomKey, msg.sender_key, sender_ed25519); } else if (auto forwardedRoomKey = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::ForwardedRoomKey>>( &device_event)) { + forwardedRoomKey->content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.push_back( + msg.sender_key); import_inbound_megolm_session(*forwardedRoomKey); } else if (auto e = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretSend>>(&device_event)) { auto local_user = http::client()->user_id(); if (msg.sender != local_user.to_string()) - continue; + return; auto secret_name = request_id_to_secret_name.find(e->content.request_id); @@ -306,7 +370,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string()); if (!verificationStatus) - continue; + return; auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string()); std::string sender_device_id; @@ -344,7 +408,6 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) "for secrect " "'{}'", name); - return; } }); @@ -364,13 +427,8 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg) } try { - auto otherUserDeviceKeys = cache::userKeys(msg.sender); - - if (!otherUserDeviceKeys) - return; - std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets; - for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys->device_keys) { + for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) { if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key) targets[msg.sender].push_back(device_id); } @@ -450,7 +508,7 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> sendSessionTo; mtx::crypto::OutboundGroupSessionPtr session = nullptr; - OutboundGroupSessionData group_session_data; + GroupSessionData group_session_data; if (cache::outboundMegolmSessionExists(room_id)) { auto res = cache::getOutboundMegolmSession(room_id); @@ -519,7 +577,8 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, } else { // compare devices bool device_removed = false; - for (const auto &dev : session_member_it->second.devices) { + for (const auto &dev : + session_member_it->second.deviceids) { if (!member_it->second || !member_it->second->device_keys.count( dev.first)) { @@ -541,7 +600,7 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, if (member_it->second) for (const auto &dev : member_it->second->device_keys) - if (!session_member_it->second.devices + if (!session_member_it->second.deviceids .count(dev.first) && (member_it->first != own_user_id || dev.first != device_id)) @@ -571,9 +630,7 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, const auto session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get()); // Saving the new megolm session. - OutboundGroupSessionData session_data{}; - session_data.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get()); - session_data.session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get()); + GroupSessionData session_data{}; session_data.message_index = 0; session_data.timestamp = QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch(); @@ -581,22 +638,19 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, for (const auto &[user, devices] : members) { sendSessionTo[user] = {}; - session_data.initially.keys[user] = {}; + session_data.currently.keys[user] = {}; if (devices) { for (const auto &[device_id_, key] : devices->device_keys) { (void)key; if (device_id != device_id_ || user != own_user_id) { sendSessionTo[user].push_back(device_id_); - session_data.initially.keys[user] - .devices[device_id_] = 0; + session_data.currently.keys[user] + .deviceids[device_id_] = 0; } } } } - cache::saveOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, session_data, session); - group_session_data = std::move(session_data); - { MegolmSessionIndex index; index.room_id = room_id; @@ -604,8 +658,12 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, index.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519; auto megolm_session = olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(session_key); - cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session)); + cache::saveInboundMegolmSession( + index, std::move(megolm_session), session_data); } + + cache::saveOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, session_data, session); + group_session_data = std::move(session_data); } mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> megolm_payload{}; @@ -641,8 +699,8 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, group_session_data.currently.keys[user] = {}; for (const auto &device_id_ : devices) { - if (!group_session_data.currently.keys[user].devices.count(device_id_)) - group_session_data.currently.keys[user].devices[device_id_] = + if (!group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids.count(device_id_)) + group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids[device_id_] = group_session_data.message_index; } } @@ -704,7 +762,8 @@ try_olm_decryption(const std::string &sender_key, const mtx::events::msg::OlmCip void create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> &roomKey, - const std::string &sender_key) + const std::string &sender_key, + const std::string &sender_ed25519) { MegolmSessionIndex index; index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id; @@ -712,9 +771,13 @@ create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::R index.sender_key = sender_key; try { + GroupSessionData data{}; + data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = {sender_key}; + data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sender_ed25519; + auto megolm_session = olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key); - cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session)); + cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data); } catch (const lmdb::error &e) { nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what()); return; @@ -741,7 +804,13 @@ import_inbound_megolm_session( try { auto megolm_session = olm::client()->import_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key); - cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session)); + + GroupSessionData data{}; + data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = + roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain; + data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = roomKey.content.sender_claimed_ed25519_key; + + cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data); } catch (const lmdb::error &e) { nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what()); return; @@ -875,10 +944,10 @@ handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyR uint64_t minimumIndex = -1; if (outboundSession.data.currently.keys.count(req.sender)) { if (outboundSession.data.currently.keys.at(req.sender) - .devices.count(req.content.requesting_device_id)) { + .deviceids.count(req.content.requesting_device_id)) { shouldSeeKeys = true; minimumIndex = outboundSession.data.currently.keys.at(req.sender) - .devices.at(req.content.requesting_device_id); + .deviceids.at(req.content.requesting_device_id); } }