diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/src')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsProtocol.cs | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.cs | 744 |
2 files changed, 746 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsProtocol.cs b/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsProtocol.cs index 2e2ef9214..8ba156952 100644 --- a/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsProtocol.cs +++ b/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsProtocol.cs @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ namespace Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Tls } } - protected void WriteHandshakeMessage(byte[] buf, int off, int len) + protected virtual void WriteHandshakeMessage(byte[] buf, int off, int len) { while (len > 0) { @@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ namespace Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Tls message.WriteToRecordStream(this); } - protected byte[] CreateVerifyData(bool isServer) + protected virtual byte[] CreateVerifyData(bool isServer) { TlsContext context = Context; string asciiLabel = isServer ? ExporterLabel.server_finished : ExporterLabel.client_finished; diff --git a/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.cs b/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..589ede802 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/src/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.cs @@ -0,0 +1,744 @@ +using System; +using System.Collections; +using System.IO; + +using Org.BouncyCastle.Asn1.X509; +using Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Parameters; +using Org.BouncyCastle.Security; +using Org.BouncyCastle.Utilities; + +namespace Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Tls +{ + public class TlsServerProtocol + : TlsProtocol + { + protected TlsServer mTlsServer = null; + internal TlsServerContextImpl mTlsServerContext = null; + + protected TlsKeyExchange mKeyExchange = null; + protected TlsCredentials mServerCredentials = null; + protected CertificateRequest mCertificateRequest = null; + + protected short mClientCertificateType = -1; + protected TlsHandshakeHash mPrepareFinishHash = null; + + public TlsServerProtocol(Stream stream, SecureRandom secureRandom) + : base(stream, secureRandom) + { + } + + public TlsServerProtocol(Stream input, Stream output, SecureRandom secureRandom) + : base(input, output, secureRandom) + { + } + + /** + * Receives a TLS handshake in the role of server + * + * @param mTlsServer + * @throws IOException If handshake was not successful. + */ + public virtual void Accept(TlsServer tlsServer) + { + if (tlsServer == null) + throw new ArgumentNullException("tlsServer"); + if (this.mTlsServer != null) + throw new InvalidOperationException("'Accept' can only be called once"); + + this.mTlsServer = tlsServer; + + this.mSecurityParameters = new SecurityParameters(); + this.mSecurityParameters.entity = ConnectionEnd.server; + + this.mTlsServerContext = new TlsServerContextImpl(mSecureRandom, mSecurityParameters); + + this.mSecurityParameters.serverRandom = CreateRandomBlock(tlsServer.ShouldUseGmtUnixTime(), + mTlsServerContext.NonceRandomGenerator); + + this.mTlsServer.Init(mTlsServerContext); + this.mRecordStream.Init(mTlsServerContext); + + this.mRecordStream.SetRestrictReadVersion(false); + + CompleteHandshake(); + } + + protected override void CleanupHandshake() + { + base.CleanupHandshake(); + + this.mKeyExchange = null; + this.mServerCredentials = null; + this.mCertificateRequest = null; + this.mPrepareFinishHash = null; + } + + protected override TlsContext Context + { + get { return mTlsServerContext; } + } + + internal override AbstractTlsContext ContextAdmin + { + get { return mTlsServerContext; } + } + + protected override TlsPeer Peer + { + get { return mTlsServer; } + } + + protected override void HandleHandshakeMessage(byte type, byte[] data) + { + MemoryStream buf = new MemoryStream(data); + + switch (type) + { + case HandshakeType.client_hello: + { + switch (this.mConnectionState) + { + case CS_START: + { + ReceiveClientHelloMessage(buf); + this.mConnectionState = CS_CLIENT_HELLO; + + SendServerHelloMessage(); + this.mConnectionState = CS_SERVER_HELLO; + + IList serverSupplementalData = mTlsServer.GetServerSupplementalData(); + if (serverSupplementalData != null) + { + SendSupplementalDataMessage(serverSupplementalData); + } + this.mConnectionState = CS_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA; + + this.mKeyExchange = mTlsServer.GetKeyExchange(); + this.mKeyExchange.Init(Context); + + this.mServerCredentials = mTlsServer.GetCredentials(); + + Certificate serverCertificate = null; + + if (this.mServerCredentials == null) + { + this.mKeyExchange.SkipServerCredentials(); + } + else + { + this.mKeyExchange.ProcessServerCredentials(this.mServerCredentials); + + serverCertificate = this.mServerCredentials.Certificate; + SendCertificateMessage(serverCertificate); + } + this.mConnectionState = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE; + + // TODO[RFC 3546] Check whether empty certificates is possible, allowed, or excludes CertificateStatus + if (serverCertificate == null || serverCertificate.IsEmpty) + { + this.mAllowCertificateStatus = false; + } + + if (this.mAllowCertificateStatus) + { + CertificateStatus certificateStatus = mTlsServer.GetCertificateStatus(); + if (certificateStatus != null) + { + SendCertificateStatusMessage(certificateStatus); + } + } + + this.mConnectionState = CS_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + + byte[] serverKeyExchange = this.mKeyExchange.GenerateServerKeyExchange(); + if (serverKeyExchange != null) + { + SendServerKeyExchangeMessage(serverKeyExchange); + } + this.mConnectionState = CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + + if (this.mServerCredentials != null) + { + this.mCertificateRequest = mTlsServer.GetCertificateRequest(); + if (this.mCertificateRequest != null) + { + this.mKeyExchange.ValidateCertificateRequest(mCertificateRequest); + + SendCertificateRequestMessage(mCertificateRequest); + + TlsUtilities.TrackHashAlgorithms(this.mRecordStream.HandshakeHash, + this.mCertificateRequest.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms); + } + } + this.mConnectionState = CS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + + SendServerHelloDoneMessage(); + this.mConnectionState = CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; + + this.mRecordStream.HandshakeHash.SealHashAlgorithms(); + + break; + } + default: + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + break; + } + case HandshakeType.supplemental_data: + { + switch (this.mConnectionState) + { + case CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + { + mTlsServer.ProcessClientSupplementalData(ReadSupplementalDataMessage(buf)); + this.mConnectionState = CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA; + break; + } + default: + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + break; + } + case HandshakeType.certificate: + { + switch (this.mConnectionState) + { + case CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + case CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA: + { + if (mConnectionState < CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA) + { + mTlsServer.ProcessClientSupplementalData(null); + } + + if (this.mCertificateRequest == null) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + + ReceiveCertificateMessage(buf); + this.mConnectionState = CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + break; + } + default: + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + break; + } + case HandshakeType.client_key_exchange: + { + switch (this.mConnectionState) + { + case CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + case CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA: + case CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + { + if (mConnectionState < CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA) + { + mTlsServer.ProcessClientSupplementalData(null); + } + + if (mConnectionState < CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) + { + if (this.mCertificateRequest == null) + { + this.mKeyExchange.SkipClientCredentials(); + } + else + { + if (TlsUtilities.IsTlsV12(Context)) + { + /* + * RFC 5246 If no suitable certificate is available, the client MUST Send a + * certificate message containing no certificates. + * + * NOTE: In previous RFCs, this was SHOULD instead of MUST. + */ + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + else if (TlsUtilities.IsSsl(Context)) + { + if (this.mPeerCertificate == null) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + else + { + NotifyClientCertificate(Certificate.EmptyChain); + } + } + } + + ReceiveClientKeyExchangeMessage(buf); + this.mConnectionState = CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + break; + } + default: + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + break; + } + case HandshakeType.certificate_verify: + { + switch (this.mConnectionState) + { + case CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + { + /* + * RFC 5246 7.4.8 This message is only sent following a client certificate that has + * signing capability (i.e., all certificates except those containing fixed + * Diffie-Hellman parameters). + */ + if (!ExpectCertificateVerifyMessage()) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + + ReceiveCertificateVerifyMessage(buf); + this.mConnectionState = CS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + + break; + } + default: + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + break; + } + case HandshakeType.finished: + { + switch (this.mConnectionState) + { + case CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + case CS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + { + if (mConnectionState < CS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY && ExpectCertificateVerifyMessage()) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + + ProcessFinishedMessage(buf); + this.mConnectionState = CS_CLIENT_FINISHED; + + if (this.mExpectSessionTicket) + { + SendNewSessionTicketMessage(mTlsServer.GetNewSessionTicket()); + SendChangeCipherSpecMessage(); + } + this.mConnectionState = CS_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET; + + SendFinishedMessage(); + this.mConnectionState = CS_SERVER_FINISHED; + this.mConnectionState = CS_END; + break; + } + default: + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + break; + } + case HandshakeType.hello_request: + case HandshakeType.hello_verify_request: + case HandshakeType.server_hello: + case HandshakeType.server_key_exchange: + case HandshakeType.certificate_request: + case HandshakeType.server_hello_done: + case HandshakeType.session_ticket: + default: + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + } + } + + protected override void HandleWarningMessage(byte description) + { + switch (description) + { + case AlertDescription.no_certificate: + { + /* + * SSL 3.0 If the server has sent a certificate request Message, the client must Send + * either the certificate message or a no_certificate alert. + */ + if (TlsUtilities.IsSsl(Context) && mCertificateRequest != null) + { + NotifyClientCertificate(Certificate.EmptyChain); + } + break; + } + default: + { + base.HandleWarningMessage(description); + break; + } + } + } + + protected virtual void NotifyClientCertificate(Certificate clientCertificate) + { + if (mCertificateRequest == null) + throw new InvalidOperationException(); + if (mPeerCertificate != null) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message); + + this.mPeerCertificate = clientCertificate; + + if (clientCertificate.IsEmpty) + { + this.mKeyExchange.SkipClientCredentials(); + } + else + { + + /* + * TODO RFC 5246 7.4.6. If the certificate_authorities list in the certificate request + * message was non-empty, one of the certificates in the certificate chain SHOULD be + * issued by one of the listed CAs. + */ + + this.mClientCertificateType = TlsUtilities.GetClientCertificateType(clientCertificate, + this.mServerCredentials.Certificate); + + this.mKeyExchange.ProcessClientCertificate(clientCertificate); + } + + /* + * RFC 5246 7.4.6. If the client does not Send any certificates, the server MAY at its + * discretion either continue the handshake without client authentication, or respond with a + * fatal handshake_failure alert. Also, if some aspect of the certificate chain was + * unacceptable (e.g., it was not signed by a known, trusted CA), the server MAY at its + * discretion either continue the handshake (considering the client unauthenticated) or Send + * a fatal alert. + */ + this.mTlsServer.NotifyClientCertificate(clientCertificate); + } + + protected virtual void ReceiveCertificateMessage(MemoryStream buf) + { + Certificate clientCertificate = Certificate.Parse(buf); + + AssertEmpty(buf); + + NotifyClientCertificate(clientCertificate); + } + + protected virtual void ReceiveCertificateVerifyMessage(MemoryStream buf) + { + DigitallySigned clientCertificateVerify = DigitallySigned.Parse(Context, buf); + + AssertEmpty(buf); + + // Verify the CertificateVerify message contains a correct signature. + try + { + byte[] certificateVerifyHash; + if (TlsUtilities.IsTlsV12(Context)) + { + certificateVerifyHash = mPrepareFinishHash.GetFinalHash(clientCertificateVerify.Algorithm.Hash); + } + else + { + certificateVerifyHash = TlsProtocol.GetCurrentPrfHash(Context, mPrepareFinishHash, null); + } + + X509CertificateStructure x509Cert = mPeerCertificate.GetCertificateAt(0); + SubjectPublicKeyInfo keyInfo = x509Cert.SubjectPublicKeyInfo; + AsymmetricKeyParameter publicKey = PublicKeyFactory.CreateKey(keyInfo); + + TlsSigner tlsSigner = TlsUtilities.CreateTlsSigner((byte)mClientCertificateType); + tlsSigner.Init(Context); + if (!tlsSigner.VerifyRawSignature(clientCertificateVerify.Algorithm, + clientCertificateVerify.Signature, publicKey, certificateVerifyHash)) + { + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decrypt_error); + } + } + catch (Exception e) + { + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decrypt_error, e); + } + } + + protected virtual void ReceiveClientHelloMessage(MemoryStream buf) + { + ProtocolVersion client_version = TlsUtilities.ReadVersion(buf); + if (client_version.IsDtls) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter); + + byte[] client_random = TlsUtilities.ReadFully(32, buf); + + /* + * TODO RFC 5077 3.4. If a ticket is presented by the client, the server MUST NOT attempt to + * use the Session ID in the ClientHello for stateful session resumption. + */ + byte[] sessionID = TlsUtilities.ReadOpaque8(buf); + if (sessionID.Length > 32) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter); + + /* + * TODO RFC 5246 7.4.1.2. If the session_id field is not empty (implying a session + * resumption request), this vector MUST include at least the cipher_suite from that + * session. + */ + int cipher_suites_length = TlsUtilities.ReadUint16(buf); + if (cipher_suites_length < 2 || (cipher_suites_length & 1) != 0) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decode_error); + + this.mOfferedCipherSuites = TlsUtilities.ReadUint16Array(cipher_suites_length / 2, buf); + + /* + * TODO RFC 5246 7.4.1.2. If the session_id field is not empty (implying a session + * resumption request), it MUST include the compression_method from that session. + */ + int compression_methods_length = TlsUtilities.ReadUint8(buf); + if (compression_methods_length < 1) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter); + + this.mOfferedCompressionMethods = TlsUtilities.ReadUint8Array(compression_methods_length, buf); + + /* + * TODO RFC 3546 2.3 If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore + * extensions appearing in the client hello, and Send a server hello containing no + * extensions. + */ + this.mClientExtensions = ReadExtensions(buf); + + ContextAdmin.SetClientVersion(client_version); + + mTlsServer.NotifyClientVersion(client_version); + + mSecurityParameters.clientRandom = client_random; + + mTlsServer.NotifyOfferedCipherSuites(mOfferedCipherSuites); + mTlsServer.NotifyOfferedCompressionMethods(mOfferedCompressionMethods); + + /* + * RFC 5746 3.6. Server Behavior: Initial Handshake + */ + { + /* + * RFC 5746 3.4. The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info" extension, + * or the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV signaling cipher suite value in the + * ClientHello. Including both is NOT RECOMMENDED. + */ + + /* + * When a ClientHello is received, the server MUST check if it includes the + * TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV. If it does, set the secure_renegotiation flag + * to TRUE. + */ + if (Arrays.Contains(mOfferedCipherSuites, CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)) + { + this.mSecureRenegotiation = true; + } + + /* + * The server MUST check if the "renegotiation_info" extension is included in the + * ClientHello. + */ + byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtilities.GetExtensionData(mClientExtensions, ExtensionType.renegotiation_info); + if (renegExtData != null) + { + /* + * If the extension is present, set secure_renegotiation flag to TRUE. The + * server MUST then verify that the length of the "renegotiated_connection" + * field is zero, and if it is not, MUST abort the handshake. + */ + this.mSecureRenegotiation = true; + + if (!Arrays.ConstantTimeAreEqual(renegExtData, CreateRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes))) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure); + } + } + + mTlsServer.NotifySecureRenegotiation(this.mSecureRenegotiation); + + if (mClientExtensions != null) + { + mTlsServer.ProcessClientExtensions(mClientExtensions); + } + } + + protected virtual void ReceiveClientKeyExchangeMessage(MemoryStream buf) + { + mKeyExchange.ProcessClientKeyExchange(buf); + + AssertEmpty(buf); + + EstablishMasterSecret(Context, mKeyExchange); + mRecordStream.SetPendingConnectionState(Peer.GetCompression(), Peer.GetCipher()); + + this.mPrepareFinishHash = mRecordStream.PrepareToFinish(); + + if (!mExpectSessionTicket) + { + SendChangeCipherSpecMessage(); + } + } + + protected virtual void SendCertificateRequestMessage(CertificateRequest certificateRequest) + { + HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.certificate_request); + + certificateRequest.Encode(message); + + message.WriteToRecordStream(this); + } + + protected virtual void SendCertificateStatusMessage(CertificateStatus certificateStatus) + { + HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.certificate_status); + + certificateStatus.Encode(message); + + message.WriteToRecordStream(this); + } + + protected virtual void SendNewSessionTicketMessage(NewSessionTicket newSessionTicket) + { + if (newSessionTicket == null) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error); + + HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.session_ticket); + + newSessionTicket.Encode(message); + + message.WriteToRecordStream(this); + } + + protected virtual void SendServerHelloMessage() + { + HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.server_hello); + + ProtocolVersion server_version = mTlsServer.GetServerVersion(); + if (!server_version.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(Context.ClientVersion)) + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error); + + mRecordStream.ReadVersion = server_version; + mRecordStream.SetWriteVersion(server_version); + mRecordStream.SetRestrictReadVersion(true); + ContextAdmin.SetServerVersion(server_version); + + TlsUtilities.WriteVersion(server_version, message); + + message.Write(this.mSecurityParameters.serverRandom); + + /* + * The server may return an empty session_id to indicate that the session will not be cached + * and therefore cannot be resumed. + */ + TlsUtilities.WriteOpaque8(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes, message); + + int selectedCipherSuite = mTlsServer.GetSelectedCipherSuite(); + if (!Arrays.Contains(mOfferedCipherSuites, selectedCipherSuite) + || selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL + || selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + || !TlsUtilities.IsValidCipherSuiteForVersion(selectedCipherSuite, server_version)) + { + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error); + } + mSecurityParameters.cipherSuite = selectedCipherSuite; + + byte selectedCompressionMethod = mTlsServer.GetSelectedCompressionMethod(); + if (!Arrays.Contains(mOfferedCompressionMethods, selectedCompressionMethod)) + { + throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error); + } + mSecurityParameters.compressionAlgorithm = selectedCompressionMethod; + + TlsUtilities.WriteUint16(selectedCipherSuite, message); + TlsUtilities.WriteUint8(selectedCompressionMethod, message); + + this.mServerExtensions = mTlsServer.GetServerExtensions(); + + /* + * RFC 5746 3.6. Server Behavior: Initial Handshake + */ + if (this.mSecureRenegotiation) + { + byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtilities.GetExtensionData(this.mServerExtensions, ExtensionType.renegotiation_info); + bool noRenegExt = (null == renegExtData); + + if (noRenegExt) + { + /* + * Note that Sending a "renegotiation_info" extension in response to a ClientHello + * containing only the SCSV is an explicit exception to the prohibition in RFC 5246, + * Section 7.4.1.4, on the server Sending unsolicited extensions and is only allowed + * because the client is signaling its willingness to receive the extension via the + * TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV. + */ + + /* + * If the secure_renegotiation flag is set to TRUE, the server MUST include an empty + * "renegotiation_info" extension in the ServerHello message. + */ + this.mServerExtensions = TlsExtensionsUtilities.EnsureExtensionsInitialised(mServerExtensions); + this.mServerExtensions[ExtensionType.renegotiation_info] = CreateRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtilities.EmptyBytes); + } + } + + /* + * TODO RFC 3546 2.3 If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore + * extensions appearing in the client hello, and Send a server hello containing no + * extensions. + */ + + if (this.mServerExtensions != null) + { + this.mSecurityParameters.encryptThenMac = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasEncryptThenMacExtension(mServerExtensions); + + this.mSecurityParameters.maxFragmentLength = ProcessMaxFragmentLengthExtension(mClientExtensions, + mServerExtensions, AlertDescription.internal_error); + + this.mSecurityParameters.truncatedHMac = TlsExtensionsUtilities.HasTruncatedHMacExtension(mServerExtensions); + + /* + * TODO It's surprising that there's no provision to allow a 'fresh' CertificateStatus to be sent in + * a session resumption handshake. + */ + this.mAllowCertificateStatus = !mResumedSession + && TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(mServerExtensions, ExtensionType.status_request, + AlertDescription.internal_error); + + this.mExpectSessionTicket = !mResumedSession + && TlsUtilities.HasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(mServerExtensions, ExtensionType.session_ticket, + AlertDescription.internal_error); + + WriteExtensions(message, this.mServerExtensions); + } + + if (mSecurityParameters.maxFragmentLength >= 0) + { + int plainTextLimit = 1 << (8 + mSecurityParameters.maxFragmentLength); + mRecordStream.SetPlaintextLimit(plainTextLimit); + } + + mSecurityParameters.prfAlgorithm = GetPrfAlgorithm(Context, mSecurityParameters.CipherSuite); + + /* + * RFC 5264 7.4.9. Any cipher suite which does not explicitly specify verify_data_length has + * a verify_data_length equal to 12. This includes all existing cipher suites. + */ + mSecurityParameters.verifyDataLength = 12; + + message.WriteToRecordStream(this); + + this.mRecordStream.NotifyHelloComplete(); + } + + protected virtual void SendServerHelloDoneMessage() + { + byte[] message = new byte[4]; + TlsUtilities.WriteUint8(HandshakeType.server_hello_done, message, 0); + TlsUtilities.WriteUint24(0, message, 1); + + WriteHandshakeMessage(message, 0, message.Length); + } + + protected virtual void SendServerKeyExchangeMessage(byte[] serverKeyExchange) + { + HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.server_key_exchange, serverKeyExchange.Length); + + message.Write(serverKeyExchange); + + message.WriteToRecordStream(this); + } + + protected virtual bool ExpectCertificateVerifyMessage() + { + return mClientCertificateType >= 0 && TlsUtilities.HasSigningCapability((byte)mClientCertificateType); + } + } +} |