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#
# This file is licensed under the Affero General Public License (AGPL) version 3.
#
# Copyright (C) 2023 New Vector, Ltd
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
# published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
# License, or (at your option) any later version.
#
# See the GNU Affero General Public License for more details:
# <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.html>.
#
# Originally licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0:
# <http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0>.
#
# [This file includes modifications made by New Vector Limited]
#
#
import logging
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, List, Optional
from urllib.parse import urlencode
from authlib.oauth2 import ClientAuth
from authlib.oauth2.auth import encode_client_secret_basic, encode_client_secret_post
from authlib.oauth2.rfc7523 import ClientSecretJWT, PrivateKeyJWT, private_key_jwt_sign
from authlib.oauth2.rfc7662 import IntrospectionToken
from authlib.oidc.discovery import OpenIDProviderMetadata, get_well_known_url
from prometheus_client import Histogram
from twisted.web.client import readBody
from twisted.web.http_headers import Headers
from synapse.api.auth.base import BaseAuth
from synapse.api.errors import (
AuthError,
HttpResponseException,
InvalidClientTokenError,
OAuthInsufficientScopeError,
StoreError,
SynapseError,
)
from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest
from synapse.logging.context import make_deferred_yieldable
from synapse.types import Requester, UserID, create_requester
from synapse.util import json_decoder
from synapse.util.caches.cached_call import RetryOnExceptionCachedCall
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from synapse.server import HomeServer
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
introspection_response_timer = Histogram(
"synapse_api_auth_delegated_introspection_response",
"Time taken to get a response for an introspection request",
["code"],
)
# Scope as defined by MSC2967
# https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/2967
SCOPE_MATRIX_API = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:api:*"
SCOPE_MATRIX_GUEST = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:api:guest"
SCOPE_MATRIX_DEVICE_PREFIX = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:device:"
# Scope which allows access to the Synapse admin API
SCOPE_SYNAPSE_ADMIN = "urn:synapse:admin:*"
def scope_to_list(scope: str) -> List[str]:
"""Convert a scope string to a list of scope tokens"""
return scope.strip().split(" ")
class PrivateKeyJWTWithKid(PrivateKeyJWT): # type: ignore[misc]
"""An implementation of the private_key_jwt client auth method that includes a kid header.
This is needed because some providers (Keycloak) require the kid header to figure
out which key to use to verify the signature.
"""
def sign(self, auth: Any, token_endpoint: str) -> bytes:
return private_key_jwt_sign(
auth.client_secret,
client_id=auth.client_id,
token_endpoint=token_endpoint,
claims=self.claims,
header={"kid": auth.client_secret["kid"]},
)
class MSC3861DelegatedAuth(BaseAuth):
AUTH_METHODS = {
"client_secret_post": encode_client_secret_post,
"client_secret_basic": encode_client_secret_basic,
"client_secret_jwt": ClientSecretJWT(),
"private_key_jwt": PrivateKeyJWTWithKid(),
}
EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER = "oauth-delegated"
def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"):
super().__init__(hs)
self._config = hs.config.experimental.msc3861
auth_method = MSC3861DelegatedAuth.AUTH_METHODS.get(
self._config.client_auth_method.value, None
)
# Those assertions are already checked when parsing the config
assert self._config.enabled, "OAuth delegation is not enabled"
assert self._config.issuer, "No issuer provided"
assert self._config.client_id, "No client_id provided"
assert auth_method is not None, "Invalid client_auth_method provided"
self._clock = hs.get_clock()
self._http_client = hs.get_proxied_http_client()
self._hostname = hs.hostname
self._admin_token = self._config.admin_token
self._issuer_metadata = RetryOnExceptionCachedCall(self._load_metadata)
if isinstance(auth_method, PrivateKeyJWTWithKid):
# Use the JWK as the client secret when using the private_key_jwt method
assert self._config.jwk, "No JWK provided"
self._client_auth = ClientAuth(
self._config.client_id, self._config.jwk, auth_method
)
else:
# Else use the client secret
assert self._config.client_secret, "No client_secret provided"
self._client_auth = ClientAuth(
self._config.client_id, self._config.client_secret, auth_method
)
async def _load_metadata(self) -> OpenIDProviderMetadata:
if self._config.issuer_metadata is not None:
return OpenIDProviderMetadata(**self._config.issuer_metadata)
url = get_well_known_url(self._config.issuer, external=True)
response = await self._http_client.get_json(url)
metadata = OpenIDProviderMetadata(**response)
# metadata.validate_introspection_endpoint()
return metadata
async def _introspect_token(self, token: str) -> IntrospectionToken:
"""
Send a token to the introspection endpoint and returns the introspection response
Parameters:
token: The token to introspect
Raises:
HttpResponseException: If the introspection endpoint returns a non-2xx response
ValueError: If the introspection endpoint returns an invalid JSON response
JSONDecodeError: If the introspection endpoint returns a non-JSON response
Exception: If the HTTP request fails
Returns:
The introspection response
"""
metadata = await self._issuer_metadata.get()
introspection_endpoint = metadata.get("introspection_endpoint")
raw_headers: Dict[str, str] = {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
"User-Agent": str(self._http_client.user_agent, "utf-8"),
"Accept": "application/json",
}
args = {"token": token, "token_type_hint": "access_token"}
body = urlencode(args, True)
# Fill the body/headers with credentials
uri, raw_headers, body = self._client_auth.prepare(
method="POST", uri=introspection_endpoint, headers=raw_headers, body=body
)
headers = Headers({k: [v] for (k, v) in raw_headers.items()})
# Do the actual request
# We're not using the SimpleHttpClient util methods as we don't want to
# check the HTTP status code, and we do the body encoding ourselves.
start_time = self._clock.time()
try:
response = await self._http_client.request(
method="POST",
uri=uri,
data=body.encode("utf-8"),
headers=headers,
)
resp_body = await make_deferred_yieldable(readBody(response))
except Exception:
end_time = self._clock.time()
introspection_response_timer.labels("ERR").observe(end_time - start_time)
raise
end_time = self._clock.time()
introspection_response_timer.labels(response.code).observe(
end_time - start_time
)
if response.code < 200 or response.code >= 300:
raise HttpResponseException(
response.code,
response.phrase.decode("ascii", errors="replace"),
resp_body,
)
resp = json_decoder.decode(resp_body.decode("utf-8"))
if not isinstance(resp, dict):
raise ValueError(
"The introspection endpoint returned an invalid JSON response."
)
return IntrospectionToken(**resp)
async def is_server_admin(self, requester: Requester) -> bool:
return "urn:synapse:admin:*" in requester.scope
async def get_user_by_req(
self,
request: SynapseRequest,
allow_guest: bool = False,
allow_expired: bool = False,
allow_locked: bool = False,
) -> Requester:
access_token = self.get_access_token_from_request(request)
requester = await self.get_appservice_user(request, access_token)
if not requester:
# TODO: we probably want to assert the allow_guest inside this call
# so that we don't provision the user if they don't have enough permission:
requester = await self.get_user_by_access_token(access_token, allow_expired)
if not allow_guest and requester.is_guest:
raise OAuthInsufficientScopeError([SCOPE_MATRIX_API])
request.requester = requester
return requester
async def get_user_by_access_token(
self,
token: str,
allow_expired: bool = False,
) -> Requester:
if self._admin_token is not None and token == self._admin_token:
# XXX: This is a temporary solution so that the admin API can be called by
# the OIDC provider. This will be removed once we have OIDC client
# credentials grant support in matrix-authentication-service.
logging.info("Admin toked used")
# XXX: that user doesn't exist and won't be provisioned.
# This is mostly fine for admin calls, but we should also think about doing
# requesters without a user_id.
admin_user = UserID("__oidc_admin", self._hostname)
return create_requester(
user_id=admin_user,
scope=["urn:synapse:admin:*"],
)
try:
introspection_result = await self._introspect_token(token)
except Exception:
logger.exception("Failed to introspect token")
raise SynapseError(503, "Unable to introspect the access token")
logger.info(f"Introspection result: {introspection_result!r}")
# TODO: introspection verification should be more extensive, especially:
# - verify the audience
if not introspection_result.get("active"):
raise InvalidClientTokenError("Token is not active")
# Let's look at the scope
scope: List[str] = scope_to_list(introspection_result.get("scope", ""))
# Determine type of user based on presence of particular scopes
has_user_scope = SCOPE_MATRIX_API in scope
has_guest_scope = SCOPE_MATRIX_GUEST in scope
if not has_user_scope and not has_guest_scope:
raise InvalidClientTokenError("No scope in token granting user rights")
# Match via the sub claim
sub: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("sub")
if sub is None:
raise InvalidClientTokenError(
"Invalid sub claim in the introspection result"
)
user_id_str = await self.store.get_user_by_external_id(
MSC3861DelegatedAuth.EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER, sub
)
if user_id_str is None:
# If we could not find a user via the external_id, it either does not exist,
# or the external_id was never recorded
# TODO: claim mapping should be configurable
username: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("username")
if username is None or not isinstance(username, str):
raise AuthError(
500,
"Invalid username claim in the introspection result",
)
user_id = UserID(username, self._hostname)
# First try to find a user from the username claim
user_info = await self.store.get_user_by_id(user_id=user_id.to_string())
if user_info is None:
# If the user does not exist, we should create it on the fly
# TODO: we could use SCIM to provision users ahead of time and listen
# for SCIM SET events if those ever become standard:
# https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hunt-scim-notify-00
# TODO: claim mapping should be configurable
# If present, use the name claim as the displayname
name: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("name")
await self.store.register_user(
user_id=user_id.to_string(), create_profile_with_displayname=name
)
# And record the sub as external_id
await self.store.record_user_external_id(
MSC3861DelegatedAuth.EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER, sub, user_id.to_string()
)
else:
user_id = UserID.from_string(user_id_str)
# Find device_ids in scope
# We only allow a single device_id in the scope, so we find them all in the
# scope list, and raise if there are more than one. The OIDC server should be
# the one enforcing valid scopes, so we raise a 500 if we find an invalid scope.
device_ids = [
tok[len(SCOPE_MATRIX_DEVICE_PREFIX) :]
for tok in scope
if tok.startswith(SCOPE_MATRIX_DEVICE_PREFIX)
]
if len(device_ids) > 1:
raise AuthError(
500,
"Multiple device IDs in scope",
)
device_id = device_ids[0] if device_ids else None
if device_id is not None:
# Sanity check the device_id
if len(device_id) > 255 or len(device_id) < 1:
raise AuthError(
500,
"Invalid device ID in scope",
)
# Create the device on the fly if it does not exist
try:
await self.store.get_device(
user_id=user_id.to_string(), device_id=device_id
)
except StoreError:
await self.store.store_device(
user_id=user_id.to_string(),
device_id=device_id,
initial_device_display_name="OIDC-native client",
)
# TODO: there is a few things missing in the requester here, which still need
# to be figured out, like:
# - impersonation, with the `authenticated_entity`, which is used for
# rate-limiting, MAU limits, etc.
# - shadow-banning, with the `shadow_banned` flag
# - a proper solution for appservices, which still needs to be figured out in
# the context of MSC3861
return create_requester(
user_id=user_id,
device_id=device_id,
scope=scope,
is_guest=(has_guest_scope and not has_user_scope),
)
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