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-rw-r--r--synapse/config/key.py27
-rw-r--r--synapse/crypto/keyring.py7
-rw-r--r--synapse/storage/keys.py8
3 files changed, 31 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/config/key.py b/synapse/config/key.py
index aba7092ccd..424875feae 100644
--- a/synapse/config/key.py
+++ b/synapse/config/key.py
@@ -41,6 +41,15 @@ validation or TLS certificate validation. This is likely to be very insecure. If
 you are *sure* you want to do this, set 'accept_keys_insecurely' on the
 keyserver configuration."""
 
+RELYING_ON_MATRIX_KEY_ERROR = """\
+Your server is configured to accept key server responses without TLS certificate
+validation, and which are only signed by the old (possibly compromised)
+matrix.org signing key 'ed25519:auto'. This likely isn't what you want to do,
+and you should enable 'federation_verify_certificates' in your configuration.
+
+If you are *sure* you want to do this, set 'accept_keys_insecurely' on the
+trusted_key_server configuration."""
+
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -340,10 +349,20 @@ def _parse_key_servers(key_servers, federation_verify_certificates):
                 result.verify_keys[key_id] = verify_key
 
         if (
-            not verify_keys
-            and not server.get("accept_keys_insecurely")
-            and not federation_verify_certificates
+            not federation_verify_certificates and
+            not server.get("accept_keys_insecurely")
         ):
-            raise ConfigError(INSECURE_NOTARY_ERROR)
+            _assert_keyserver_has_verify_keys(result)
 
         yield result
+
+
+def _assert_keyserver_has_verify_keys(trusted_key_server):
+    if not trusted_key_server.verify_keys:
+        raise ConfigError(INSECURE_NOTARY_ERROR)
+
+    # also check that they are not blindly checking the old matrix.org key
+    if trusted_key_server.server_name == "matrix.org" and any(
+        key_id == "ed25519:auto" for key_id in trusted_key_server.verify_keys
+    ):
+        raise ConfigError(RELYING_ON_MATRIX_KEY_ERROR)
diff --git a/synapse/crypto/keyring.py b/synapse/crypto/keyring.py
index 96964b0d50..6f603f1961 100644
--- a/synapse/crypto/keyring.py
+++ b/synapse/crypto/keyring.py
@@ -750,13 +750,6 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
                 verify_signed_json(response, perspective_name, perspective_keys[key_id])
                 verified = True
 
-                if perspective_name == "matrix.org" and key_id == "ed25519:auto":
-                    logger.warning(
-                        "Trusting trusted_key_server responses signed by the "
-                        "compromised matrix.org signing key 'ed25519:auto'. "
-                        "This is a placebo."
-                    )
-
         if not verified:
             raise KeyLookupError(
                 "Response not signed with a known key: signed with: %r, known keys: %r"
diff --git a/synapse/storage/keys.py b/synapse/storage/keys.py
index 5300720dbb..e3655ad8d7 100644
--- a/synapse/storage/keys.py
+++ b/synapse/storage/keys.py
@@ -80,6 +80,14 @@ class KeyStore(SQLBaseStore):
 
             for row in txn:
                 server_name, key_id, key_bytes, ts_valid_until_ms = row
+
+                if ts_valid_until_ms is None:
+                    # Old keys may be stored with a ts_valid_until_ms of null,
+                    # in which case we treat this as if it was set to `0`, i.e.
+                    # it won't match key requests that define a minimum
+                    # `ts_valid_until_ms`.
+                    ts_valid_until_ms = 0
+
                 res = FetchKeyResult(
                     verify_key=decode_verify_key_bytes(key_id, bytes(key_bytes)),
                     valid_until_ts=ts_valid_until_ms,