diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'synapse/handlers/auth.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | synapse/handlers/auth.py | 892 |
1 files changed, 491 insertions, 401 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/auth.py b/synapse/handlers/auth.py index 374372b69e..119678e67b 100644 --- a/synapse/handlers/auth.py +++ b/synapse/handlers/auth.py @@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ import logging import time import unicodedata +import urllib.parse +from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple, Union import attr -import bcrypt +import bcrypt # type: ignore[import] import pymacaroons -from canonicaljson import json - -from twisted.internet import defer -from twisted.web.client import PartialDownloadError import synapse.util.stringutils as stringutils from synapse.api.constants import LoginType @@ -38,11 +36,15 @@ from synapse.api.errors import ( UserDeactivatedError, ) from synapse.api.ratelimiting import Ratelimiter -from synapse.config.emailconfig import ThreepidBehaviour +from synapse.handlers.ui_auth import INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS +from synapse.handlers.ui_auth.checkers import UserInteractiveAuthChecker +from synapse.http.server import finish_request +from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest from synapse.logging.context import defer_to_thread +from synapse.metrics.background_process_metrics import run_as_background_process from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi -from synapse.types import UserID -from synapse.util.caches.expiringcache import ExpiringCache +from synapse.push.mailer import load_jinja2_templates +from synapse.types import Requester, UserID from ._base import BaseHandler @@ -58,23 +60,14 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): """ super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs) - self.checkers = { - LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._check_recaptcha, - LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY: self._check_email_identity, - LoginType.MSISDN: self._check_msisdn, - LoginType.DUMMY: self._check_dummy_auth, - LoginType.TERMS: self._check_terms_auth, - } - self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds - # This is not a cache per se, but a store of all current sessions that - # expire after N hours - self.sessions = ExpiringCache( - cache_name="register_sessions", - clock=hs.get_clock(), - expiry_ms=self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS, - reset_expiry_on_get=True, - ) + self.checkers = {} # type: Dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker] + for auth_checker_class in INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS: + inst = auth_checker_class(hs) + if inst.is_enabled(): + self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst # type: ignore + + self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds account_handler = ModuleApi(hs, self) self.password_providers = [ @@ -87,6 +80,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later? self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator() self._password_enabled = hs.config.password_enabled + self._sso_enabled = ( + hs.config.cas_enabled or hs.config.saml2_enabled or hs.config.oidc_enabled + ) # we keep this as a list despite the O(N^2) implication so that we can # keep PASSWORD first and avoid confusing clients which pick the first @@ -102,14 +98,70 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if t not in login_types: login_types.append(t) self._supported_login_types = login_types - - self._account_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter() - self._failed_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter() + # Login types and UI Auth types have a heavy overlap, but are not + # necessarily identical. Login types have SSO (and other login types) + # added in the rest layer, see synapse.rest.client.v1.login.LoginRestServerlet.on_GET. + ui_auth_types = login_types.copy() + if self._sso_enabled: + ui_auth_types.append(LoginType.SSO) + self._supported_ui_auth_types = ui_auth_types + + # Ratelimiter for failed auth during UIA. Uses same ratelimit config + # as per `rc_login.failed_attempts`. + self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter( + clock=self.clock, + rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second, + burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count, + ) self._clock = self.hs.get_clock() - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def validate_user_via_ui_auth(self, requester, request_body, clientip): + # Expire old UI auth sessions after a period of time. + if hs.config.worker_app is None: + self._clock.looping_call( + run_as_background_process, + 5 * 60 * 1000, + "expire_old_sessions", + self._expire_old_sessions, + ) + + # Load the SSO HTML templates. + + # The following template is shown to the user during a client login via SSO, + # after the SSO completes and before redirecting them back to their client. + # It notifies the user they are about to give access to their matrix account + # to the client. + self._sso_redirect_confirm_template = load_jinja2_templates( + hs.config.sso_template_dir, ["sso_redirect_confirm.html"], + )[0] + # The following template is shown during user interactive authentication + # in the fallback auth scenario. It notifies the user that they are + # authenticating for an operation to occur on their account. + self._sso_auth_confirm_template = load_jinja2_templates( + hs.config.sso_template_dir, ["sso_auth_confirm.html"], + )[0] + # The following template is shown after a successful user interactive + # authentication session. It tells the user they can close the window. + self._sso_auth_success_template = hs.config.sso_auth_success_template + # The following template is shown during the SSO authentication process if + # the account is deactivated. + self._sso_account_deactivated_template = ( + hs.config.sso_account_deactivated_template + ) + + self._server_name = hs.config.server_name + + # cast to tuple for use with str.startswith + self._whitelisted_sso_clients = tuple(hs.config.sso_client_whitelist) + + async def validate_user_via_ui_auth( + self, + requester: Requester, + request: SynapseRequest, + request_body: Dict[str, Any], + clientip: str, + description: str, + ) -> dict: """ Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth. @@ -118,14 +170,19 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them. Args: - requester (Requester): The user, as given by the access token + requester: The user, as given by the access token + + request: The request sent by the client. - request_body (dict): The body of the request sent by the client + request_body: The body of the request sent by the client - clientip (str): The IP address of the client. + clientip: The IP address of the client. + + description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that + describes the operation happening on their account. Returns: - defer.Deferred[dict]: the parameters for this request (which may + The parameters for this request (which may have been given only in a previous call). Raises: @@ -134,15 +191,31 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): AuthError if the client has completed a login flow, and it gives a different user to `requester` + + LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's failed request count for this + user is too high to proceed + """ + user_id = requester.user.to_string() + + # Check if we should be ratelimited due to too many previous failed attempts + self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(user_id, update=False) + # build a list of supported flows - flows = [[login_type] for login_type in self._supported_login_types] + flows = [[login_type] for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types] - result, params, _ = yield self.check_auth(flows, request_body, clientip) + try: + result, params, _ = await self.check_auth( + flows, request, request_body, clientip, description + ) + except LoginError: + # Update the ratelimiter to say we failed (`can_do_action` doesn't raise). + self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(user_id) + raise # find the completed login type - for login_type in self._supported_login_types: + for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types: if login_type not in result: continue @@ -158,34 +231,48 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): return params - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def check_auth(self, flows, clientdict, clientip): + def get_enabled_auth_types(self): + """Return the enabled user-interactive authentication types + + Returns the UI-Auth types which are supported by the homeserver's current + config. + """ + return self.checkers.keys() + + async def check_auth( + self, + flows: List[List[str]], + request: SynapseRequest, + clientdict: Dict[str, Any], + clientip: str, + description: str, + ) -> Tuple[dict, dict, str]: """ Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow. - As a side effect, this function fills in the 'creds' key on the user's - session with a map, which maps each auth-type (str) to the relevant - identity authenticated by that auth-type (mostly str, but for captcha, bool). - If no auth flows have been completed successfully, raises an InteractiveAuthIncompleteError. To handle this, you can use synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha._base.interactive_auth_handler as a decorator. Args: - flows (list): A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of - strings representing auth-types. At least one full - flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful. + flows: A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of + strings representing auth-types. At least one full + flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful. + + request: The request sent by the client. clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the 'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent. - clientip (str): The IP address of the client. + clientip: The IP address of the client. + + description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that + describes the operation happening on their account. Returns: - defer.Deferred[dict, dict, str]: a deferred tuple of - (creds, params, session_id). + A tuple of (creds, params, session_id). 'creds' contains the authenticated credentials of each stage. @@ -201,47 +288,93 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): """ authdict = None - sid = None + sid = None # type: Optional[str] if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict: authdict = clientdict["auth"] del clientdict["auth"] if "session" in authdict: sid = authdict["session"] - session = self._get_session_info(sid) - if len(clientdict) > 0: + # Convert the URI and method to strings. + uri = request.uri.decode("utf-8") + method = request.uri.decode("utf-8") + + # If there's no session ID, create a new session. + if not sid: + session = await self.store.create_ui_auth_session( + clientdict, uri, method, description + ) + + else: + try: + session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(sid) + except StoreError: + raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (sid,)) + + # If the client provides parameters, update what is persisted, + # otherwise use whatever was last provided. + # # This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters # and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split # auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you # could continue registration from your phone having clicked the # email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse # because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects - # on a home server. - # Revisit: Assumimg the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data - # isn't arbintrary. - session["clientdict"] = clientdict - self._save_session(session) - elif "clientdict" in session: - clientdict = session["clientdict"] + # on a homeserver. + # + # Revisit: Assuming the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data + # isn't arbitrary. + # + # Note that the registration endpoint explicitly removes the + # "initial_device_display_name" parameter if it is provided + # without a "password" parameter. See the changes to + # synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha.register.RegisterRestServlet.on_POST + # in commit 544722bad23fc31056b9240189c3cbbbf0ffd3f9. + if not clientdict: + clientdict = session.clientdict + + # Ensure that the queried operation does not vary between stages of + # the UI authentication session. This is done by generating a stable + # comparator and storing it during the initial query. Subsequent + # queries ensure that this comparator has not changed. + # + # The comparator is based on the requested URI and HTTP method. The + # client dict (minus the auth dict) should also be checked, but some + # clients are not spec compliant, just warn for now if the client + # dict changes. + if (session.uri, session.method) != (uri, method): + raise SynapseError( + 403, + "Requested operation has changed during the UI authentication session.", + ) + + if session.clientdict != clientdict: + logger.warning( + "Requested operation has changed during the UI " + "authentication session. A future version of Synapse " + "will remove this capability." + ) + + # For backwards compatibility, changes to the client dict are + # persisted as clients modify them throughout their user interactive + # authentication flow. + await self.store.set_ui_auth_clientdict(sid, clientdict) if not authdict: raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError( - self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session) + self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id) ) - if "creds" not in session: - session["creds"] = {} - creds = session["creds"] - # check auth type currently being presented - errordict = {} + errordict = {} # type: Dict[str, Any] if "type" in authdict: - login_type = authdict["type"] + login_type = authdict["type"] # type: str try: - result = yield self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip) + result = await self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip) if result: - creds[login_type] = result - self._save_session(session) + await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete( + session.session_id, login_type, result + ) except LoginError as e: if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY: # riot used to have a bug where it would request a new @@ -257,6 +390,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): # so that the client can have another go. errordict = e.error_dict() + creds = await self.store.get_completed_ui_auth_stages(session.session_id) for f in flows: if len(set(f) - set(creds)) == 0: # it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can @@ -269,15 +403,17 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): creds, list(clientdict), ) - return creds, clientdict, session["id"] - ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session) + return creds, clientdict, session.session_id + + ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id) ret["completed"] = list(creds) ret.update(errordict) raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(ret) - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def add_oob_auth(self, stagetype, authdict, clientip): + async def add_oob_auth( + self, stagetype: str, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str + ) -> bool: """ Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth. @@ -287,19 +423,15 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if "session" not in authdict: raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM) - sess = self._get_session_info(authdict["session"]) - if "creds" not in sess: - sess["creds"] = {} - creds = sess["creds"] - - result = yield self.checkers[stagetype](authdict, clientip) + result = await self.checkers[stagetype].check_auth(authdict, clientip) if result: - creds[stagetype] = result - self._save_session(sess) + await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete( + authdict["session"], stagetype, result + ) return True return False - def get_session_id(self, clientdict): + def get_session_id(self, clientdict: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]: """ Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary @@ -307,7 +439,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request Returns: - str|None: The string session ID the client sent. If the client did + The string session ID the client sent. If the client did not send a session ID, returns None. """ sid = None @@ -317,43 +449,57 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): sid = authdict["session"] return sid - def set_session_data(self, session_id, key, value): + async def set_session_data(self, session_id: str, key: str, value: Any) -> None: """ Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by the client. Args: - session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth - key (string): The key to store the data under - value (any): The data to store + session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth + key: The key to store the data under + value: The data to store """ - sess = self._get_session_info(session_id) - sess.setdefault("serverdict", {})[key] = value - self._save_session(sess) + try: + await self.store.set_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, value) + except StoreError: + raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,)) - def get_session_data(self, session_id, key, default=None): + async def get_session_data( + self, session_id: str, key: str, default: Optional[Any] = None + ) -> Any: """ Retrieve data stored with set_session_data Args: - session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth - key (string): The key to store the data under - default (any): Value to return if the key has not been set + session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth + key: The key to store the data under + default: Value to return if the key has not been set """ - sess = self._get_session_info(session_id) - return sess.setdefault("serverdict", {}).get(key, default) + try: + return await self.store.get_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, default) + except StoreError: + raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,)) - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def _check_auth_dict(self, authdict, clientip): + async def _expire_old_sessions(self): + """ + Invalidate any user interactive authentication sessions that have expired. + """ + now = self._clock.time_msec() + expiration_time = now - self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS + await self.store.delete_old_ui_auth_sessions(expiration_time) + + async def _check_auth_dict( + self, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str + ) -> Union[Dict[str, Any], str]: """Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client Args: - authdict (object): auth dict provided by the client - clientip (str): IP address of the client + authdict: auth dict provided by the client + clientip: IP address of the client Returns: - Deferred: result of the stage verification. + Result of the stage verification. Raises: StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database @@ -363,7 +509,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): login_type = authdict["type"] checker = self.checkers.get(login_type) if checker is not None: - res = yield checker(authdict, clientip=clientip) + res = await checker.check_auth(authdict, clientip=clientip) return res # build a v1-login-style dict out of the authdict and fall back to the @@ -373,132 +519,13 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if user_id is None: raise SynapseError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM) - (canonical_id, callback) = yield self.validate_login(user_id, authdict) + (canonical_id, callback) = await self.validate_login(user_id, authdict) return canonical_id - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def _check_recaptcha(self, authdict, clientip, **kwargs): - try: - user_response = authdict["response"] - except KeyError: - # Client tried to provide captcha but didn't give the parameter: - # bad request. - raise LoginError( - 400, "Captcha response is required", errcode=Codes.CAPTCHA_NEEDED - ) - - logger.info( - "Submitting recaptcha response %s with remoteip %s", user_response, clientip - ) - - # TODO: get this from the homeserver rather than creating a new one for - # each request - try: - client = self.hs.get_simple_http_client() - resp_body = yield client.post_urlencoded_get_json( - self.hs.config.recaptcha_siteverify_api, - args={ - "secret": self.hs.config.recaptcha_private_key, - "response": user_response, - "remoteip": clientip, - }, - ) - except PartialDownloadError as pde: - # Twisted is silly - data = pde.response - resp_body = json.loads(data) - - if "success" in resp_body: - # Note that we do NOT check the hostname here: we explicitly - # intend the CAPTCHA to be presented by whatever client the - # user is using, we just care that they have completed a CAPTCHA. - logger.info( - "%s reCAPTCHA from hostname %s", - "Successful" if resp_body["success"] else "Failed", - resp_body.get("hostname"), - ) - if resp_body["success"]: - return True - raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED) - - def _check_email_identity(self, authdict, **kwargs): - return self._check_threepid("email", authdict, **kwargs) - - def _check_msisdn(self, authdict, **kwargs): - return self._check_threepid("msisdn", authdict) - - def _check_dummy_auth(self, authdict, **kwargs): - return defer.succeed(True) - - def _check_terms_auth(self, authdict, **kwargs): - return defer.succeed(True) - - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def _check_threepid(self, medium, authdict, **kwargs): - if "threepid_creds" not in authdict: - raise LoginError(400, "Missing threepid_creds", Codes.MISSING_PARAM) - - threepid_creds = authdict["threepid_creds"] - - identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler - - logger.info("Getting validated threepid. threepidcreds: %r", (threepid_creds,)) - if self.hs.config.threepid_behaviour_email == ThreepidBehaviour.REMOTE: - if medium == "email": - threepid = yield identity_handler.threepid_from_creds( - self.hs.config.account_threepid_delegate_email, threepid_creds - ) - elif medium == "msisdn": - threepid = yield identity_handler.threepid_from_creds( - self.hs.config.account_threepid_delegate_msisdn, threepid_creds - ) - else: - raise SynapseError(400, "Unrecognized threepid medium: %s" % (medium,)) - elif self.hs.config.threepid_behaviour_email == ThreepidBehaviour.LOCAL: - row = yield self.store.get_threepid_validation_session( - medium, - threepid_creds["client_secret"], - sid=threepid_creds["sid"], - validated=True, - ) - - threepid = ( - { - "medium": row["medium"], - "address": row["address"], - "validated_at": row["validated_at"], - } - if row - else None - ) - - if row: - # Valid threepid returned, delete from the db - yield self.store.delete_threepid_session(threepid_creds["sid"]) - else: - raise SynapseError( - 400, "Password resets are not enabled on this homeserver" - ) - - if not threepid: - raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED) - - if threepid["medium"] != medium: - raise LoginError( - 401, - "Expecting threepid of type '%s', got '%s'" - % (medium, threepid["medium"]), - errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED, - ) - - threepid["threepid_creds"] = authdict["threepid_creds"] - - return threepid - - def _get_params_recaptcha(self): + def _get_params_recaptcha(self) -> dict: return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key} - def _get_params_terms(self): + def _get_params_terms(self) -> dict: return { "policies": { "privacy_policy": { @@ -515,7 +542,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): } } - def _auth_dict_for_flows(self, flows, session): + def _auth_dict_for_flows( + self, flows: List[List[str]], session_id: str, + ) -> Dict[str, Any]: public_flows = [] for f in flows: public_flows.append(f) @@ -525,7 +554,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms, } - params = {} + params = {} # type: Dict[str, Any] for f in public_flows: for stage in f: @@ -533,25 +562,14 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): params[stage] = get_params[stage]() return { - "session": session["id"], + "session": session_id, "flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows], "params": params, } - def _get_session_info(self, session_id): - if session_id not in self.sessions: - session_id = None - - if not session_id: - # create a new session - while session_id is None or session_id in self.sessions: - session_id = stringutils.random_string(24) - self.sessions[session_id] = {"id": session_id} - - return self.sessions[session_id] - - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def get_access_token_for_user_id(self, user_id, device_id, valid_until_ms): + async def get_access_token_for_user_id( + self, user_id: str, device_id: Optional[str], valid_until_ms: Optional[int] + ): """ Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID. @@ -561,11 +579,11 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already. Args: - user_id (str): canonical User ID - device_id (str|None): the device ID to associate with the tokens. + user_id: canonical User ID + device_id: the device ID to associate with the tokens. None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated: we should always have a device ID) - valid_until_ms (int|None): when the token is valid until. None for + valid_until_ms: when the token is valid until. None for no expiry. Returns: The access token for the user's session. @@ -579,10 +597,10 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): ) logger.info("Logging in user %s on device %s%s", user_id, device_id, fmt_expiry) - yield self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id) + await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id) access_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_access_token(user_id) - yield self.store.add_access_token_to_user( + await self.store.add_access_token_to_user( user_id, access_token, device_id, valid_until_ms ) @@ -592,52 +610,45 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): # device, so we double-check it here. if device_id is not None: try: - yield self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id) + await self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id) except StoreError: - yield self.store.delete_access_token(access_token) + await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token) raise StoreError(400, "Login raced against device deletion") return access_token - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def check_user_exists(self, user_id): + async def check_user_exists(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[str]: """ Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches. Args: - (unicode|bytes) user_id: complete @user:id + user_id: complete @user:id Returns: - defer.Deferred: (unicode) canonical_user_id, or None if zero or - multiple matches - - Raises: - LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's login requests count for this - user is too high too proceed. - UserDeactivatedError if a user is found but is deactivated. + The canonical_user_id, or None if zero or multiple matches """ - self.ratelimit_login_per_account(user_id) - res = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) + res = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) if res is not None: return res[0] return None - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(self, user_id): + async def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash( + self, user_id: str + ) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str]]: """Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact matches. Returns: - tuple: A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)` - None: if there is not exactly one match + A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)` or `None` + if there is not exactly one match """ - user_infos = yield self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id) + user_infos = await self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id) result = None if not user_infos: - logger.warn("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id) + logger.warning("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id) elif len(user_infos) == 1: # a single match (possibly not exact) result = user_infos.popitem() @@ -646,7 +657,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id]) else: # multiple matches, none of them exact - logger.warn( + logger.warning( "Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user " "inexactly: %r", user_id, @@ -654,7 +665,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): ) return result - def get_supported_login_types(self): + def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Iterable[str]: """Get a the login types supported for the /login API By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is @@ -662,30 +673,29 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): other login types. Returns: - Iterable[str]: login types + login types """ return self._supported_login_types - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def validate_login(self, username, login_submission): + async def validate_login( + self, username: str, login_submission: Dict[str, Any] + ) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]: """Authenticates the user for the /login API Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate m.login.password auth types. Args: - username (str): username supplied by the user - login_submission (dict): the whole of the login submission + username: username supplied by the user + login_submission: the whole of the login submission (including 'type' and other relevant fields) Returns: - Deferred[str, func]: canonical user id, and optional callback + A tuple of the canonical user id, and optional callback to be called once the access token and device id are issued Raises: StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database SynapseError if there was a problem with the request LoginError if there was an authentication problem. - LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's login requests count for this - user is too high too proceed. """ if username.startswith("@"): @@ -693,8 +703,6 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): else: qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string() - self.ratelimit_login_per_account(qualified_user_id) - login_type = login_submission.get("type") known_login_type = False @@ -711,7 +719,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "check_password") and login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD: known_login_type = True - is_valid = yield provider.check_password(qualified_user_id, password) + is_valid = await provider.check_password(qualified_user_id, password) if is_valid: return qualified_user_id, None @@ -743,7 +751,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): % (login_type, missing_fields), ) - result = yield provider.check_auth(username, login_type, login_dict) + result = await provider.check_auth(username, login_type, login_dict) if result: if isinstance(result, str): result = (result, None) @@ -752,8 +760,8 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD and self.hs.config.password_localdb_enabled: known_login_type = True - canonical_user_id = yield self._check_local_password( - qualified_user_id, password + canonical_user_id = await self._check_local_password( + qualified_user_id, password # type: ignore ) if canonical_user_id: @@ -762,32 +770,23 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if not known_login_type: raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login type %s" % login_type) - # unknown username or invalid password. - self._failed_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit( - qualified_user_id.lower(), - time_now_s=self._clock.time(), - rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second, - burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count, - update=True, - ) - # We raise a 403 here, but note that if we're doing user-interactive # login, it turns all LoginErrors into a 401 anyway. raise LoginError(403, "Invalid password", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def check_password_provider_3pid(self, medium, address, password): + async def check_password_provider_3pid( + self, medium: str, address: str, password: str + ) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]: """Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login Args: - medium (str): The medium of the 3pid (ex. email). - address (str): The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com). - password (str): The password of the user. + medium: The medium of the 3pid (ex. email). + address: The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com). + password: The password of the user. Returns: - Deferred[(str|None, func|None)]: A tuple of `(user_id, - callback)`. If authentication is successful, `user_id` is a `str` - containing the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is + A tuple of `(user_id, callback)`. If authentication is successful, + `user_id`is the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is then either a function to be later run after the server has completed login/registration, or `None`. If authentication was unsuccessful, `user_id` and `callback` are both `None`. @@ -799,7 +798,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): # success, to a str (which is the user_id) or a tuple of # (user_id, callback_func), where callback_func should be run # after we've finished everything else - result = yield provider.check_3pid_auth(medium, address, password) + result = await provider.check_3pid_auth(medium, address, password) if result: # Check if the return value is a str or a tuple if isinstance(result, str): @@ -809,43 +808,36 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): return None, None - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def _check_local_password(self, user_id, password): + async def _check_local_password(self, user_id: str, password: str) -> Optional[str]: """Authenticate a user against the local password database. user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact matches. Args: - user_id (unicode): complete @user:id - password (unicode): the provided password + user_id: complete @user:id + password: the provided password Returns: - Deferred[unicode] the canonical_user_id, or Deferred[None] if - unknown user/bad password - - Raises: - LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's login requests count for this - user is too high too proceed. + The canonical_user_id, or None if unknown user/bad password """ - lookupres = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) + lookupres = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) if not lookupres: return None (user_id, password_hash) = lookupres # If the password hash is None, the account has likely been deactivated if not password_hash: - deactivated = yield self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(user_id) + deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(user_id) if deactivated: raise UserDeactivatedError("This account has been deactivated") - result = yield self.validate_hash(password, password_hash) + result = await self.validate_hash(password, password_hash) if not result: - logger.warn("Failed password login for user %s", user_id) + logger.warning("Failed password login for user %s", user_id) return None return user_id - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token): + async def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token: str): auth_api = self.hs.get_auth() user_id = None try: @@ -854,27 +846,24 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", user_id) except Exception: raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) - self.ratelimit_login_per_account(user_id) - yield self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id) + + await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id) return user_id - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def delete_access_token(self, access_token): + async def delete_access_token(self, access_token: str): """Invalidate a single access token Args: - access_token (str): access token to be deleted + access_token: access token to be deleted - Returns: - Deferred """ - user_info = yield self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token) - yield self.store.delete_access_token(access_token) + user_info = await self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token) + await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token) # see if any of our auth providers want to know about this for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"): - yield provider.on_logged_out( + await provider.on_logged_out( user_id=str(user_info["user"]), device_id=user_info["device_id"], access_token=access_token, @@ -882,27 +871,26 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): # delete pushers associated with this access token if user_info["token_id"] is not None: - yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token( + await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token( str(user_info["user"]), (user_info["token_id"],) ) - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def delete_access_tokens_for_user( - self, user_id, except_token_id=None, device_id=None + async def delete_access_tokens_for_user( + self, + user_id: str, + except_token_id: Optional[str] = None, + device_id: Optional[str] = None, ): """Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user Args: - user_id (str): ID of user the tokens belong to - except_token_id (str|None): access_token ID which should *not* be - deleted - device_id (str|None): ID of device the tokens are associated with. + user_id: ID of user the tokens belong to + except_token_id: access_token ID which should *not* be deleted + device_id: ID of device the tokens are associated with. If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will be deleted - Returns: - Deferred """ - tokens_and_devices = yield self.store.user_delete_access_tokens( + tokens_and_devices = await self.store.user_delete_access_tokens( user_id, except_token_id=except_token_id, device_id=device_id ) @@ -910,19 +898,28 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"): for token, token_id, device_id in tokens_and_devices: - yield provider.on_logged_out( + await provider.on_logged_out( user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, access_token=token ) # delete pushers associated with the access tokens - yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token( + await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token( user_id, (token_id for _, token_id, _ in tokens_and_devices) ) - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def add_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, validated_at): + async def add_threepid( + self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, validated_at: int + ): + # check if medium has a valid value + if medium not in ["email", "msisdn"]: + raise SynapseError( + code=400, + msg=("'%s' is not a valid value for 'medium'" % (medium,)), + errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM, + ) + # 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case. - # We've now moving towards the Home Server being the entity that + # We've now moving towards the homeserver being the entity that # is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords # on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific # types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing @@ -933,26 +930,26 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if medium == "email": address = address.lower() - yield self.store.user_add_threepid( + await self.store.user_add_threepid( user_id, medium, address, validated_at, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() ) - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def delete_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, id_server=None): + async def delete_threepid( + self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, id_server: Optional[str] = None + ) -> bool: """Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it from the local database. Args: - user_id (str) - medium (str) - address (str) - id_server (str|None): Use the given identity server when unbinding + user_id: ID of user to remove the 3pid from. + medium: The medium of the 3pid being removed: "email" or "msisdn". + address: The 3pid address to remove. + id_server: Use the given identity server when unbinding any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the identity server specified when binding (if known). - Returns: - Deferred[bool]: Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on + Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the unbind API. """ @@ -962,27 +959,21 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): address = address.lower() identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler - result = yield identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid( + result = await identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid( user_id, {"medium": medium, "address": address, "id_server": id_server} ) - yield self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address) + await self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address) return result - def _save_session(self, session): - # TODO: Persistent storage - logger.debug("Saving session %s", session) - session["last_used"] = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() - self.sessions[session["id"]] = session - - def hash(self, password): + async def hash(self, password: str) -> str: """Computes a secure hash of password. Args: - password (unicode): Password to hash. + password: Password to hash. Returns: - Deferred(unicode): Hashed password. + Hashed password. """ def _do_hash(): @@ -994,17 +985,19 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds), ).decode("ascii") - return defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash) + return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash) - def validate_hash(self, password, stored_hash): + async def validate_hash( + self, password: str, stored_hash: Union[bytes, str] + ) -> bool: """Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash. Args: - password (unicode): Password to hash. - stored_hash (bytes): Expected hash value. + password: Password to hash. + stored_hash: Expected hash value. Returns: - Deferred(bool): Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash. + Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash. """ def _do_validate_hash(): @@ -1020,46 +1013,150 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if not isinstance(stored_hash, bytes): stored_hash = stored_hash.encode("ascii") - return defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash) + return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash) else: - return defer.succeed(False) + return False - def ratelimit_login_per_account(self, user_id): - """Checks whether the process must be stopped because of ratelimiting. + async def start_sso_ui_auth(self, redirect_url: str, session_id: str) -> str: + """ + Get the HTML for the SSO redirect confirmation page. + + Args: + redirect_url: The URL to redirect to the SSO provider. + session_id: The user interactive authentication session ID. - Checks against two ratelimiters: the generic one for login attempts per - account and the one specific to failed attempts. + Returns: + The HTML to render. + """ + try: + session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(session_id) + except StoreError: + raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,)) + return self._sso_auth_confirm_template.render( + description=session.description, redirect_url=redirect_url, + ) + + async def complete_sso_ui_auth( + self, registered_user_id: str, session_id: str, request: SynapseRequest, + ): + """Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request Args: - user_id (unicode): complete @user:id + registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for. + request: The request to complete. + client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the + process. + """ + # Mark the stage of the authentication as successful. + # Save the user who authenticated with SSO, this will be used to ensure + # that the account be modified is also the person who logged in. + await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete( + session_id, LoginType.SSO, registered_user_id + ) - Raises: - LimitExceededError if one of the ratelimiters' login requests count - for this user is too high too proceed. + # Render the HTML and return. + html_bytes = self._sso_auth_success_template.encode("utf-8") + request.setResponseCode(200) + request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", b"text/html; charset=utf-8") + request.setHeader(b"Content-Length", b"%d" % (len(html_bytes),)) + + request.write(html_bytes) + finish_request(request) + + async def complete_sso_login( + self, + registered_user_id: str, + request: SynapseRequest, + client_redirect_url: str, + ): + """Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request + + Args: + registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for. + request: The request to complete. + client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the + process. """ - self._failed_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit( - user_id.lower(), - time_now_s=self._clock.time(), - rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second, - burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count, - update=False, + # If the account has been deactivated, do not proceed with the login + # flow. + deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(registered_user_id) + if deactivated: + html_bytes = self._sso_account_deactivated_template.encode("utf-8") + + request.setResponseCode(403) + request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", b"text/html; charset=utf-8") + request.setHeader(b"Content-Length", b"%d" % (len(html_bytes),)) + request.write(html_bytes) + finish_request(request) + return + + self._complete_sso_login(registered_user_id, request, client_redirect_url) + + def _complete_sso_login( + self, + registered_user_id: str, + request: SynapseRequest, + client_redirect_url: str, + ): + """ + The synchronous portion of complete_sso_login. + + This exists purely for backwards compatibility of synapse.module_api.ModuleApi. + """ + # Create a login token + login_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_short_term_login_token( + registered_user_id ) - self._account_ratelimiter.ratelimit( - user_id.lower(), - time_now_s=self._clock.time(), - rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_account.per_second, - burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_account.burst_count, - update=True, + # Append the login token to the original redirect URL (i.e. with its query + # parameters kept intact) to build the URL to which the template needs to + # redirect the users once they have clicked on the confirmation link. + redirect_url = self.add_query_param_to_url( + client_redirect_url, "loginToken", login_token ) + # if the client is whitelisted, we can redirect straight to it + if client_redirect_url.startswith(self._whitelisted_sso_clients): + request.redirect(redirect_url) + finish_request(request) + return + + # Otherwise, serve the redirect confirmation page. + + # Remove the query parameters from the redirect URL to get a shorter version of + # it. This is only to display a human-readable URL in the template, but not the + # URL we redirect users to. + redirect_url_no_params = client_redirect_url.split("?")[0] + + html_bytes = self._sso_redirect_confirm_template.render( + display_url=redirect_url_no_params, + redirect_url=redirect_url, + server_name=self._server_name, + ).encode("utf-8") + + request.setResponseCode(200) + request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", b"text/html; charset=utf-8") + request.setHeader(b"Content-Length", b"%d" % (len(html_bytes),)) + request.write(html_bytes) + finish_request(request) + + @staticmethod + def add_query_param_to_url(url: str, param_name: str, param: Any): + url_parts = list(urllib.parse.urlparse(url)) + query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(url_parts[4])) + query.update({param_name: param}) + url_parts[4] = urllib.parse.urlencode(query) + return urllib.parse.urlunparse(url_parts) + @attr.s class MacaroonGenerator(object): hs = attr.ib() - def generate_access_token(self, user_id, extra_caveats=None): + def generate_access_token( + self, user_id: str, extra_caveats: Optional[List[str]] = None + ) -> str: extra_caveats = extra_caveats or [] macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access") @@ -1072,16 +1169,9 @@ class MacaroonGenerator(object): macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat) return macaroon.serialize() - def generate_short_term_login_token(self, user_id, duration_in_ms=(2 * 60 * 1000)): - """ - - Args: - user_id (unicode): - duration_in_ms (int): - - Returns: - unicode - """ + def generate_short_term_login_token( + self, user_id: str, duration_in_ms: int = (2 * 60 * 1000) + ) -> str: macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login") now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() @@ -1089,12 +1179,12 @@ class MacaroonGenerator(object): macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,)) return macaroon.serialize() - def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id): + def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id: str) -> str: macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher") return macaroon.serialize() - def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id): + def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id: str) -> pymacaroons.Macaroon: macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon( location=self.hs.config.server_name, identifier="key", |