diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'synapse/handlers/auth.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | synapse/handlers/auth.py | 390 |
1 files changed, 272 insertions, 118 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/auth.py b/synapse/handlers/auth.py index 82d458b424..3b146f09d6 100644 --- a/synapse/handlers/auth.py +++ b/synapse/handlers/auth.py @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ from twisted.internet import defer from ._base import BaseHandler from synapse.api.constants import LoginType from synapse.types import UserID -from synapse.api.errors import AuthError, LoginError, Codes +from synapse.api.errors import AuthError, LoginError, Codes, StoreError, SynapseError from synapse.util.async import run_on_reactor from twisted.web.client import PartialDownloadError @@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000 def __init__(self, hs): + """ + Args: + hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): + """ super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs) self.checkers = { LoginType.PASSWORD: self._check_password_auth, @@ -47,7 +51,20 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): } self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds self.sessions = {} - self.INVALID_TOKEN_HTTP_STATUS = 401 + + account_handler = _AccountHandler( + hs, check_user_exists=self.check_user_exists + ) + + self.password_providers = [ + module(config=config, account_handler=account_handler) + for module, config in hs.config.password_providers + ] + + logger.info("Extra password_providers: %r", self.password_providers) + + self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later? + self.device_handler = hs.get_device_handler() @defer.inlineCallbacks def check_auth(self, flows, clientdict, clientip): @@ -118,21 +135,47 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): creds = session['creds'] # check auth type currently being presented + errordict = {} if 'type' in authdict: - if authdict['type'] not in self.checkers: + login_type = authdict['type'] + if login_type not in self.checkers: raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.UNRECOGNIZED) - result = yield self.checkers[authdict['type']](authdict, clientip) - if result: - creds[authdict['type']] = result - self._save_session(session) + try: + result = yield self.checkers[login_type](authdict, clientip) + if result: + creds[login_type] = result + self._save_session(session) + except LoginError, e: + if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY: + # riot used to have a bug where it would request a new + # validation token (thus sending a new email) each time it + # got a 401 with a 'flows' field. + # (https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2447). + # + # Grandfather in the old behaviour for now to avoid + # breaking old riot deployments. + raise e + + # this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response + # so that the client can have another go. + errordict = e.error_dict() for f in flows: if len(set(f) - set(creds.keys())) == 0: - logger.info("Auth completed with creds: %r", creds) + # it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can + # include the password in the case of registering, so only log + # the keys (confusingly, clientdict may contain a password + # param, creds is just what the user authed as for UI auth + # and is not sensitive). + logger.info( + "Auth completed with creds: %r. Client dict has keys: %r", + creds, clientdict.keys() + ) defer.returnValue((True, creds, clientdict, session['id'])) ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session) ret['completed'] = creds.keys() + ret.update(errordict) defer.returnValue((False, ret, clientdict, session['id'])) @defer.inlineCallbacks @@ -163,9 +206,13 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): def get_session_id(self, clientdict): """ Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary - :param clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request - :return: The string session ID the client sent. If the client did not - send a session ID, returns None. + + Args: + clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request + + Returns: + str|None: The string session ID the client sent. If the client did + not send a session ID, returns None. """ sid = None if clientdict and 'auth' in clientdict: @@ -179,9 +226,11 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by the client. - :param session_id: (string) The ID of this session as returned from check_auth - :param key: (string) The key to store the data under - :param value: (any) The data to store + + Args: + session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth + key (string): The key to store the data under + value (any): The data to store """ sess = self._get_session_info(session_id) sess.setdefault('serverdict', {})[key] = value @@ -190,14 +239,15 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): def get_session_data(self, session_id, key, default=None): """ Retrieve data stored with set_session_data - :param session_id: (string) The ID of this session as returned from check_auth - :param key: (string) The key to store the data under - :param default: (any) Value to return if the key has not been set + + Args: + session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth + key (string): The key to store the data under + default (any): Value to return if the key has not been set """ sess = self._get_session_info(session_id) return sess.setdefault('serverdict', {}).get(key, default) - @defer.inlineCallbacks def _check_password_auth(self, authdict, _): if "user" not in authdict or "password" not in authdict: raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM) @@ -207,9 +257,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): if not user_id.startswith('@'): user_id = UserID.create(user_id, self.hs.hostname).to_string() - user_id, password_hash = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) - self._check_password(user_id, password, password_hash) - defer.returnValue(user_id) + return self._check_password(user_id, password) @defer.inlineCallbacks def _check_recaptcha(self, authdict, clientip): @@ -245,8 +293,17 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): data = pde.response resp_body = simplejson.loads(data) - if 'success' in resp_body and resp_body['success']: - defer.returnValue(True) + if 'success' in resp_body: + # Note that we do NOT check the hostname here: we explicitly + # intend the CAPTCHA to be presented by whatever client the + # user is using, we just care that they have completed a CAPTCHA. + logger.info( + "%s reCAPTCHA from hostname %s", + "Successful" if resp_body['success'] else "Failed", + resp_body.get('hostname') + ) + if resp_body['success']: + defer.returnValue(True) raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED) @defer.inlineCallbacks @@ -313,147 +370,205 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): return self.sessions[session_id] - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def login_with_password(self, user_id, password): + def validate_password_login(self, user_id, password): """ Authenticates the user with their username and password. Used only by the v1 login API. Args: - user_id (str): User ID + user_id (str): complete @user:id password (str): Password Returns: - A tuple of: - The user's ID. - The access token for the user's session. - The refresh token for the user's session. + defer.Deferred: (str) canonical user id Raises: - StoreError if there was a problem storing the token. + StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database LoginError if there was an authentication problem. """ - user_id, password_hash = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) - self._check_password(user_id, password, password_hash) - - logger.info("Logging in user %s", user_id) - access_token = yield self.issue_access_token(user_id) - refresh_token = yield self.issue_refresh_token(user_id) - defer.returnValue((user_id, access_token, refresh_token)) + return self._check_password(user_id, password) @defer.inlineCallbacks - def get_login_tuple_for_user_id(self, user_id): + def get_access_token_for_user_id(self, user_id, device_id=None, + initial_display_name=None): """ - Gets login tuple for the user with the given user ID. + Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID. + The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other - machanism (e.g. CAS) + machanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case. + + The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already. Args: - user_id (str): User ID + user_id (str): canonical User ID + device_id (str|None): the device ID to associate with the tokens. + None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated: + we should always have a device ID) + initial_display_name (str): display name to associate with the + device if it needs re-registering Returns: - A tuple of: - The user's ID. The access token for the user's session. - The refresh token for the user's session. Raises: StoreError if there was a problem storing the token. LoginError if there was an authentication problem. """ - user_id, ignored = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) + logger.info("Logging in user %s on device %s", user_id, device_id) + access_token = yield self.issue_access_token(user_id, device_id) + + # the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however, + # it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we + # really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the + # device, so we double-check it here. + if device_id is not None: + yield self.device_handler.check_device_registered( + user_id, device_id, initial_display_name + ) - logger.info("Logging in user %s", user_id) - access_token = yield self.issue_access_token(user_id) - refresh_token = yield self.issue_refresh_token(user_id) - defer.returnValue((user_id, access_token, refresh_token)) + defer.returnValue(access_token) @defer.inlineCallbacks - def does_user_exist(self, user_id): - try: - yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) - defer.returnValue(True) - except LoginError: - defer.returnValue(False) + def check_user_exists(self, user_id): + """ + Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case + insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches. + + Args: + (str) user_id: complete @user:id + + Returns: + defer.Deferred: (str) canonical_user_id, or None if zero or + multiple matches + """ + res = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) + if res is not None: + defer.returnValue(res[0]) + defer.returnValue(None) @defer.inlineCallbacks def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(self, user_id): """Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case - insensitively, but will throw if there are multiple inexact matches. + insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact + matches. Returns: tuple: A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)` + None: if there is not exactly one match """ user_infos = yield self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id) + + result = None if not user_infos: logger.warn("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id) - raise LoginError(403, "", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) - - if len(user_infos) > 1: - if user_id not in user_infos: - logger.warn( - "Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user " - "inexactly: %r", - user_id, user_infos.keys() - ) - raise LoginError(403, "", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) - - defer.returnValue((user_id, user_infos[user_id])) + elif len(user_infos) == 1: + # a single match (possibly not exact) + result = user_infos.popitem() + elif user_id in user_infos: + # multiple matches, but one is exact + result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id]) else: - defer.returnValue(user_infos.popitem()) + # multiple matches, none of them exact + logger.warn( + "Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user " + "inexactly: %r", + user_id, user_infos.keys() + ) + defer.returnValue(result) + + @defer.inlineCallbacks + def _check_password(self, user_id, password): + """Authenticate a user against the LDAP and local databases. - def _check_password(self, user_id, password, stored_hash): - """Checks that user_id has passed password, raises LoginError if not.""" - if not self.validate_hash(password, stored_hash): + user_id is checked case insensitively against the local database, but + will throw if there are multiple inexact matches. + + Args: + user_id (str): complete @user:id + Returns: + (str) the canonical_user_id + Raises: + LoginError if login fails + """ + for provider in self.password_providers: + is_valid = yield provider.check_password(user_id, password) + if is_valid: + defer.returnValue(user_id) + + canonical_user_id = yield self._check_local_password(user_id, password) + + if canonical_user_id: + defer.returnValue(canonical_user_id) + + # unknown username or invalid password. We raise a 403 here, but note + # that if we're doing user-interactive login, it turns all LoginErrors + # into a 401 anyway. + raise LoginError( + 403, "Invalid password", + errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN + ) + + @defer.inlineCallbacks + def _check_local_password(self, user_id, password): + """Authenticate a user against the local password database. + + user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are + multiple inexact matches. + + Args: + user_id (str): complete @user:id + Returns: + (str) the canonical_user_id, or None if unknown user / bad password + """ + lookupres = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) + if not lookupres: + defer.returnValue(None) + (user_id, password_hash) = lookupres + result = self.validate_hash(password, password_hash) + if not result: logger.warn("Failed password login for user %s", user_id) - raise LoginError(403, "", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) + defer.returnValue(None) + defer.returnValue(user_id) @defer.inlineCallbacks - def issue_access_token(self, user_id): + def issue_access_token(self, user_id, device_id=None): access_token = self.generate_access_token(user_id) - yield self.store.add_access_token_to_user(user_id, access_token) + yield self.store.add_access_token_to_user(user_id, access_token, + device_id) defer.returnValue(access_token) - @defer.inlineCallbacks - def issue_refresh_token(self, user_id): - refresh_token = self.generate_refresh_token(user_id) - yield self.store.add_refresh_token_to_user(user_id, refresh_token) - defer.returnValue(refresh_token) - def generate_access_token(self, user_id, extra_caveats=None): extra_caveats = extra_caveats or [] macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access") - now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() - expiry = now + (60 * 60 * 1000) - macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,)) + # Include a nonce, to make sure that each login gets a different + # access token. + macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("nonce = %s" % ( + stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16), + )) for caveat in extra_caveats: macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat) return macaroon.serialize() - def generate_refresh_token(self, user_id): - m = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) - m.add_first_party_caveat("type = refresh") - # Important to add a nonce, because otherwise every refresh token for a - # user will be the same. - m.add_first_party_caveat("nonce = %s" % ( - stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16), - )) - return m.serialize() - - def generate_short_term_login_token(self, user_id): + def generate_short_term_login_token(self, user_id, duration_in_ms=(2 * 60 * 1000)): macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login") now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() - expiry = now + (2 * 60 * 1000) + expiry = now + duration_in_ms macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,)) return macaroon.serialize() + def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id): + macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) + macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher") + return macaroon.serialize() + def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token): + auth_api = self.hs.get_auth() try: macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(login_token) - auth_api = self.hs.get_auth() - auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", True) - return self.get_user_from_macaroon(macaroon) - except (pymacaroons.exceptions.MacaroonException, TypeError, ValueError): - raise AuthError(401, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN) + user_id = auth_api.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon) + auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", True, user_id) + return user_id + except Exception: + raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id): macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon( @@ -464,32 +579,39 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,)) return macaroon - def get_user_from_macaroon(self, macaroon): - user_prefix = "user_id = " - for caveat in macaroon.caveats: - if caveat.caveat_id.startswith(user_prefix): - return caveat.caveat_id[len(user_prefix):] - raise AuthError( - self.INVALID_TOKEN_HTTP_STATUS, "No user_id found in token", - errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN - ) - @defer.inlineCallbacks def set_password(self, user_id, newpassword, requester=None): password_hash = self.hash(newpassword) - except_access_token_ids = [requester.access_token_id] if requester else [] + except_access_token_id = requester.access_token_id if requester else None - yield self.store.user_set_password_hash(user_id, password_hash) + try: + yield self.store.user_set_password_hash(user_id, password_hash) + except StoreError as e: + if e.code == 404: + raise SynapseError(404, "Unknown user", Codes.NOT_FOUND) + raise e yield self.store.user_delete_access_tokens( - user_id, except_access_token_ids + user_id, except_access_token_id ) yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_user( - user_id, except_access_token_ids + user_id, except_access_token_id ) @defer.inlineCallbacks def add_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, validated_at): + # 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case. + # We've now moving towards the Home Server being the entity that + # is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords + # on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific + # types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing + # infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge + # of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking + # for the presenc eof an email address during password reset was + # case sensitive). + if medium == 'email': + address = address.lower() + yield self.store.user_add_threepid( user_id, medium, address, validated_at, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() @@ -520,7 +642,8 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): Returns: Hashed password (str). """ - return bcrypt.hashpw(password, bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds)) + return bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode('utf8') + self.hs.config.password_pepper, + bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds)) def validate_hash(self, password, stored_hash): """Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash. @@ -532,4 +655,35 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): Returns: Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash (bool). """ - return bcrypt.hashpw(password, stored_hash) == stored_hash + if stored_hash: + return bcrypt.hashpw(password + self.hs.config.password_pepper, + stored_hash.encode('utf-8')) == stored_hash + else: + return False + + +class _AccountHandler(object): + """A proxy object that gets passed to password auth providers so they + can register new users etc if necessary. + """ + def __init__(self, hs, check_user_exists): + self.hs = hs + + self._check_user_exists = check_user_exists + + def check_user_exists(self, user_id): + """Check if user exissts. + + Returns: + Deferred(bool) + """ + return self._check_user_exists(user_id) + + def register(self, localpart): + """Registers a new user with given localpart + + Returns: + Deferred: a 2-tuple of (user_id, access_token) + """ + reg = self.hs.get_handlers().registration_handler + return reg.register(localpart=localpart) |