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-rw-r--r--synapse/api/auth.py525
1 files changed, 382 insertions, 143 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/api/auth.py b/synapse/api/auth.py

index 3038df4ab8..ddab210718 100644 --- a/synapse/api/auth.py +++ b/synapse/api/auth.py
@@ -13,22 +13,22 @@ # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. -"""This module contains classes for authenticating the user.""" +import logging + +import pymacaroons from canonicaljson import encode_canonical_json from signedjson.key import decode_verify_key_bytes from signedjson.sign import verify_signed_json, SignatureVerifyException - from twisted.internet import defer +from unpaddedbase64 import decode_base64 +import synapse.types from synapse.api.constants import EventTypes, Membership, JoinRules from synapse.api.errors import AuthError, Codes, SynapseError, EventSizeError -from synapse.types import Requester, RoomID, UserID, EventID -from synapse.util.logutils import log_function +from synapse.types import UserID, get_domain_from_id from synapse.util.logcontext import preserve_context_over_fn -from unpaddedbase64 import decode_base64 - -import logging -import pymacaroons +from synapse.util.logutils import log_function +from synapse.util.metrics import Measure logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) @@ -39,23 +39,34 @@ AuthEventTypes = ( EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite, ) +# guests always get this device id. +GUEST_DEVICE_ID = "guest_device" -class Auth(object): +class Auth(object): + """ + FIXME: This class contains a mix of functions for authenticating users + of our client-server API and authenticating events added to room graphs. + """ def __init__(self, hs): self.hs = hs + self.clock = hs.get_clock() self.store = hs.get_datastore() self.state = hs.get_state_handler() self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS = 401 - self._KNOWN_CAVEAT_PREFIXES = set([ - "gen = ", - "guest = ", - "type = ", - "time < ", - "user_id = ", - ]) - - def check(self, event, auth_events): + + @defer.inlineCallbacks + def check_from_context(self, event, context, do_sig_check=True): + auth_events_ids = yield self.compute_auth_events( + event, context.prev_state_ids, for_verification=True, + ) + auth_events = yield self.store.get_events(auth_events_ids) + auth_events = { + (e.type, e.state_key): e for e in auth_events.values() + } + self.check(event, auth_events=auth_events, do_sig_check=do_sig_check) + + def check(self, event, auth_events, do_sig_check=True): """ Checks if this event is correctly authed. Args: @@ -66,11 +77,35 @@ class Auth(object): Returns: True if the auth checks pass. """ - self.check_size_limits(event) + with Measure(self.clock, "auth.check"): + self.check_size_limits(event) - try: if not hasattr(event, "room_id"): raise AuthError(500, "Event has no room_id: %s" % event) + + if do_sig_check: + sender_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.sender) + event_id_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.event_id) + + is_invite_via_3pid = ( + event.type == EventTypes.Member + and event.membership == Membership.INVITE + and "third_party_invite" in event.content + ) + + # Check the sender's domain has signed the event + if not event.signatures.get(sender_domain): + # We allow invites via 3pid to have a sender from a different + # HS, as the sender must match the sender of the original + # 3pid invite. This is checked further down with the + # other dedicated membership checks. + if not is_invite_via_3pid: + raise AuthError(403, "Event not signed by sender's server") + + # Check the event_id's domain has signed the event + if not event.signatures.get(event_id_domain): + raise AuthError(403, "Event not signed by sending server") + if auth_events is None: # Oh, we don't know what the state of the room was, so we # are trusting that this is allowed (at least for now) @@ -78,6 +113,12 @@ class Auth(object): return True if event.type == EventTypes.Create: + room_id_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.room_id) + if room_id_domain != sender_domain: + raise AuthError( + 403, + "Creation event's room_id domain does not match sender's" + ) # FIXME return True @@ -89,8 +130,8 @@ class Auth(object): "Room %r does not exist" % (event.room_id,) ) - creating_domain = RoomID.from_string(event.room_id).domain - originating_domain = UserID.from_string(event.sender).domain + creating_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.room_id) + originating_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.sender) if creating_domain != originating_domain: if not self.can_federate(event, auth_events): raise AuthError( @@ -100,6 +141,22 @@ class Auth(object): # FIXME: Temp hack if event.type == EventTypes.Aliases: + if not event.is_state(): + raise AuthError( + 403, + "Alias event must be a state event", + ) + if not event.state_key: + raise AuthError( + 403, + "Alias event must have non-empty state_key" + ) + sender_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.sender) + if event.state_key != sender_domain: + raise AuthError( + 403, + "Alias event's state_key does not match sender's domain" + ) return True logger.debug( @@ -118,6 +175,24 @@ class Auth(object): return allowed self.check_event_sender_in_room(event, auth_events) + + # Special case to allow m.room.third_party_invite events wherever + # a user is allowed to issue invites. Fixes + # https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/1208 hopefully + if event.type == EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite: + user_level = self._get_user_power_level(event.user_id, auth_events) + invite_level = self._get_named_level(auth_events, "invite", 0) + + if user_level < invite_level: + raise AuthError( + 403, ( + "You cannot issue a third party invite for %s." % + (event.content.display_name,) + ) + ) + else: + return True + self._can_send_event(event, auth_events) if event.type == EventTypes.PowerLevels: @@ -127,13 +202,6 @@ class Auth(object): self.check_redaction(event, auth_events) logger.debug("Allowing! %s", event) - except AuthError as e: - logger.info( - "Event auth check failed on event %s with msg: %s", - event, e.msg - ) - logger.info("Denying! %s", event) - raise def check_size_limits(self, event): def too_big(field): @@ -219,21 +287,17 @@ class Auth(object): @defer.inlineCallbacks def check_host_in_room(self, room_id, host): - curr_state = yield self.state.get_current_state(room_id) + with Measure(self.clock, "check_host_in_room"): + latest_event_ids = yield self.store.get_latest_event_ids_in_room(room_id) - for event in curr_state.values(): - if event.type == EventTypes.Member: - try: - if UserID.from_string(event.state_key).domain != host: - continue - except: - logger.warn("state_key not user_id: %s", event.state_key) - continue - - if event.content["membership"] == Membership.JOIN: - defer.returnValue(True) + entry = yield self.state.resolve_state_groups( + room_id, latest_event_ids + ) - defer.returnValue(False) + ret = yield self.store.is_host_joined( + room_id, host, entry.state_group, entry.state + ) + defer.returnValue(ret) def check_event_sender_in_room(self, event, auth_events): key = (EventTypes.Member, event.user_id, ) @@ -271,8 +335,8 @@ class Auth(object): target_user_id = event.state_key - creating_domain = RoomID.from_string(event.room_id).domain - target_domain = UserID.from_string(target_user_id).domain + creating_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.room_id) + target_domain = get_domain_from_id(target_user_id) if creating_domain != target_domain: if not self.can_federate(event, auth_events): raise AuthError( @@ -328,6 +392,10 @@ class Auth(object): if Membership.INVITE == membership and "third_party_invite" in event.content: if not self._verify_third_party_invite(event, auth_events): raise AuthError(403, "You are not invited to this room.") + if target_banned: + raise AuthError( + 403, "%s is banned from the room" % (target_user_id,) + ) return True if Membership.JOIN != membership: @@ -432,6 +500,9 @@ class Auth(object): if not invite_event: return False + if invite_event.sender != event.sender: + return False + if event.user_id != invite_event.user_id: return False @@ -512,33 +583,38 @@ class Auth(object): return default @defer.inlineCallbacks - def get_user_by_req(self, request, allow_guest=False): + def get_user_by_req(self, request, allow_guest=False, rights="access"): """ Get a registered user's ID. Args: request - An HTTP request with an access_token query parameter. Returns: - tuple of: - UserID (str) - Access token ID (str) + defer.Deferred: resolves to a ``synapse.types.Requester`` object Raises: AuthError if no user by that token exists or the token is invalid. """ # Can optionally look elsewhere in the request (e.g. headers) try: - user_id = yield self._get_appservice_user_id(request.args) + user_id, app_service = yield self._get_appservice_user_id(request) if user_id: request.authenticated_entity = user_id defer.returnValue( - Requester(UserID.from_string(user_id), "", False) + synapse.types.create_requester(user_id, app_service=app_service) ) - access_token = request.args["access_token"][0] - user_info = yield self.get_user_by_access_token(access_token) + access_token = get_access_token_from_request( + request, self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS + ) + + user_info = yield self.get_user_by_access_token(access_token, rights) user = user_info["user"] token_id = user_info["token_id"] is_guest = user_info["is_guest"] + # device_id may not be present if get_user_by_access_token has been + # stubbed out. + device_id = user_info.get("device_id") + ip_addr = self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request) user_agent = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders( "User-Agent", @@ -550,7 +626,8 @@ class Auth(object): user=user, access_token=access_token, ip=ip_addr, - user_agent=user_agent + user_agent=user_agent, + device_id=device_id, ) if is_guest and not allow_guest: @@ -560,7 +637,9 @@ class Auth(object): request.authenticated_entity = user.to_string() - defer.returnValue(Requester(user, token_id, is_guest)) + defer.returnValue(synapse.types.create_requester( + user, token_id, is_guest, device_id, app_service=app_service) + ) except KeyError: raise AuthError( self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Missing access token.", @@ -568,19 +647,21 @@ class Auth(object): ) @defer.inlineCallbacks - def _get_appservice_user_id(self, request_args): - app_service = yield self.store.get_app_service_by_token( - request_args["access_token"][0] + def _get_appservice_user_id(self, request): + app_service = self.store.get_app_service_by_token( + get_access_token_from_request( + request, self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS + ) ) if app_service is None: - defer.returnValue(None) + defer.returnValue((None, None)) - if "user_id" not in request_args: - defer.returnValue(app_service.sender) + if "user_id" not in request.args: + defer.returnValue((app_service.sender, app_service)) - user_id = request_args["user_id"][0] + user_id = request.args["user_id"][0] if app_service.sender == user_id: - defer.returnValue(app_service.sender) + defer.returnValue((app_service.sender, app_service)) if not app_service.is_interested_in_user(user_id): raise AuthError( @@ -592,10 +673,10 @@ class Auth(object): 403, "Application service has not registered this user" ) - defer.returnValue(user_id) + defer.returnValue((user_id, app_service)) @defer.inlineCallbacks - def get_user_by_access_token(self, token): + def get_user_by_access_token(self, token, rights="access"): """ Get a registered user's ID. Args: @@ -606,46 +687,62 @@ class Auth(object): AuthError if no user by that token exists or the token is invalid. """ try: - ret = yield self.get_user_from_macaroon(token) + ret = yield self.get_user_from_macaroon(token, rights) except AuthError: # TODO(daniel): Remove this fallback when all existing access tokens # have been re-issued as macaroons. + if self.hs.config.expire_access_token: + raise ret = yield self._look_up_user_by_access_token(token) + defer.returnValue(ret) @defer.inlineCallbacks - def get_user_from_macaroon(self, macaroon_str): + def get_user_from_macaroon(self, macaroon_str, rights="access"): try: macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(macaroon_str) - self.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "access", False) - user_prefix = "user_id = " - user = None + user_id = self.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon) + user = UserID.from_string(user_id) + + self.validate_macaroon( + macaroon, rights, self.hs.config.expire_access_token, + user_id=user_id, + ) + guest = False for caveat in macaroon.caveats: - if caveat.caveat_id.startswith(user_prefix): - user = UserID.from_string(caveat.caveat_id[len(user_prefix):]) - elif caveat.caveat_id == "guest = true": + if caveat.caveat_id == "guest = true": guest = True - if user is None: - raise AuthError( - self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "No user caveat in macaroon", - errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN - ) - if guest: ret = { "user": user, "is_guest": True, "token_id": None, + # all guests get the same device id + "device_id": GUEST_DEVICE_ID, + } + elif rights == "delete_pusher": + # We don't store these tokens in the database + ret = { + "user": user, + "is_guest": False, + "token_id": None, + "device_id": None, } else: - # This codepath exists so that we can actually return a - # token ID, because we use token IDs in place of device - # identifiers throughout the codebase. - # TODO(daniel): Remove this fallback when device IDs are - # properly implemented. + # This codepath exists for several reasons: + # * so that we can actually return a token ID, which is used + # in some parts of the schema (where we probably ought to + # use device IDs instead) + # * the only way we currently have to invalidate an + # access_token is by removing it from the database, so we + # have to check here that it is still in the db + # * some attributes (notably device_id) aren't stored in the + # macaroon. They probably should be. + # TODO: build the dictionary from the macaroon once the + # above are fixed ret = yield self._look_up_user_by_access_token(macaroon_str) if ret["user"] != user: logger.error( @@ -665,31 +762,67 @@ class Auth(object): errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN ) - def validate_macaroon(self, macaroon, type_string, verify_expiry): + def get_user_id_from_macaroon(self, macaroon): + """Retrieve the user_id given by the caveats on the macaroon. + + Does *not* validate the macaroon. + + Args: + macaroon (pymacaroons.Macaroon): The macaroon to validate + + Returns: + (str) user id + + Raises: + AuthError if there is no user_id caveat in the macaroon + """ + user_prefix = "user_id = " + for caveat in macaroon.caveats: + if caveat.caveat_id.startswith(user_prefix): + return caveat.caveat_id[len(user_prefix):] + raise AuthError( + self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "No user caveat in macaroon", + errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN + ) + + def validate_macaroon(self, macaroon, type_string, verify_expiry, user_id): """ validate that a Macaroon is understood by and was signed by this server. Args: macaroon(pymacaroons.Macaroon): The macaroon to validate - type_string(str): The kind of token this is (e.g. "access", "refresh") + type_string(str): The kind of token required (e.g. "access", + "delete_pusher") verify_expiry(bool): Whether to verify whether the macaroon has expired. - This should really always be True, but no clients currently implement - token refresh, so we can't enforce expiry yet. + user_id (str): The user_id required """ v = pymacaroons.Verifier() + + # the verifier runs a test for every caveat on the macaroon, to check + # that it is met for the current request. Each caveat must match at + # least one of the predicates specified by satisfy_exact or + # specify_general. v.satisfy_exact("gen = 1") v.satisfy_exact("type = " + type_string) - v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("user_id = ")) + v.satisfy_exact("user_id = %s" % user_id) v.satisfy_exact("guest = true") + + # verify_expiry should really always be True, but there exist access + # tokens in the wild which expire when they should not, so we can't + # enforce expiry yet (so we have to allow any caveat starting with + # 'time < ' in access tokens). + # + # On the other hand, short-term login tokens (as used by CAS login, for + # example) have an expiry time which we do want to enforce. + if verify_expiry: v.satisfy_general(self._verify_expiry) else: v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("time < ")) - v.verify(macaroon, self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key) + # access_tokens include a nonce for uniqueness: any value is acceptable + v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("nonce = ")) - v = pymacaroons.Verifier() - v.satisfy_general(self._verify_recognizes_caveats) v.verify(macaroon, self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key) def _verify_expiry(self, caveat): @@ -700,15 +833,6 @@ class Auth(object): now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() return now < expiry - def _verify_recognizes_caveats(self, caveat): - first_space = caveat.find(" ") - if first_space < 0: - return False - second_space = caveat.find(" ", first_space + 1) - if second_space < 0: - return False - return caveat[:second_space + 1] in self._KNOWN_CAVEAT_PREFIXES - @defer.inlineCallbacks def _look_up_user_by_access_token(self, token): ret = yield self.store.get_user_by_access_token(token) @@ -718,18 +842,23 @@ class Auth(object): self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Unrecognised access token.", errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN ) + # we use ret.get() below because *lots* of unit tests stub out + # get_user_by_access_token in a way where it only returns a couple of + # the fields. user_info = { "user": UserID.from_string(ret.get("name")), "token_id": ret.get("token_id", None), "is_guest": False, + "device_id": ret.get("device_id"), } defer.returnValue(user_info) - @defer.inlineCallbacks def get_appservice_by_req(self, request): try: - token = request.args["access_token"][0] - service = yield self.store.get_app_service_by_token(token) + token = get_access_token_from_request( + request, self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS + ) + service = self.store.get_app_service_by_token(token) if not service: logger.warn("Unrecognised appservice access token: %s" % (token,)) raise AuthError( @@ -738,7 +867,7 @@ class Auth(object): errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN ) request.authenticated_entity = service.sender - defer.returnValue(service) + return defer.succeed(service) except KeyError: raise AuthError( self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Missing access token." @@ -749,7 +878,7 @@ class Auth(object): @defer.inlineCallbacks def add_auth_events(self, builder, context): - auth_ids = self.compute_auth_events(builder, context.current_state) + auth_ids = yield self.compute_auth_events(builder, context.prev_state_ids) auth_events_entries = yield self.store.add_event_hashes( auth_ids @@ -757,30 +886,32 @@ class Auth(object): builder.auth_events = auth_events_entries - def compute_auth_events(self, event, current_state): + @defer.inlineCallbacks + def compute_auth_events(self, event, current_state_ids, for_verification=False): if event.type == EventTypes.Create: - return [] + defer.returnValue([]) auth_ids = [] key = (EventTypes.PowerLevels, "", ) - power_level_event = current_state.get(key) + power_level_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key) - if power_level_event: - auth_ids.append(power_level_event.event_id) + if power_level_event_id: + auth_ids.append(power_level_event_id) key = (EventTypes.JoinRules, "", ) - join_rule_event = current_state.get(key) + join_rule_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key) key = (EventTypes.Member, event.user_id, ) - member_event = current_state.get(key) + member_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key) key = (EventTypes.Create, "", ) - create_event = current_state.get(key) - if create_event: - auth_ids.append(create_event.event_id) + create_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key) + if create_event_id: + auth_ids.append(create_event_id) - if join_rule_event: + if join_rule_event_id: + join_rule_event = yield self.store.get_event(join_rule_event_id) join_rule = join_rule_event.content.get("join_rule") is_public = join_rule == JoinRules.PUBLIC if join_rule else False else: @@ -789,15 +920,21 @@ class Auth(object): if event.type == EventTypes.Member: e_type = event.content["membership"] if e_type in [Membership.JOIN, Membership.INVITE]: - if join_rule_event: - auth_ids.append(join_rule_event.event_id) + if join_rule_event_id: + auth_ids.append(join_rule_event_id) if e_type == Membership.JOIN: - if member_event and not is_public: - auth_ids.append(member_event.event_id) + if member_event_id and not is_public: + auth_ids.append(member_event_id) else: - if member_event: - auth_ids.append(member_event.event_id) + if member_event_id: + auth_ids.append(member_event_id) + + if for_verification: + key = (EventTypes.Member, event.state_key, ) + existing_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key) + if existing_event_id: + auth_ids.append(existing_event_id) if e_type == Membership.INVITE: if "third_party_invite" in event.content: @@ -805,26 +942,26 @@ class Auth(object): EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite, event.content["third_party_invite"]["signed"]["token"] ) - third_party_invite = current_state.get(key) - if third_party_invite: - auth_ids.append(third_party_invite.event_id) - elif member_event: + third_party_invite_id = current_state_ids.get(key) + if third_party_invite_id: + auth_ids.append(third_party_invite_id) + elif member_event_id: + member_event = yield self.store.get_event(member_event_id) if member_event.content["membership"] == Membership.JOIN: auth_ids.append(member_event.event_id) - return auth_ids + defer.returnValue(auth_ids) - @log_function - def _can_send_event(self, event, auth_events): + def _get_send_level(self, etype, state_key, auth_events): key = (EventTypes.PowerLevels, "", ) send_level_event = auth_events.get(key) send_level = None if send_level_event: send_level = send_level_event.content.get("events", {}).get( - event.type + etype ) if send_level is None: - if hasattr(event, "state_key"): + if state_key is not None: send_level = send_level_event.content.get( "state_default", 50 ) @@ -838,6 +975,13 @@ class Auth(object): else: send_level = 0 + return send_level + + @log_function + def _can_send_event(self, event, auth_events): + send_level = self._get_send_level( + event.type, event.get("state_key", None), auth_events + ) user_level = self._get_user_power_level(event.user_id, auth_events) if user_level < send_level: @@ -855,16 +999,6 @@ class Auth(object): 403, "You are not allowed to set others state" ) - else: - sender_domain = UserID.from_string( - event.user_id - ).domain - - if sender_domain != event.state_key: - raise AuthError( - 403, - "You are not allowed to set others state" - ) return True @@ -888,8 +1022,8 @@ class Auth(object): if user_level >= redact_level: return False - redacter_domain = EventID.from_string(event.event_id).domain - redactee_domain = EventID.from_string(event.redacts).domain + redacter_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.event_id) + redactee_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.redacts) if redacter_domain == redactee_domain: return True @@ -982,3 +1116,108 @@ class Auth(object): "You don't have permission to add ops level greater " "than your own" ) + + @defer.inlineCallbacks + def check_can_change_room_list(self, room_id, user): + """Check if the user is allowed to edit the room's entry in the + published room list. + + Args: + room_id (str) + user (UserID) + """ + + is_admin = yield self.is_server_admin(user) + if is_admin: + defer.returnValue(True) + + user_id = user.to_string() + yield self.check_joined_room(room_id, user_id) + + # We currently require the user is a "moderator" in the room. We do this + # by checking if they would (theoretically) be able to change the + # m.room.aliases events + power_level_event = yield self.state.get_current_state( + room_id, EventTypes.PowerLevels, "" + ) + + auth_events = {} + if power_level_event: + auth_events[(EventTypes.PowerLevels, "")] = power_level_event + + send_level = self._get_send_level( + EventTypes.Aliases, "", auth_events + ) + user_level = self._get_user_power_level(user_id, auth_events) + + if user_level < send_level: + raise AuthError( + 403, + "This server requires you to be a moderator in the room to" + " edit its room list entry" + ) + + +def has_access_token(request): + """Checks if the request has an access_token. + + Returns: + bool: False if no access_token was given, True otherwise. + """ + query_params = request.args.get("access_token") + auth_headers = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders("Authorization") + return bool(query_params) or bool(auth_headers) + + +def get_access_token_from_request(request, token_not_found_http_status=401): + """Extracts the access_token from the request. + + Args: + request: The http request. + token_not_found_http_status(int): The HTTP status code to set in the + AuthError if the token isn't found. This is used in some of the + legacy APIs to change the status code to 403 from the default of + 401 since some of the old clients depended on auth errors returning + 403. + Returns: + str: The access_token + Raises: + AuthError: If there isn't an access_token in the request. + """ + + auth_headers = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders("Authorization") + query_params = request.args.get("access_token") + if auth_headers: + # Try the get the access_token from a "Authorization: Bearer" + # header + if query_params is not None: + raise AuthError( + token_not_found_http_status, + "Mixing Authorization headers and access_token query parameters.", + errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN, + ) + if len(auth_headers) > 1: + raise AuthError( + token_not_found_http_status, + "Too many Authorization headers.", + errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN, + ) + parts = auth_headers[0].split(" ") + if parts[0] == "Bearer" and len(parts) == 2: + return parts[1] + else: + raise AuthError( + token_not_found_http_status, + "Invalid Authorization header.", + errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN, + ) + else: + # Try to get the access_token from the query params. + if not query_params: + raise AuthError( + token_not_found_http_status, + "Missing access token.", + errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN + ) + + return query_params[0]