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author | David Baker <dbkr@users.noreply.github.com> | 2019-06-18 22:51:24 +0100 |
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committer | Richard van der Hoff <1389908+richvdh@users.noreply.github.com> | 2019-06-18 22:51:24 +0100 |
commit | f2d2ae03dae519a4f2035f1466fdd3429c71edc8 (patch) | |
tree | 313bf881fe0583a5129ed0e472667e6be566b6d4 /synapse | |
parent | Fix seven contrib files with Python syntax errors (#5446) (diff) | |
download | synapse-f2d2ae03dae519a4f2035f1466fdd3429c71edc8.tar.xz |
Add some logging to 3pid invite sig verification (#5015)
I had to add quite a lot of logging to diagnose a problem with 3pid invites - we only logged the one failure which isn't all that informative. NB. I'm not convinced the logic of this loop is right: I think it should just accept a single valid signature from a trusted source rather than fail if *any* signature is invalid. Also it should probably not skip the rest of middle loop if a check fails? However, I'm deliberately not changing the logic here.
Diffstat (limited to 'synapse')
-rw-r--r-- | synapse/handlers/federation.py | 46 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/federation.py b/synapse/handlers/federation.py index 93e064cda3..51d7eb274b 100644 --- a/synapse/handlers/federation.py +++ b/synapse/handlers/federation.py @@ -2744,25 +2744,55 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler): if not invite_event: raise AuthError(403, "Could not find invite") + logger.debug("Checking auth on event %r", event.content) + last_exception = None + # for each public key in the 3pid invite event for public_key_object in self.hs.get_auth().get_public_keys(invite_event): try: + # for each sig on the third_party_invite block of the actual invite for server, signature_block in signed["signatures"].items(): for key_name, encoded_signature in signature_block.items(): if not key_name.startswith("ed25519:"): continue - public_key = public_key_object["public_key"] - verify_key = decode_verify_key_bytes( - key_name, - decode_base64(public_key) + logger.debug( + "Attempting to verify sig with key %s from %r " + "against pubkey %r", + key_name, server, public_key_object, ) - verify_signed_json(signed, server, verify_key) - if "key_validity_url" in public_key_object: - yield self._check_key_revocation( - public_key, + + try: + public_key = public_key_object["public_key"] + verify_key = decode_verify_key_bytes( + key_name, + decode_base64(public_key) + ) + verify_signed_json(signed, server, verify_key) + logger.debug( + "Successfully verified sig with key %s from %r " + "against pubkey %r", + key_name, server, public_key_object, + ) + except Exception: + logger.info( + "Failed to verify sig with key %s from %r " + "against pubkey %r", + key_name, server, public_key_object, + ) + raise + try: + if "key_validity_url" in public_key_object: + yield self._check_key_revocation( + public_key, + public_key_object["key_validity_url"] + ) + except Exception: + logger.info( + "Failed to query key_validity_url %s", public_key_object["key_validity_url"] ) + raise return except Exception as e: last_exception = e |