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authorErik Johnston <erik@matrix.org>2019-10-22 10:41:18 +0100
committerErik Johnston <erik@matrix.org>2019-10-22 10:41:18 +0100
commitbb6264be0b13314123b4fd047fe180616e8f0efa (patch)
treee06f393f38b4aea65101fbcdc0637e719b285727 /synapse/handlers
parentFix packaging (diff)
parentDelete format_tap.py (#6219) (diff)
downloadsynapse-bb6264be0b13314123b4fd047fe180616e8f0efa.tar.xz
Merge branch 'develop' of github.com:matrix-org/synapse into erikj/refactor_stores
Diffstat (limited to 'synapse/handlers')
-rw-r--r--synapse/handlers/device.py17
-rw-r--r--synapse/handlers/e2e_keys.py198
-rw-r--r--synapse/handlers/federation.py109
-rw-r--r--synapse/handlers/sync.py7
4 files changed, 220 insertions, 111 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/device.py b/synapse/handlers/device.py
index 71a8f33da3..5f23ee4488 100644
--- a/synapse/handlers/device.py
+++ b/synapse/handlers/device.py
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
 # Copyright 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
+# Copyright 2019 New Vector Ltd
+# Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
 #
 # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -439,6 +441,21 @@ class DeviceHandler(DeviceWorkerHandler):
                 log_kv({"message": "sent device update to host", "host": host})
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
+    def notify_user_signature_update(self, from_user_id, user_ids):
+        """Notify a user that they have made new signatures of other users.
+
+        Args:
+            from_user_id (str): the user who made the signature
+            user_ids (list[str]): the users IDs that have new signatures
+        """
+
+        position = yield self.store.add_user_signature_change_to_streams(
+            from_user_id, user_ids
+        )
+
+        self.notifier.on_new_event("device_list_key", position, users=[from_user_id])
+
+    @defer.inlineCallbacks
     def on_federation_query_user_devices(self, user_id):
         stream_id, devices = yield self.store.get_devices_with_keys_by_user(user_id)
         return {"user_id": user_id, "stream_id": stream_id, "devices": devices}
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/e2e_keys.py b/synapse/handlers/e2e_keys.py
index 0a84d0e2b0..be675197f1 100644
--- a/synapse/handlers/e2e_keys.py
+++ b/synapse/handlers/e2e_keys.py
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
 # Copyright 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
-# Copyright 2018 New Vector Ltd
+# Copyright 2018-2019 New Vector Ltd
+# Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
 #
 # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -19,13 +20,18 @@ import logging
 from six import iteritems
 
 from canonicaljson import encode_canonical_json, json
+from signedjson.sign import SignatureVerifyException, verify_signed_json
 
 from twisted.internet import defer
 
-from synapse.api.errors import CodeMessageException, SynapseError
+from synapse.api.errors import CodeMessageException, Codes, SynapseError
 from synapse.logging.context import make_deferred_yieldable, run_in_background
 from synapse.logging.opentracing import log_kv, set_tag, tag_args, trace
-from synapse.types import UserID, get_domain_from_id
+from synapse.types import (
+    UserID,
+    get_domain_from_id,
+    get_verify_key_from_cross_signing_key,
+)
 from synapse.util import unwrapFirstError
 from synapse.util.retryutils import NotRetryingDestination
 
@@ -49,7 +55,7 @@ class E2eKeysHandler(object):
 
     @trace
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def query_devices(self, query_body, timeout):
+    def query_devices(self, query_body, timeout, from_user_id):
         """ Handle a device key query from a client
 
         {
@@ -67,6 +73,11 @@ class E2eKeysHandler(object):
                 }
             }
         }
+
+        Args:
+            from_user_id (str): the user making the query.  This is used when
+                adding cross-signing signatures to limit what signatures users
+                can see.
         """
 
         device_keys_query = query_body.get("device_keys", {})
@@ -125,6 +136,11 @@ class E2eKeysHandler(object):
                 r = remote_queries_not_in_cache.setdefault(domain, {})
                 r[user_id] = remote_queries[user_id]
 
+        # Get cached cross-signing keys
+        cross_signing_keys = yield self.get_cross_signing_keys_from_cache(
+            device_keys_query, from_user_id
+        )
+
         # Now fetch any devices that we don't have in our cache
         @trace
         @defer.inlineCallbacks
@@ -188,6 +204,14 @@ class E2eKeysHandler(object):
                     if user_id in destination_query:
                         results[user_id] = keys
 
+                for user_id, key in remote_result["master_keys"].items():
+                    if user_id in destination_query:
+                        cross_signing_keys["master_keys"][user_id] = key
+
+                for user_id, key in remote_result["self_signing_keys"].items():
+                    if user_id in destination_query:
+                        cross_signing_keys["self_signing_keys"][user_id] = key
+
             except Exception as e:
                 failure = _exception_to_failure(e)
                 failures[destination] = failure
@@ -204,7 +228,61 @@ class E2eKeysHandler(object):
             ).addErrback(unwrapFirstError)
         )
 
-        return {"device_keys": results, "failures": failures}
+        ret = {"device_keys": results, "failures": failures}
+
+        ret.update(cross_signing_keys)
+
+        return ret
+
+    @defer.inlineCallbacks
+    def get_cross_signing_keys_from_cache(self, query, from_user_id):
+        """Get cross-signing keys for users from the database
+
+        Args:
+            query (Iterable[string]) an iterable of user IDs.  A dict whose keys
+                are user IDs satisfies this, so the query format used for
+                query_devices can be used here.
+            from_user_id (str): the user making the query.  This is used when
+                adding cross-signing signatures to limit what signatures users
+                can see.
+
+        Returns:
+            defer.Deferred[dict[str, dict[str, dict]]]: map from
+                (master|self_signing|user_signing) -> user_id -> key
+        """
+        master_keys = {}
+        self_signing_keys = {}
+        user_signing_keys = {}
+
+        for user_id in query:
+            # XXX: consider changing the store functions to allow querying
+            # multiple users simultaneously.
+            key = yield self.store.get_e2e_cross_signing_key(
+                user_id, "master", from_user_id
+            )
+            if key:
+                master_keys[user_id] = key
+
+            key = yield self.store.get_e2e_cross_signing_key(
+                user_id, "self_signing", from_user_id
+            )
+            if key:
+                self_signing_keys[user_id] = key
+
+            # users can see other users' master and self-signing keys, but can
+            # only see their own user-signing keys
+            if from_user_id == user_id:
+                key = yield self.store.get_e2e_cross_signing_key(
+                    user_id, "user_signing", from_user_id
+                )
+                if key:
+                    user_signing_keys[user_id] = key
+
+        return {
+            "master_keys": master_keys,
+            "self_signing_keys": self_signing_keys,
+            "user_signing_keys": user_signing_keys,
+        }
 
     @trace
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
@@ -441,6 +519,116 @@ class E2eKeysHandler(object):
         log_kv({"message": "Inserting new one_time_keys.", "keys": new_keys})
         yield self.store.add_e2e_one_time_keys(user_id, device_id, time_now, new_keys)
 
+    @defer.inlineCallbacks
+    def upload_signing_keys_for_user(self, user_id, keys):
+        """Upload signing keys for cross-signing
+
+        Args:
+            user_id (string): the user uploading the keys
+            keys (dict[string, dict]): the signing keys
+        """
+
+        # if a master key is uploaded, then check it.  Otherwise, load the
+        # stored master key, to check signatures on other keys
+        if "master_key" in keys:
+            master_key = keys["master_key"]
+
+            _check_cross_signing_key(master_key, user_id, "master")
+        else:
+            master_key = yield self.store.get_e2e_cross_signing_key(user_id, "master")
+
+        # if there is no master key, then we can't do anything, because all the
+        # other cross-signing keys need to be signed by the master key
+        if not master_key:
+            raise SynapseError(400, "No master key available", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
+
+        try:
+            master_key_id, master_verify_key = get_verify_key_from_cross_signing_key(
+                master_key
+            )
+        except ValueError:
+            if "master_key" in keys:
+                # the invalid key came from the request
+                raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid master key", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
+            else:
+                # the invalid key came from the database
+                logger.error("Invalid master key found for user %s", user_id)
+                raise SynapseError(500, "Invalid master key")
+
+        # for the other cross-signing keys, make sure that they have valid
+        # signatures from the master key
+        if "self_signing_key" in keys:
+            self_signing_key = keys["self_signing_key"]
+
+            _check_cross_signing_key(
+                self_signing_key, user_id, "self_signing", master_verify_key
+            )
+
+        if "user_signing_key" in keys:
+            user_signing_key = keys["user_signing_key"]
+
+            _check_cross_signing_key(
+                user_signing_key, user_id, "user_signing", master_verify_key
+            )
+
+        # if everything checks out, then store the keys and send notifications
+        deviceids = []
+        if "master_key" in keys:
+            yield self.store.set_e2e_cross_signing_key(user_id, "master", master_key)
+            deviceids.append(master_verify_key.version)
+        if "self_signing_key" in keys:
+            yield self.store.set_e2e_cross_signing_key(
+                user_id, "self_signing", self_signing_key
+            )
+            try:
+                deviceids.append(
+                    get_verify_key_from_cross_signing_key(self_signing_key)[1].version
+                )
+            except ValueError:
+                raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid self-signing key", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
+        if "user_signing_key" in keys:
+            yield self.store.set_e2e_cross_signing_key(
+                user_id, "user_signing", user_signing_key
+            )
+            # the signature stream matches the semantics that we want for
+            # user-signing key updates: only the user themselves is notified of
+            # their own user-signing key updates
+            yield self.device_handler.notify_user_signature_update(user_id, [user_id])
+
+        # master key and self-signing key updates match the semantics of device
+        # list updates: all users who share an encrypted room are notified
+        if len(deviceids):
+            yield self.device_handler.notify_device_update(user_id, deviceids)
+
+        return {}
+
+
+def _check_cross_signing_key(key, user_id, key_type, signing_key=None):
+    """Check a cross-signing key uploaded by a user.  Performs some basic sanity
+    checking, and ensures that it is signed, if a signature is required.
+
+    Args:
+        key (dict): the key data to verify
+        user_id (str): the user whose key is being checked
+        key_type (str): the type of key that the key should be
+        signing_key (VerifyKey): (optional) the signing key that the key should
+            be signed with.  If omitted, signatures will not be checked.
+    """
+    if (
+        key.get("user_id") != user_id
+        or key_type not in key.get("usage", [])
+        or len(key.get("keys", {})) != 1
+    ):
+        raise SynapseError(400, ("Invalid %s key" % (key_type,)), Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
+
+    if signing_key:
+        try:
+            verify_signed_json(key, user_id, signing_key)
+        except SignatureVerifyException:
+            raise SynapseError(
+                400, ("Invalid signature on %s key" % key_type), Codes.INVALID_SIGNATURE
+            )
+
 
 def _exception_to_failure(e):
     if isinstance(e, CodeMessageException):
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/federation.py b/synapse/handlers/federation.py
index 50fc0fde2a..4b4c6c15f9 100644
--- a/synapse/handlers/federation.py
+++ b/synapse/handlers/federation.py
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ from unpaddedbase64 import decode_base64
 
 from twisted.internet import defer
 
+from synapse import event_auth
 from synapse.api.constants import EventTypes, Membership, RejectedReason
 from synapse.api.errors import (
     AuthError,
@@ -1763,7 +1764,7 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler):
                 auth_for_e[(EventTypes.Create, "")] = create_event
 
             try:
-                self.auth.check(room_version, e, auth_events=auth_for_e)
+                event_auth.check(room_version, e, auth_events=auth_for_e)
             except SynapseError as err:
                 # we may get SynapseErrors here as well as AuthErrors. For
                 # instance, there are a couple of (ancient) events in some
@@ -1919,7 +1920,7 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler):
             }
 
             try:
-                self.auth.check(room_version, event, auth_events=current_auth_events)
+                event_auth.check(room_version, event, auth_events=current_auth_events)
             except AuthError as e:
                 logger.warn("Soft-failing %r because %s", event, e)
                 event.internal_metadata.soft_failed = True
@@ -2018,7 +2019,7 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler):
             )
 
         try:
-            self.auth.check(room_version, event, auth_events=auth_events)
+            event_auth.check(room_version, event, auth_events=auth_events)
         except AuthError as e:
             logger.warn("Failed auth resolution for %r because %s", event, e)
             raise e
@@ -2181,103 +2182,10 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler):
 
             auth_events.update(new_state)
 
-            different_auth = event_auth_events.difference(
-                e.event_id for e in auth_events.values()
-            )
-
             yield self._update_context_for_auth_events(
                 event, context, auth_events, event_key
             )
 
-        if not different_auth:
-            # we're done
-            return
-
-        logger.info(
-            "auth_events still refers to events which are not in the calculated auth "
-            "chain after state resolution: %s",
-            different_auth,
-        )
-
-        # Only do auth resolution if we have something new to say.
-        # We can't prove an auth failure.
-        do_resolution = False
-
-        for e_id in different_auth:
-            if e_id in have_events:
-                if have_events[e_id] == RejectedReason.NOT_ANCESTOR:
-                    do_resolution = True
-                    break
-
-        if not do_resolution:
-            logger.info(
-                "Skipping auth resolution due to lack of provable rejection reasons"
-            )
-            return
-
-        logger.info("Doing auth resolution")
-
-        prev_state_ids = yield context.get_prev_state_ids(self.store)
-
-        # 1. Get what we think is the auth chain.
-        auth_ids = yield self.auth.compute_auth_events(event, prev_state_ids)
-        local_auth_chain = yield self.store.get_auth_chain(auth_ids, include_given=True)
-
-        try:
-            # 2. Get remote difference.
-            try:
-                result = yield self.federation_client.query_auth(
-                    origin, event.room_id, event.event_id, local_auth_chain
-                )
-            except RequestSendFailed as e:
-                # The other side isn't around or doesn't implement the
-                # endpoint, so lets just bail out.
-                logger.info("Failed to query auth from remote: %s", e)
-                return
-
-            seen_remotes = yield self.store.have_seen_events(
-                [e.event_id for e in result["auth_chain"]]
-            )
-
-            # 3. Process any remote auth chain events we haven't seen.
-            for ev in result["auth_chain"]:
-                if ev.event_id in seen_remotes:
-                    continue
-
-                if ev.event_id == event.event_id:
-                    continue
-
-                try:
-                    auth_ids = ev.auth_event_ids()
-                    auth = {
-                        (e.type, e.state_key): e
-                        for e in result["auth_chain"]
-                        if e.event_id in auth_ids or event.type == EventTypes.Create
-                    }
-                    ev.internal_metadata.outlier = True
-
-                    logger.debug(
-                        "do_auth %s different_auth: %s", event.event_id, e.event_id
-                    )
-
-                    yield self._handle_new_event(origin, ev, auth_events=auth)
-
-                    if ev.event_id in event_auth_events:
-                        auth_events[(ev.type, ev.state_key)] = ev
-                except AuthError:
-                    pass
-
-        except Exception:
-            # FIXME:
-            logger.exception("Failed to query auth chain")
-
-        # 4. Look at rejects and their proofs.
-        # TODO.
-
-        yield self._update_context_for_auth_events(
-            event, context, auth_events, event_key
-        )
-
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
     def _update_context_for_auth_events(self, event, context, auth_events, event_key):
         """Update the state_ids in an event context after auth event resolution,
@@ -2444,15 +2352,6 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler):
 
             reason_map[e.event_id] = reason
 
-            if reason == RejectedReason.AUTH_ERROR:
-                pass
-            elif reason == RejectedReason.REPLACED:
-                # TODO: Get proof
-                pass
-            elif reason == RejectedReason.NOT_ANCESTOR:
-                # TODO: Get proof.
-                pass
-
         logger.debug("construct_auth_difference returning")
 
         return {
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/sync.py b/synapse/handlers/sync.py
index 19bca6717f..d99160e9d7 100644
--- a/synapse/handlers/sync.py
+++ b/synapse/handlers/sync.py
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
 # Copyright 2015, 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
-# Copyright 2018 New Vector Ltd
+# Copyright 2018, 2019 New Vector Ltd
 #
 # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -1124,6 +1124,11 @@ class SyncHandler(object):
             # weren't in the previous sync *or* they left and rejoined.
             users_that_have_changed.update(newly_joined_or_invited_users)
 
+            user_signatures_changed = yield self.store.get_users_whose_signatures_changed(
+                user_id, since_token.device_list_key
+            )
+            users_that_have_changed.update(user_signatures_changed)
+
             # Now find users that we no longer track
             for room_id in newly_left_rooms:
                 left_users = yield self.state.get_current_users_in_room(room_id)