diff options
author | Daniel Wagner-Hall <daniel@matrix.org> | 2016-02-23 15:11:25 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | review.rocks <nobody@review.rocks> | 2016-02-23 15:11:25 +0000 |
commit | 577951b0324f67308f50c14fad703d2103621bc5 (patch) | |
tree | 5179d927a8d339151131a1faf79cd79fb8265179 /synapse/handlers/federation.py | |
parent | Merge pull request #600 from matrix-org/erikj/presence (diff) | |
download | synapse-577951b0324f67308f50c14fad703d2103621bc5.tar.xz |
Allow third_party_signed to be specified on /join
Diffstat (limited to 'synapse/handlers/federation.py')
-rw-r--r-- | synapse/handlers/federation.py | 93 |
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/handlers/federation.py b/synapse/handlers/federation.py index ac15f9e5dd..3655b9e5e2 100644 --- a/synapse/handlers/federation.py +++ b/synapse/handlers/federation.py @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ # limitations under the License. """Contains handlers for federation events.""" +from signedjson.key import decode_verify_key_bytes +from signedjson.sign import verify_signed_json +from unpaddedbase64 import decode_base64 from ._base import BaseHandler @@ -1620,19 +1623,15 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler): @defer.inlineCallbacks @log_function - def exchange_third_party_invite(self, invite): - sender = invite["sender"] - room_id = invite["room_id"] - - if "signed" not in invite or "token" not in invite["signed"]: - logger.info( - "Discarding received notification of third party invite " - "without signed: %s" % (invite,) - ) - return - + def exchange_third_party_invite( + self, + sender_user_id, + target_user_id, + room_id, + signed, + ): third_party_invite = { - "signed": invite["signed"], + "signed": signed, } event_dict = { @@ -1642,8 +1641,8 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler): "third_party_invite": third_party_invite, }, "room_id": room_id, - "sender": sender, - "state_key": invite["mxid"], + "sender": sender_user_id, + "state_key": target_user_id, } if (yield self.auth.check_host_in_room(room_id, self.hs.hostname)): @@ -1656,11 +1655,11 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler): ) self.auth.check(event, context.current_state) - yield self._validate_keyserver(event, auth_events=context.current_state) + yield self._check_signature(event, auth_events=context.current_state) member_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().room_member_handler yield member_handler.send_membership_event(event, context, from_client=False) else: - destinations = set([x.split(":", 1)[-1] for x in (sender, room_id)]) + destinations = set(x.split(":", 1)[-1] for x in (sender_user_id, room_id)) yield self.replication_layer.forward_third_party_invite( destinations, room_id, @@ -1681,7 +1680,7 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler): ) self.auth.check(event, auth_events=context.current_state) - yield self._validate_keyserver(event, auth_events=context.current_state) + yield self._check_signature(event, auth_events=context.current_state) returned_invite = yield self.send_invite(origin, event) # TODO: Make sure the signatures actually are correct. @@ -1711,17 +1710,69 @@ class FederationHandler(BaseHandler): defer.returnValue((event, context)) @defer.inlineCallbacks - def _validate_keyserver(self, event, auth_events): - token = event.content["third_party_invite"]["signed"]["token"] + def _check_signature(self, event, auth_events): + """ + Checks that the signature in the event is consistent with its invite. + :param event (Event): The m.room.member event to check + :param auth_events (dict<(event type, state_key), event>) + + :raises + AuthError if signature didn't match any keys, or key has been + revoked, + SynapseError if a transient error meant a key couldn't be checked + for revocation. + """ + signed = event.content["third_party_invite"]["signed"] + token = signed["token"] invite_event = auth_events.get( (EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite, token,) ) + if not invite_event: + raise AuthError(403, "Could not find invite") + + last_exception = None + for public_key_object in self.hs.get_auth().get_public_keys(invite_event): + try: + for server, signature_block in signed["signatures"].items(): + for key_name, encoded_signature in signature_block.items(): + if not key_name.startswith("ed25519:"): + continue + + public_key = public_key_object["public_key"] + verify_key = decode_verify_key_bytes( + key_name, + decode_base64(public_key) + ) + verify_signed_json(signed, server, verify_key) + if "key_validity_url" in public_key_object: + yield self._check_key_revocation( + public_key, + public_key_object["key_validity_url"] + ) + return + except Exception as e: + last_exception = e + raise last_exception + + @defer.inlineCallbacks + def _check_key_revocation(self, public_key, url): + """ + Checks whether public_key has been revoked. + + :param public_key (str): base-64 encoded public key. + :param url (str): Key revocation URL. + + :raises + AuthError if they key has been revoked. + SynapseError if a transient error meant a key couldn't be checked + for revocation. + """ try: response = yield self.hs.get_simple_http_client().get_json( - invite_event.content["key_validity_url"], - {"public_key": invite_event.content["public_key"]} + url, + {"public_key": public_key} ) except Exception: raise SynapseError( |