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authorHugh Nimmo-Smith <hughns@matrix.org>2023-05-09 16:20:04 +0200
committerPatrick Cloke <clokep@users.noreply.github.com>2023-05-30 09:43:06 -0400
commit249f4a338dde0c1bcde5e14121d8d9fa156f185f (patch)
treecd7438eb6e52b3512533e445081c77447456b2a2 /synapse/api/auth/msc3861_delegated.py
parentTest MSC2965 implementation: well-known discovery document (diff)
downloadsynapse-249f4a338dde0c1bcde5e14121d8d9fa156f185f.tar.xz
Refactor config to be an experimental feature
Also enforce you can't combine it with incompatible config options
Diffstat (limited to 'synapse/api/auth/msc3861_delegated.py')
-rw-r--r--synapse/api/auth/msc3861_delegated.py280
1 files changed, 280 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/api/auth/msc3861_delegated.py b/synapse/api/auth/msc3861_delegated.py
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+# Copyright 2023 The Matrix.org Foundation.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+import logging
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, List, Optional
+from urllib.parse import urlencode
+
+from authlib.oauth2 import ClientAuth
+from authlib.oauth2.auth import encode_client_secret_basic, encode_client_secret_post
+from authlib.oauth2.rfc7523 import ClientSecretJWT, PrivateKeyJWT, private_key_jwt_sign
+from authlib.oauth2.rfc7662 import IntrospectionToken
+from authlib.oidc.discovery import OpenIDProviderMetadata, get_well_known_url
+
+from twisted.web.client import readBody
+from twisted.web.http_headers import Headers
+
+from synapse.api.auth.base import BaseAuth
+from synapse.api.errors import (
+    AuthError,
+    InvalidClientTokenError,
+    OAuthInsufficientScopeError,
+    StoreError,
+)
+from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest
+from synapse.logging.context import make_deferred_yieldable
+from synapse.types import Requester, UserID, create_requester
+from synapse.util import json_decoder
+from synapse.util.caches.cached_call import RetryOnExceptionCachedCall
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from synapse.server import HomeServer
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+def scope_to_list(scope: str) -> List[str]:
+    """Convert a scope string to a list of scope tokens"""
+    return scope.strip().split(" ")
+
+
+class PrivateKeyJWTWithKid(PrivateKeyJWT):
+    """An implementation of the private_key_jwt client auth method that includes a kid header.
+
+    This is needed because some providers (Keycloak) require the kid header to figure
+    out which key to use to verify the signature.
+    """
+
+    def sign(self, auth: Any, token_endpoint: str) -> bytes:
+        return private_key_jwt_sign(
+            auth.client_secret,
+            client_id=auth.client_id,
+            token_endpoint=token_endpoint,
+            claims=self.claims,
+            header={"kid": auth.client_secret["kid"]},
+        )
+
+
+class MSC3861DelegatedAuth(BaseAuth):
+    AUTH_METHODS = {
+        "client_secret_post": encode_client_secret_post,
+        "client_secret_basic": encode_client_secret_basic,
+        "client_secret_jwt": ClientSecretJWT(),
+        "private_key_jwt": PrivateKeyJWTWithKid(),
+    }
+
+    EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER = "oauth-delegated"
+
+    def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"):
+        super().__init__(hs)
+
+        self._config = hs.config.experimental.msc3861
+        auth_method = MSC3861DelegatedAuth.AUTH_METHODS.get(
+            self._config.client_auth_method.value, None
+        )
+        # Those assertions are already checked when parsing the config
+        assert self._config.enabled, "OAuth delegation is not enabled"
+        assert self._config.issuer, "No issuer provided"
+        assert self._config.client_id, "No client_id provided"
+        assert auth_method is not None, "Invalid client_auth_method provided"
+
+        self._http_client = hs.get_proxied_http_client()
+        self._hostname = hs.hostname
+
+        self._issuer_metadata = RetryOnExceptionCachedCall(self._load_metadata)
+
+        if isinstance(auth_method, PrivateKeyJWTWithKid):
+            # Use the JWK as the client secret when using the private_key_jwt method
+            assert self._config.jwk, "No JWK provided"
+            self._client_auth = ClientAuth(
+                self._config.client_id, self._config.jwk, auth_method
+            )
+        else:
+            # Else use the client secret
+            assert self._config.client_secret, "No client_secret provided"
+            self._client_auth = ClientAuth(
+                self._config.client_id, self._config.client_secret, auth_method
+            )
+
+    async def _load_metadata(self) -> OpenIDProviderMetadata:
+        if self._config.issuer_metadata is not None:
+            return OpenIDProviderMetadata(**self._config.issuer_metadata)
+        url = get_well_known_url(self._config.issuer, external=True)
+        response = await self._http_client.get_json(url)
+        metadata = OpenIDProviderMetadata(**response)
+        # metadata.validate_introspection_endpoint()
+        return metadata
+
+    async def _introspect_token(self, token: str) -> IntrospectionToken:
+        metadata = await self._issuer_metadata.get()
+        introspection_endpoint = metadata.get("introspection_endpoint")
+        raw_headers: Dict[str, str] = {
+            "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+            "User-Agent": str(self._http_client.user_agent, "utf-8"),
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+        }
+
+        args = {"token": token, "token_type_hint": "access_token"}
+        body = urlencode(args, True)
+
+        # Fill the body/headers with credentials
+        uri, raw_headers, body = self._client_auth.prepare(
+            method="POST", uri=introspection_endpoint, headers=raw_headers, body=body
+        )
+        headers = Headers({k: [v] for (k, v) in raw_headers.items()})
+
+        # Do the actual request
+        # We're not using the SimpleHttpClient util methods as we don't want to
+        # check the HTTP status code and we do the body encoding ourself.
+        response = await self._http_client.request(
+            method="POST",
+            uri=uri,
+            data=body.encode("utf-8"),
+            headers=headers,
+        )
+
+        resp_body = await make_deferred_yieldable(readBody(response))
+        # TODO: Let's not worry about 5xx errors & co. for now and just try
+        # decoding that as JSON. We should also do some validation of the
+        # response
+        resp = json_decoder.decode(resp_body.decode("utf-8"))
+        return IntrospectionToken(**resp)
+
+    async def is_server_admin(self, requester: Requester) -> bool:
+        return "urn:synapse:admin:*" in requester.scope
+
+    async def get_user_by_req(
+        self,
+        request: SynapseRequest,
+        allow_guest: bool = False,
+        allow_expired: bool = False,
+    ) -> Requester:
+        access_token = self.get_access_token_from_request(request)
+
+        # TODO: we probably want to assert the allow_guest inside this call so that we don't provision the user if they don't have enough permission:
+        requester = await self.get_user_by_access_token(access_token, allow_expired)
+
+        if not allow_guest and requester.is_guest:
+            raise OAuthInsufficientScopeError(
+                ["urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:api:*"]
+            )
+
+        return requester
+
+    async def get_user_by_access_token(
+        self,
+        token: str,
+        allow_expired: bool = False,
+    ) -> Requester:
+        introspection_result = await self._introspect_token(token)
+
+        logger.info(f"Introspection result: {introspection_result!r}")
+
+        # TODO: introspection verification should be more extensive, especially:
+        #   - verify the audience
+        if not introspection_result.get("active"):
+            raise InvalidClientTokenError("Token is not active")
+
+        # Let's look at the scope
+        scope: List[str] = scope_to_list(introspection_result.get("scope", ""))
+
+        # Determine type of user based on presence of particular scopes
+        has_admin_scope = "urn:synapse:admin:*" in scope
+        has_user_scope = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:api:*" in scope
+        has_guest_scope = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:api:guest" in scope
+        is_user = has_user_scope or has_admin_scope
+        is_guest = has_guest_scope and not is_user
+
+        if not is_user and not is_guest:
+            raise InvalidClientTokenError("No scope in token granting user rights")
+
+        # Match via the sub claim
+        sub: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("sub")
+        if sub is None:
+            raise InvalidClientTokenError(
+                "Invalid sub claim in the introspection result"
+            )
+
+        user_id_str = await self.store.get_user_by_external_id(
+            MSC3861DelegatedAuth.EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER, sub
+        )
+        if user_id_str is None:
+            # If we could not find a user via the external_id, it either does not exist,
+            # or the external_id was never recorded
+
+            # TODO: claim mapping should be configurable
+            username: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("username")
+            if username is None or not isinstance(username, str):
+                raise AuthError(
+                    500,
+                    "Invalid username claim in the introspection result",
+                )
+            user_id = UserID(username, self._hostname)
+
+            # First try to find a user from the username claim
+            user_info = await self.store.get_userinfo_by_id(user_id=user_id.to_string())
+            if user_info is None:
+                # If the user does not exist, we should create it on the fly
+                # TODO: we could use SCIM to provision users ahead of time and listen
+                # for SCIM SET events if those ever become standard:
+                # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hunt-scim-notify-00
+
+                # TODO: claim mapping should be configurable
+                # If present, use the name claim as the displayname
+                name: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("name")
+
+                await self.store.register_user(
+                    user_id=user_id.to_string(), create_profile_with_displayname=name
+                )
+
+            # And record the sub as external_id
+            await self.store.record_user_external_id(
+                MSC3861DelegatedAuth.EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER, sub, user_id.to_string()
+            )
+        else:
+            user_id = UserID.from_string(user_id_str)
+
+        # Find device_id in scope
+        device_id = None
+        for tok in scope:
+            if tok.startswith("urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:device:"):
+                parts = tok.split(":")
+                if len(parts) == 5:
+                    device_id = parts[4]
+
+        if device_id:
+            # Create the device on the fly if it does not exist
+            try:
+                await self.store.get_device(
+                    user_id=user_id.to_string(), device_id=device_id
+                )
+            except StoreError:
+                await self.store.store_device(
+                    user_id=user_id.to_string(),
+                    device_id=device_id,
+                    initial_device_display_name="OIDC-native client",
+                )
+
+        # TODO: there is a few things missing in the requester here, which still need
+        # to be figured out, like:
+        #   - impersonation, with the `authenticated_entity`, which is used for
+        #     rate-limiting, MAU limits, etc.
+        #   - shadow-banning, with the `shadow_banned` flag
+        #   - a proper solution for appservices, which still needs to be figured out in
+        #     the context of MSC3861
+        return create_requester(
+            user_id=user_id,
+            device_id=device_id,
+            scope=scope,
+            is_guest=is_guest,
+        )