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author | Matthew Hodgson <matthew@arasphere.net> | 2016-04-11 10:40:29 +0100 |
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committer | Matthew Hodgson <matthew@arasphere.net> | 2016-04-11 10:40:29 +0100 |
commit | 4bd3d252188e5a4630d35d8b4bf1f3c287e92944 (patch) | |
tree | 9d78df7b09d93b0d49805ff1516f0ec5250c55a1 /docs/url_previews.rst | |
parent | Merge pull request #677 from matrix-org/erikj/dns_cache (diff) | |
parent | fix typos and needless try/except from PR review (diff) | |
download | synapse-4bd3d252188e5a4630d35d8b4bf1f3c287e92944.tar.xz |
Merge pull request #688 from matrix-org/matthew/preview_urls
URL previewing support
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/url_previews.rst')
-rw-r--r-- | docs/url_previews.rst | 74 |
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/url_previews.rst b/docs/url_previews.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..634d9d907f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/url_previews.rst @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +URL Previews +============ + +Design notes on a URL previewing service for Matrix: + +Options are: + + 1. Have an AS which listens for URLs, downloads them, and inserts an event that describes their metadata. + * Pros: + * Decouples the implementation entirely from Synapse. + * Uses existing Matrix events & content repo to store the metadata. + * Cons: + * Which AS should provide this service for a room, and why should you trust it? + * Doesn't work well with E2E; you'd have to cut the AS into every room + * the AS would end up subscribing to every room anyway. + + 2. Have a generic preview API (nothing to do with Matrix) that provides a previewing service: + * Pros: + * Simple and flexible; can be used by any clients at any point + * Cons: + * If each HS provides one of these independently, all the HSes in a room may needlessly DoS the target URI + * We need somewhere to store the URL metadata rather than just using Matrix itself + * We can't piggyback on matrix to distribute the metadata between HSes. + + 3. Make the synapse of the sending user responsible for spidering the URL and inserting an event asynchronously which describes the metadata. + * Pros: + * Works transparently for all clients + * Piggy-backs nicely on using Matrix for distributing the metadata. + * No confusion as to which AS + * Cons: + * Doesn't work with E2E + * We might want to decouple the implementation of the spider from the HS, given spider behaviour can be quite complicated and evolve much more rapidly than the HS. It's more like a bot than a core part of the server. + + 4. Make the sending client use the preview API and insert the event itself when successful. + * Pros: + * Works well with E2E + * No custom server functionality + * Lets the client customise the preview that they send (like on FB) + * Cons: + * Entirely specific to the sending client, whereas it'd be nice if /any/ URL was correctly previewed if clients support it. + + 5. Have the option of specifying a shared (centralised) previewing service used by a room, to avoid all the different HSes in the room DoSing the target. + +Best solution is probably a combination of both 2 and 4. + * Sending clients do their best to create and send a preview at the point of sending the message, perhaps delaying the message until the preview is computed? (This also lets the user validate the preview before sending) + * Receiving clients have the option of going and creating their own preview if one doesn't arrive soon enough (or if the original sender didn't create one) + +This is a bit magical though in that the preview could come from two entirely different sources - the sending HS or your local one. However, this can always be exposed to users: "Generate your own URL previews if none are available?" + +This is tantamount also to senders calculating their own thumbnails for sending in advance of the main content - we are trusting the sender not to lie about the content in the thumbnail. Whereas currently thumbnails are calculated by the receiving homeserver to avoid this attack. + +However, this kind of phishing attack does exist whether we let senders pick their thumbnails or not, in that a malicious sender can send normal text messages around the attachment claiming it to be legitimate. We could rely on (future) reputation/abuse management to punish users who phish (be it with bogus metadata or bogus descriptions). Bogus metadata is particularly bad though, especially if it's avoidable. + +As a first cut, let's do #2 and have the receiver hit the API to calculate its own previews (as it does currently for image thumbnails). We can then extend/optimise this to option 4 as a special extra if needed. + +API +--- + +GET /_matrix/media/r0/preview_url?url=http://wherever.com +200 OK +{ + "og:type" : "article" + "og:url" : "https://twitter.com/matrixdotorg/status/684074366691356672" + "og:title" : "Matrix on Twitter" + "og:image" : "https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/500400952029888512/yI0qtFi7_400x400.png" + "og:description" : "“Synapse 0.12 is out! Lots of polishing, performance &amp; bugfixes: /sync API, /r0 prefix, fulltext search, 3PID invites https://t.co/5alhXLLEGP”" + "og:site_name" : "Twitter" +} + +* Downloads the URL + * If HTML, just stores it in RAM and parses it for OG meta tags + * Download any media OG meta tags to the media repo, and refer to them in the OG via mxc:// URIs. + * If a media filetype we know we can thumbnail: store it on disk, and hand it to the thumbnailer. Generate OG meta tags from the thumbnailer contents. + * Otherwise, don't bother downloading further. |