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author | Patrick Cloke <clokep@users.noreply.github.com> | 2021-09-07 09:10:34 -0400 |
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committer | GitHub <noreply@github.com> | 2021-09-07 13:10:34 +0000 |
commit | 89ba83481821d44a4b768fbcd7761de039393a67 (patch) | |
tree | b3083113dc8b937973d30a88c136bc4f44a01e55 /docs/url_previews.md | |
parent | Return stripped m.space.child events via the space summary. (#10760) (diff) | |
download | synapse-89ba83481821d44a4b768fbcd7761de039393a67.tar.xz |
Use attrs internally for the URL preview code & add documentation. (#10753)
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/url_previews.md')
-rw-r--r-- | docs/url_previews.md | 76 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/docs/url_previews.md b/docs/url_previews.md deleted file mode 100644 index 665554e165..0000000000 --- a/docs/url_previews.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -URL Previews -============ - -Design notes on a URL previewing service for Matrix: - -Options are: - - 1. Have an AS which listens for URLs, downloads them, and inserts an event that describes their metadata. - * Pros: - * Decouples the implementation entirely from Synapse. - * Uses existing Matrix events & content repo to store the metadata. - * Cons: - * Which AS should provide this service for a room, and why should you trust it? - * Doesn't work well with E2E; you'd have to cut the AS into every room - * the AS would end up subscribing to every room anyway. - - 2. Have a generic preview API (nothing to do with Matrix) that provides a previewing service: - * Pros: - * Simple and flexible; can be used by any clients at any point - * Cons: - * If each HS provides one of these independently, all the HSes in a room may needlessly DoS the target URI - * We need somewhere to store the URL metadata rather than just using Matrix itself - * We can't piggyback on matrix to distribute the metadata between HSes. - - 3. Make the synapse of the sending user responsible for spidering the URL and inserting an event asynchronously which describes the metadata. - * Pros: - * Works transparently for all clients - * Piggy-backs nicely on using Matrix for distributing the metadata. - * No confusion as to which AS - * Cons: - * Doesn't work with E2E - * We might want to decouple the implementation of the spider from the HS, given spider behaviour can be quite complicated and evolve much more rapidly than the HS. It's more like a bot than a core part of the server. - - 4. Make the sending client use the preview API and insert the event itself when successful. - * Pros: - * Works well with E2E - * No custom server functionality - * Lets the client customise the preview that they send (like on FB) - * Cons: - * Entirely specific to the sending client, whereas it'd be nice if /any/ URL was correctly previewed if clients support it. - - 5. Have the option of specifying a shared (centralised) previewing service used by a room, to avoid all the different HSes in the room DoSing the target. - -Best solution is probably a combination of both 2 and 4. - * Sending clients do their best to create and send a preview at the point of sending the message, perhaps delaying the message until the preview is computed? (This also lets the user validate the preview before sending) - * Receiving clients have the option of going and creating their own preview if one doesn't arrive soon enough (or if the original sender didn't create one) - -This is a bit magical though in that the preview could come from two entirely different sources - the sending HS or your local one. However, this can always be exposed to users: "Generate your own URL previews if none are available?" - -This is tantamount also to senders calculating their own thumbnails for sending in advance of the main content - we are trusting the sender not to lie about the content in the thumbnail. Whereas currently thumbnails are calculated by the receiving homeserver to avoid this attack. - -However, this kind of phishing attack does exist whether we let senders pick their thumbnails or not, in that a malicious sender can send normal text messages around the attachment claiming it to be legitimate. We could rely on (future) reputation/abuse management to punish users who phish (be it with bogus metadata or bogus descriptions). Bogus metadata is particularly bad though, especially if it's avoidable. - -As a first cut, let's do #2 and have the receiver hit the API to calculate its own previews (as it does currently for image thumbnails). We can then extend/optimise this to option 4 as a special extra if needed. - -API ---- - -``` -GET /_matrix/media/r0/preview_url?url=http://wherever.com -200 OK -{ - "og:type" : "article" - "og:url" : "https://twitter.com/matrixdotorg/status/684074366691356672" - "og:title" : "Matrix on Twitter" - "og:image" : "https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/500400952029888512/yI0qtFi7_400x400.png" - "og:description" : "“Synapse 0.12 is out! Lots of polishing, performance &amp; bugfixes: /sync API, /r0 prefix, fulltext search, 3PID invites https://t.co/5alhXLLEGP”" - "og:site_name" : "Twitter" -} -``` - -* Downloads the URL - * If HTML, just stores it in RAM and parses it for OG meta tags - * Download any media OG meta tags to the media repo, and refer to them in the OG via mxc:// URIs. - * If a media filetype we know we can thumbnail: store it on disk, and hand it to the thumbnailer. Generate OG meta tags from the thumbnailer contents. - * Otherwise, don't bother downloading further. |