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+Overview
+========
+
+Scope
+-----
+
+This document considers threats specific to the server to server federation 
+synapse protocol.
+
+
+Attacker
+--------
+
+It is assumed that the attacker can see and manipulate all network traffic 
+between any of the servers and may be in control of one or more homeservers 
+participating in the federation protocol.
+
+Threat Model
+============
+
+Denial of Service
+-----------------
+
+The attacker could attempt to prevent delivery of messages to or from the 
+victim in order to:
+
+    * Disrupt service or marketing campaign of a commercial competitor.
+    * Censor a discussion or censor a participant in a discussion.
+    * Perform general vandalism.
+
+Threat: Resource Exhaustion
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could cause the victims server to exhaust a particular resource 
+(e.g. open TCP connections, CPU, memory, disk storage)
+
+Threat: Unrecoverable Consistency Violations
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could send messages which created an unrecoverable "split-brain"
+state in the cluster such that the victim's servers could no longer dervive a
+consistent view of the chatroom state.
+
+Threat: Bad History
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could convince the victim to accept invalid messages which the 
+victim would then include in their view of the chatroom history. Other servers
+in the chatroom would reject the invalid messages and potentially reject the
+victims messages as well since they depended on the invalid messages.
+
+Threat: Block Network Traffic
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could try to firewall traffic between the victim's server and some
+or all of the other servers in the chatroom.
+
+Threat: High Volume of Messages
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could send large volumes of messages to a chatroom with the victim
+making the chatroom unusable.
+
+Threat: Banning users without necessary authorisation
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could attempt to ban a user from a chatroom with the necessary
+authorisation.
+
+Spoofing
+--------
+
+An attacker could try to send a message claiming to be from the victim without 
+the victim having sent the message in order to:
+
+    * Impersonate the victim while performing illict activity.
+    * Obtain privileges of the victim.
+
+Threat: Altering Message Contents
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could try to alter the contents of an existing message from the 
+victim.
+
+Threat: Fake Message "origin" Field
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could try to send a new message purporting to be from the victim
+with a phony "origin" field.
+
+Spamming
+--------
+
+The attacker could try to send a high volume of solicicted or unsolicted 
+messages to the victim in order to:
+    
+    * Find victims for scams.
+    * Market unwanted products.
+
+Threat: Unsoliticted Messages
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could try to send messages to victims who do not wish to receive 
+them.
+
+Threat: Abusive Messages
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could send abusive or threatening messages to the victim
+
+Spying
+------
+
+The attacker could try to access message contents or metadata for messages sent
+by the victim or to the victim that were not intended to reach the attacker in
+order to:
+
+    * Gain sensitive personal or commercial information.
+    * Impersonate the victim using credentials contained in the messages.
+      (e.g. password reset messages)
+    * Discover who the victim was talking to and when.
+
+Threat: Disclosure during Transmission
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could try to expose the message contents or metadata during 
+transmission between the servers.
+
+Threat: Disclosure to Servers Outside Chatroom
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could try to convince servers within a chatroom to send messages to
+a server it controls that was not authorised to be within the chatroom.
+
+Threat: Disclosure to Servers Within Chatroom
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker could take control of a server within a chatroom to expose message
+contents or metadata for messages in that room.
+
+