diff --git a/src/encryption/DeviceVerificationFlow.cpp b/src/encryption/DeviceVerificationFlow.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2481d4f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/encryption/DeviceVerificationFlow.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,849 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+#include "DeviceVerificationFlow.h"
+
+#include "Cache.h"
+#include "Cache_p.h"
+#include "ChatPage.h"
+#include "Logging.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+#include "timeline/TimelineModel.h"
+
+#include <QDateTime>
+#include <QTimer>
+#include <iostream>
+
+static constexpr int TIMEOUT = 2 * 60 * 1000; // 2 minutes
+
+namespace msgs = mtx::events::msg;
+
+static mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac
+key_verification_mac(mtx::crypto::SAS *sas,
+ mtx::identifiers::User sender,
+ const std::string &senderDevice,
+ mtx::identifiers::User receiver,
+ const std::string &receiverDevice,
+ const std::string &transactionId,
+ std::map<std::string, std::string> keys);
+
+DeviceVerificationFlow::DeviceVerificationFlow(QObject *,
+ DeviceVerificationFlow::Type flow_type,
+ TimelineModel *model,
+ QString userID,
+ QString deviceId_)
+ : sender(false)
+ , type(flow_type)
+ , deviceId(deviceId_)
+ , model_(model)
+{
+ timeout = new QTimer(this);
+ timeout->setSingleShot(true);
+ this->sas = olm::client()->sas_init();
+ this->isMacVerified = false;
+
+ auto user_id = userID.toStdString();
+ this->toClient = mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(user_id);
+ cache::client()->query_keys(
+ user_id, [user_id, this](const UserKeyCache &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to query device keys: {},{}",
+ mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!this->deviceId.isEmpty() &&
+ (res.device_keys.find(deviceId.toStdString()) == res.device_keys.end())) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("no devices retrieved {}", user_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ this->their_keys = res;
+ });
+
+ cache::client()->query_keys(
+ http::client()->user_id().to_string(),
+ [this](const UserKeyCache &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to query device keys: {},{}",
+ mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (res.master_keys.keys.empty())
+ return;
+
+ if (auto status = cache::verificationStatus(http::client()->user_id().to_string());
+ status && status->user_verified == crypto::Trust::Verified)
+ this->our_trusted_master_key = res.master_keys.keys.begin()->second;
+ });
+
+ if (model) {
+ connect(
+ this->model_, &TimelineModel::updateFlowEventId, this, [this](std::string event_id_) {
+ this->relation.rel_type = mtx::common::RelationType::Reference;
+ this->relation.event_id = event_id_;
+ this->transaction_id = event_id_;
+ });
+ }
+
+ connect(timeout, &QTimer::timeout, this, [this]() {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: timeout");
+ if (state_ != Success && state_ != Failed)
+ this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::Timeout);
+ });
+
+ connect(ChatPage::instance(),
+ &ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationStart,
+ this,
+ &DeviceVerificationFlow::handleStartMessage);
+ connect(ChatPage::instance(),
+ &ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationAccept,
+ this,
+ [this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationAccept &msg) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received accept");
+ if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
+ if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
+ return;
+ } else if (msg.relations.references()) {
+ if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((msg.key_agreement_protocol == "curve25519-hkdf-sha256") &&
+ (msg.hash == "sha256") &&
+ (msg.message_authentication_code == "hkdf-hmac-sha256")) {
+ this->commitment = msg.commitment;
+ if (std::find(msg.short_authentication_string.begin(),
+ msg.short_authentication_string.end(),
+ mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji) !=
+ msg.short_authentication_string.end()) {
+ this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji;
+ } else {
+ this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal;
+ }
+ this->mac_method = msg.message_authentication_code;
+ this->sendVerificationKey();
+ } else {
+ this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod);
+ }
+ });
+
+ connect(ChatPage::instance(),
+ &ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationCancel,
+ this,
+ [this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel &msg) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received cancel");
+ if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
+ if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
+ return;
+ } else if (msg.relations.references()) {
+ if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
+ return;
+ }
+ error_ = User;
+ emit errorChanged();
+ setState(Failed);
+ });
+
+ connect(
+ ChatPage::instance(),
+ &ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationKey,
+ this,
+ [this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationKey &msg) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received key");
+ if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
+ if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
+ return;
+ } else if (msg.relations.references()) {
+ if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (sender) {
+ if (state_ != WaitingForOtherToAccept) {
+ this->cancelVerification(OutOfOrder);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (state_ != WaitingForKeys) {
+ this->cancelVerification(OutOfOrder);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ this->sas->set_their_key(msg.key);
+ std::string info;
+ if (this->sender == true) {
+ info = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_SAS|" + http::client()->user_id().to_string() + "|" +
+ http::client()->device_id() + "|" + this->sas->public_key() + "|" +
+ this->toClient.to_string() + "|" + this->deviceId.toStdString() + "|" +
+ msg.key + "|" + this->transaction_id;
+ } else {
+ info = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_SAS|" + this->toClient.to_string() + "|" +
+ this->deviceId.toStdString() + "|" + msg.key + "|" +
+ http::client()->user_id().to_string() + "|" + http::client()->device_id() +
+ "|" + this->sas->public_key() + "|" + this->transaction_id;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::ui()->info("Info is: '{}'", info);
+
+ if (this->sender == false) {
+ this->sendVerificationKey();
+ } else {
+ if (this->commitment != mtx::crypto::bin2base64_unpadded(mtx::crypto::sha256(
+ msg.key + this->canonical_json.dump()))) {
+ this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::MismatchedCommitment);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji) {
+ this->sasList = this->sas->generate_bytes_emoji(info);
+ setState(CompareEmoji);
+ } else if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal) {
+ this->sasList = this->sas->generate_bytes_decimal(info);
+ setState(CompareNumber);
+ }
+ });
+
+ connect(
+ ChatPage::instance(),
+ &ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationMac,
+ this,
+ [this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac &msg) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received mac");
+ if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
+ if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
+ return;
+ } else if (msg.relations.references()) {
+ if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::string> key_list;
+ std::string key_string;
+ for (const auto &mac : msg.mac) {
+ for (const auto &[deviceid, key] : their_keys.device_keys) {
+ (void)deviceid;
+ if (key.keys.count(mac.first))
+ key_list[mac.first] = key.keys.at(mac.first);
+ }
+
+ if (their_keys.master_keys.keys.count(mac.first))
+ key_list[mac.first] = their_keys.master_keys.keys[mac.first];
+ if (their_keys.user_signing_keys.keys.count(mac.first))
+ key_list[mac.first] = their_keys.user_signing_keys.keys[mac.first];
+ if (their_keys.self_signing_keys.keys.count(mac.first))
+ key_list[mac.first] = their_keys.self_signing_keys.keys[mac.first];
+ }
+ auto macs = key_verification_mac(sas.get(),
+ toClient,
+ this->deviceId.toStdString(),
+ http::client()->user_id(),
+ http::client()->device_id(),
+ this->transaction_id,
+ key_list);
+
+ for (const auto &[key, mac] : macs.mac) {
+ if (mac != msg.mac.at(key)) {
+ this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::KeyMismatch);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (msg.keys == macs.keys) {
+ mtx::requests::KeySignaturesUpload req;
+ if (utils::localUser().toStdString() == this->toClient.to_string()) {
+ // self verification, sign master key with device key, if we
+ // verified it
+ for (const auto &mac : msg.mac) {
+ if (their_keys.master_keys.keys.count(mac.first)) {
+ json j = their_keys.master_keys;
+ j.erase("signatures");
+ j.erase("unsigned");
+ mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key = j;
+ master_key.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
+ ["ed25519:" + http::client()->device_id()] =
+ olm::client()->sign_message(j.dump());
+ req.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
+ [master_key.keys.at(mac.first)] = master_key;
+ } else if (mac.first == "ed25519:" + this->deviceId.toStdString()) {
+ // Sign their device key with self signing key
+
+ auto device_id = this->deviceId.toStdString();
+
+ if (their_keys.device_keys.count(device_id)) {
+ json j = their_keys.device_keys.at(device_id);
+ j.erase("signatures");
+ j.erase("unsigned");
+
+ auto secret = cache::secret(
+ mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing);
+ if (!secret)
+ continue;
+ auto ssk = mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(*secret);
+
+ mtx::crypto::DeviceKeys dev = j;
+ dev.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
+ ["ed25519:" + ssk.public_key()] = ssk.sign(j.dump());
+
+ req.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()][device_id] = dev;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Sign their master key with user signing key
+ for (const auto &mac : msg.mac) {
+ if (their_keys.master_keys.keys.count(mac.first)) {
+ json j = their_keys.master_keys;
+ j.erase("signatures");
+ j.erase("unsigned");
+
+ auto secret =
+ cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing);
+ if (!secret)
+ continue;
+ auto usk = mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(*secret);
+
+ mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key = j;
+ master_key.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
+ ["ed25519:" + usk.public_key()] = usk.sign(j.dump());
+
+ req.signatures[toClient.to_string()][master_key.keys.at(mac.first)] =
+ master_key;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!req.signatures.empty()) {
+ http::client()->keys_signatures_upload(
+ req,
+ [](const mtx::responses::KeySignaturesUpload &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("failed to upload signatures: {},{}",
+ mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ }
+
+ for (const auto &[user_id, tmp] : res.errors)
+ for (const auto &[key_id, e] : tmp)
+ nhlog::net()->error("signature error for user {} and key "
+ "id {}: {}, {}",
+ user_id,
+ key_id,
+ mtx::errors::to_string(e.errcode),
+ e.error);
+ });
+ }
+
+ this->isMacVerified = true;
+ this->acceptDevice();
+ } else {
+ this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::KeyMismatch);
+ }
+ });
+
+ connect(ChatPage::instance(),
+ &ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationReady,
+ this,
+ [this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationReady &msg) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received ready");
+ if (!sender) {
+ if (msg.from_device != http::client()->device_id()) {
+ error_ = User;
+ emit errorChanged();
+ setState(Failed);
+ }
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
+ if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
+ return;
+ } else if (msg.relations.references()) {
+ if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
+ return;
+ else {
+ this->deviceId = QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device);
+ }
+ }
+ this->startVerificationRequest();
+ });
+
+ connect(ChatPage::instance(),
+ &ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationDone,
+ this,
+ [this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationDone &msg) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received done");
+ if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
+ if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
+ return;
+ } else if (msg.relations.references()) {
+ if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
+ return;
+ }
+ nhlog::ui()->info("Flow done on other side");
+ });
+
+ timeout->start(TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+QString
+DeviceVerificationFlow::state()
+{
+ switch (state_) {
+ case PromptStartVerification:
+ return "PromptStartVerification";
+ case CompareEmoji:
+ return "CompareEmoji";
+ case CompareNumber:
+ return "CompareNumber";
+ case WaitingForKeys:
+ return "WaitingForKeys";
+ case WaitingForOtherToAccept:
+ return "WaitingForOtherToAccept";
+ case WaitingForMac:
+ return "WaitingForMac";
+ case Success:
+ return "Success";
+ case Failed:
+ return "Failed";
+ default:
+ return "";
+ }
+}
+
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::next()
+{
+ if (sender) {
+ switch (state_) {
+ case PromptStartVerification:
+ sendVerificationRequest();
+ break;
+ case CompareEmoji:
+ case CompareNumber:
+ sendVerificationMac();
+ break;
+ case WaitingForKeys:
+ case WaitingForOtherToAccept:
+ case WaitingForMac:
+ case Success:
+ case Failed:
+ nhlog::db()->error("verification: Invalid state transition!");
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (state_) {
+ case PromptStartVerification:
+ if (canonical_json.is_null())
+ sendVerificationReady();
+ else // legacy path without request and ready
+ acceptVerificationRequest();
+ break;
+ case CompareEmoji:
+ [[fallthrough]];
+ case CompareNumber:
+ sendVerificationMac();
+ break;
+ case WaitingForKeys:
+ case WaitingForOtherToAccept:
+ case WaitingForMac:
+ case Success:
+ case Failed:
+ nhlog::db()->error("verification: Invalid state transition!");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+QString
+DeviceVerificationFlow::getUserId()
+{
+ return QString::fromStdString(this->toClient.to_string());
+}
+
+QString
+DeviceVerificationFlow::getDeviceId()
+{
+ return this->deviceId;
+}
+
+bool
+DeviceVerificationFlow::getSender()
+{
+ return this->sender;
+}
+
+std::vector<int>
+DeviceVerificationFlow::getSasList()
+{
+ return this->sasList;
+}
+
+bool
+DeviceVerificationFlow::isSelfVerification() const
+{
+ return this->toClient.to_string() == http::client()->user_id().to_string();
+}
+
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::setEventId(std::string event_id_)
+{
+ this->relation.rel_type = mtx::common::RelationType::Reference;
+ this->relation.event_id = event_id_;
+ this->transaction_id = event_id_;
+}
+
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::handleStartMessage(const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart &msg,
+ std::string)
+{
+ if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
+ if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
+ return;
+ } else if (msg.relations.references()) {
+ if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((std::find(msg.key_agreement_protocols.begin(),
+ msg.key_agreement_protocols.end(),
+ "curve25519-hkdf-sha256") != msg.key_agreement_protocols.end()) &&
+ (std::find(msg.hashes.begin(), msg.hashes.end(), "sha256") != msg.hashes.end()) &&
+ (std::find(msg.message_authentication_codes.begin(),
+ msg.message_authentication_codes.end(),
+ "hkdf-hmac-sha256") != msg.message_authentication_codes.end())) {
+ if (std::find(msg.short_authentication_string.begin(),
+ msg.short_authentication_string.end(),
+ mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji) !=
+ msg.short_authentication_string.end()) {
+ this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji;
+ } else if (std::find(msg.short_authentication_string.begin(),
+ msg.short_authentication_string.end(),
+ mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal) !=
+ msg.short_authentication_string.end()) {
+ this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal;
+ } else {
+ this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!sender)
+ this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(msg);
+ else {
+ if (utils::localUser().toStdString() < this->toClient.to_string()) {
+ this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (state_ != PromptStartVerification)
+ this->acceptVerificationRequest();
+ } else {
+ this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod);
+ }
+}
+
+//! accepts a verification
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::acceptVerificationRequest()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationAccept req;
+
+ req.method = mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1;
+ req.key_agreement_protocol = "curve25519-hkdf-sha256";
+ req.hash = "sha256";
+ req.message_authentication_code = "hkdf-hmac-sha256";
+ if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji)
+ req.short_authentication_string = {mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji};
+ else if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal)
+ req.short_authentication_string = {mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal};
+ req.commitment = mtx::crypto::bin2base64_unpadded(
+ mtx::crypto::sha256(this->sas->public_key() + this->canonical_json.dump()));
+
+ send(req);
+ setState(WaitingForKeys);
+}
+//! responds verification request
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationReady()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationReady req;
+
+ req.from_device = http::client()->device_id();
+ req.methods = {mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1};
+
+ send(req);
+ setState(WaitingForKeys);
+}
+//! accepts a verification
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationDone()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationDone req;
+
+ send(req);
+}
+//! starts the verification flow
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::startVerificationRequest()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart req;
+
+ req.from_device = http::client()->device_id();
+ req.method = mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1;
+ req.key_agreement_protocols = {"curve25519-hkdf-sha256"};
+ req.hashes = {"sha256"};
+ req.message_authentication_codes = {"hkdf-hmac-sha256"};
+ req.short_authentication_string = {mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal,
+ mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji};
+
+ if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::ToDevice) {
+ mtx::requests::ToDeviceMessages<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart> body;
+ req.transaction_id = this->transaction_id;
+ this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(req);
+ } else if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::RoomMsg && model_) {
+ req.relations.relations.push_back(this->relation);
+ // Set synthesized to surpress the nheko relation extensions
+ req.relations.synthesized = true;
+ this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(req);
+ }
+ send(req);
+ setState(WaitingForOtherToAccept);
+}
+//! sends a verification request
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationRequest()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest req;
+
+ req.from_device = http::client()->device_id();
+ req.methods = {mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1};
+
+ if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::ToDevice) {
+ QDateTime currentTime = QDateTime::currentDateTimeUtc();
+
+ req.timestamp = (uint64_t)currentTime.toMSecsSinceEpoch();
+
+ } else if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::RoomMsg && model_) {
+ req.to = this->toClient.to_string();
+ req.msgtype = "m.key.verification.request";
+ req.body = "User is requesting to verify keys with you. However, your client does "
+ "not support this method, so you will need to use the legacy method of "
+ "key verification.";
+ }
+
+ send(req);
+ setState(WaitingForOtherToAccept);
+}
+//! cancels a verification flow
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error error_code)
+{
+ if (state_ == State::Success || state_ == State::Failed)
+ return;
+
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel req;
+
+ if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod) {
+ req.code = "m.unknown_method";
+ req.reason = "unknown method received";
+ } else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::MismatchedCommitment) {
+ req.code = "m.mismatched_commitment";
+ req.reason = "commitment didn't match";
+ } else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::MismatchedSAS) {
+ req.code = "m.mismatched_sas";
+ req.reason = "sas didn't match";
+ } else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::KeyMismatch) {
+ req.code = "m.key_match";
+ req.reason = "keys did not match";
+ } else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::Timeout) {
+ req.code = "m.timeout";
+ req.reason = "timed out";
+ } else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::User) {
+ req.code = "m.user";
+ req.reason = "user cancelled the verification";
+ } else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::OutOfOrder) {
+ req.code = "m.unexpected_message";
+ req.reason = "received messages out of order";
+ }
+
+ this->error_ = error_code;
+ emit errorChanged();
+ this->setState(Failed);
+
+ send(req);
+}
+//! sends the verification key
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationKey()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationKey req;
+
+ req.key = this->sas->public_key();
+
+ send(req);
+}
+
+mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac
+key_verification_mac(mtx::crypto::SAS *sas,
+ mtx::identifiers::User sender,
+ const std::string &senderDevice,
+ mtx::identifiers::User receiver,
+ const std::string &receiverDevice,
+ const std::string &transactionId,
+ std::map<std::string, std::string> keys)
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac req;
+
+ std::string info = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_MAC" + sender.to_string() + senderDevice +
+ receiver.to_string() + receiverDevice + transactionId;
+
+ std::string key_list;
+ bool first = true;
+ for (const auto &[key_id, key] : keys) {
+ req.mac[key_id] = sas->calculate_mac(key, info + key_id);
+
+ if (!first)
+ key_list += ",";
+ key_list += key_id;
+ first = false;
+ }
+
+ req.keys = sas->calculate_mac(key_list, info + "KEY_IDS");
+
+ return req;
+}
+
+//! sends the mac of the keys
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationMac()
+{
+ std::map<std::string, std::string> key_list;
+ key_list["ed25519:" + http::client()->device_id()] = olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519;
+
+ // send our master key, if we trust it
+ if (!this->our_trusted_master_key.empty())
+ key_list["ed25519:" + our_trusted_master_key] = our_trusted_master_key;
+
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac req = key_verification_mac(sas.get(),
+ http::client()->user_id(),
+ http::client()->device_id(),
+ this->toClient,
+ this->deviceId.toStdString(),
+ this->transaction_id,
+ key_list);
+
+ send(req);
+
+ setState(WaitingForMac);
+ acceptDevice();
+}
+//! Completes the verification flow
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::acceptDevice()
+{
+ if (!isMacVerified) {
+ setState(WaitingForMac);
+ } else if (state_ == WaitingForMac) {
+ cache::markDeviceVerified(this->toClient.to_string(), this->deviceId.toStdString());
+ this->sendVerificationDone();
+ setState(Success);
+
+ // Request secrets. We should probably check somehow, if a device knowns about the
+ // secrets.
+ if (utils::localUser().toStdString() == this->toClient.to_string() &&
+ (!cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing) ||
+ !cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing))) {
+ olm::request_cross_signing_keys();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void
+DeviceVerificationFlow::unverify()
+{
+ cache::markDeviceUnverified(this->toClient.to_string(), this->deviceId.toStdString());
+
+ emit refreshProfile();
+}
+
+QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
+DeviceVerificationFlow::NewInRoomVerification(QObject *parent_,
+ TimelineModel *timelineModel_,
+ const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest &msg,
+ QString other_user_,
+ QString event_id_)
+{
+ QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(
+ new DeviceVerificationFlow(parent_,
+ Type::RoomMsg,
+ timelineModel_,
+ other_user_,
+ QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device)));
+
+ flow->setEventId(event_id_.toStdString());
+
+ if (std::find(msg.methods.begin(),
+ msg.methods.end(),
+ mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1) == msg.methods.end()) {
+ flow->cancelVerification(UnknownMethod);
+ }
+
+ return flow;
+}
+QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
+DeviceVerificationFlow::NewToDeviceVerification(QObject *parent_,
+ const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest &msg,
+ QString other_user_,
+ QString txn_id_)
+{
+ QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(new DeviceVerificationFlow(
+ parent_, Type::ToDevice, nullptr, other_user_, QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device)));
+ flow->transaction_id = txn_id_.toStdString();
+
+ if (std::find(msg.methods.begin(),
+ msg.methods.end(),
+ mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1) == msg.methods.end()) {
+ flow->cancelVerification(UnknownMethod);
+ }
+
+ return flow;
+}
+QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
+DeviceVerificationFlow::NewToDeviceVerification(QObject *parent_,
+ const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart &msg,
+ QString other_user_,
+ QString txn_id_)
+{
+ QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(new DeviceVerificationFlow(
+ parent_, Type::ToDevice, nullptr, other_user_, QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device)));
+ flow->transaction_id = txn_id_.toStdString();
+
+ flow->handleStartMessage(msg, "");
+
+ return flow;
+}
+QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
+DeviceVerificationFlow::InitiateUserVerification(QObject *parent_,
+ TimelineModel *timelineModel_,
+ QString userid)
+{
+ QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(
+ new DeviceVerificationFlow(parent_, Type::RoomMsg, timelineModel_, userid, ""));
+ flow->sender = true;
+ return flow;
+}
+QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
+DeviceVerificationFlow::InitiateDeviceVerification(QObject *parent_, QString userid, QString device)
+{
+ QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(
+ new DeviceVerificationFlow(parent_, Type::ToDevice, nullptr, userid, device));
+
+ flow->sender = true;
+ flow->transaction_id = http::client()->generate_txn_id();
+
+ return flow;
+}
diff --git a/src/encryption/DeviceVerificationFlow.h b/src/encryption/DeviceVerificationFlow.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f71fa337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/encryption/DeviceVerificationFlow.h
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <QObject>
+
+#include <mtx/responses/crypto.hpp>
+#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
+
+#include "CacheCryptoStructs.h"
+#include "Logging.h"
+#include "MatrixClient.h"
+#include "Olm.h"
+#include "timeline/TimelineModel.h"
+
+class QTimer;
+
+using sas_ptr = std::unique_ptr<mtx::crypto::SAS>;
+
+// clang-format off
+/*
+ * Stolen from fluffy chat :D
+ *
+ * State | +-------------+ +-----------+ |
+ * | | AliceDevice | | BobDevice | |
+ * | | (sender) | | | |
+ * | +-------------+ +-----------+ |
+ * promptStartVerify | | | |
+ * | o | (m.key.verification.request) | |
+ * | p |-------------------------------->| (ASK FOR VERIFICATION REQUEST) |
+ * waitForOtherAccept | t | | | promptStartVerify
+ * && | i | (m.key.verification.ready) | |
+ * no commitment | o |<--------------------------------| |
+ * && | n | | |
+ * no canonical_json | a | (m.key.verification.start) | | waitingForKeys
+ * | l |<--------------------------------| Not sending to prevent the glare resolve| && no commitment
+ * | | | | && no canonical_json
+ * | | m.key.verification.start | |
+ * waitForOtherAccept | |-------------------------------->| (IF NOT ALREADY ASKED, |
+ * && | | | ASK FOR VERIFICATION REQUEST) | promptStartVerify, if not accepted
+ * canonical_json | | m.key.verification.accept | |
+ * | |<--------------------------------| |
+ * waitForOtherAccept | | | | waitingForKeys
+ * && | | m.key.verification.key | | && canonical_json
+ * commitment | |-------------------------------->| | && commitment
+ * | | | |
+ * | | m.key.verification.key | |
+ * | |<--------------------------------| |
+ * compareEmoji/Number| | | | compareEmoji/Number
+ * | | COMPARE EMOJI / NUMBERS | |
+ * | | | |
+ * waitingForMac | | m.key.verification.mac | | waitingForMac
+ * | success |<------------------------------->| success |
+ * | | | |
+ * success/fail | | m.key.verification.done | | success/fail
+ * | |<------------------------------->| |
+ */
+// clang-format on
+class DeviceVerificationFlow : public QObject
+{
+ Q_OBJECT
+ Q_PROPERTY(QString state READ state NOTIFY stateChanged)
+ Q_PROPERTY(Error error READ error NOTIFY errorChanged)
+ Q_PROPERTY(QString userId READ getUserId CONSTANT)
+ Q_PROPERTY(QString deviceId READ getDeviceId CONSTANT)
+ Q_PROPERTY(bool sender READ getSender CONSTANT)
+ Q_PROPERTY(std::vector<int> sasList READ getSasList CONSTANT)
+ Q_PROPERTY(bool isDeviceVerification READ isDeviceVerification CONSTANT)
+ Q_PROPERTY(bool isSelfVerification READ isSelfVerification CONSTANT)
+
+public:
+ enum State
+ {
+ PromptStartVerification,
+ WaitingForOtherToAccept,
+ WaitingForKeys,
+ CompareEmoji,
+ CompareNumber,
+ WaitingForMac,
+ Success,
+ Failed,
+ };
+ Q_ENUM(State)
+
+ enum Type
+ {
+ ToDevice,
+ RoomMsg
+ };
+
+ enum Error
+ {
+ UnknownMethod,
+ MismatchedCommitment,
+ MismatchedSAS,
+ KeyMismatch,
+ Timeout,
+ User,
+ OutOfOrder,
+ };
+ Q_ENUM(Error)
+
+ static QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> NewInRoomVerification(
+ QObject *parent_,
+ TimelineModel *timelineModel_,
+ const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest &msg,
+ QString other_user_,
+ QString event_id_);
+ static QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> NewToDeviceVerification(
+ QObject *parent_,
+ const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest &msg,
+ QString other_user_,
+ QString txn_id_);
+ static QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> NewToDeviceVerification(
+ QObject *parent_,
+ const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart &msg,
+ QString other_user_,
+ QString txn_id_);
+ static QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
+ InitiateUserVerification(QObject *parent_, TimelineModel *timelineModel_, QString userid);
+ static QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> InitiateDeviceVerification(QObject *parent,
+ QString userid,
+ QString device);
+
+ // getters
+ QString state();
+ Error error() { return error_; }
+ QString getUserId();
+ QString getDeviceId();
+ bool getSender();
+ std::vector<int> getSasList();
+ QString transactionId() { return QString::fromStdString(this->transaction_id); }
+ // setters
+ void setDeviceId(QString deviceID);
+ void setEventId(std::string event_id);
+ bool isDeviceVerification() const
+ {
+ return this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::ToDevice;
+ }
+ bool isSelfVerification() const;
+
+ void callback_fn(const UserKeyCache &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err, std::string user_id);
+
+public slots:
+ //! unverifies a device
+ void unverify();
+ //! Continues the flow
+ void next();
+ //! Cancel the flow
+ void cancel() { cancelVerification(User); }
+
+signals:
+ void refreshProfile();
+ void stateChanged();
+ void errorChanged();
+
+private:
+ DeviceVerificationFlow(QObject *,
+ DeviceVerificationFlow::Type flow_type,
+ TimelineModel *model,
+ QString userID,
+ QString deviceId_);
+ void setState(State state)
+ {
+ if (state != state_) {
+ state_ = state;
+ emit stateChanged();
+ }
+ }
+
+ void handleStartMessage(const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart &msg, std::string);
+ //! sends a verification request
+ void sendVerificationRequest();
+ //! accepts a verification request
+ void sendVerificationReady();
+ //! completes the verification flow();
+ void sendVerificationDone();
+ //! accepts a verification
+ void acceptVerificationRequest();
+ //! starts the verification flow
+ void startVerificationRequest();
+ //! cancels a verification flow
+ void cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error error_code);
+ //! sends the verification key
+ void sendVerificationKey();
+ //! sends the mac of the keys
+ void sendVerificationMac();
+ //! Completes the verification flow
+ void acceptDevice();
+
+ std::string transaction_id;
+
+ bool sender;
+ Type type;
+ mtx::identifiers::User toClient;
+ QString deviceId;
+
+ // public part of our master key, when trusted or empty
+ std::string our_trusted_master_key;
+
+ mtx::events::msg::SASMethods method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji;
+ QTimer *timeout = nullptr;
+ sas_ptr sas;
+ std::string mac_method;
+ std::string commitment;
+ nlohmann::json canonical_json;
+
+ std::vector<int> sasList;
+ UserKeyCache their_keys;
+ TimelineModel *model_;
+ mtx::common::Relation relation;
+
+ State state_ = PromptStartVerification;
+ Error error_ = UnknownMethod;
+
+ bool isMacVerified = false;
+
+ template<typename T>
+ void send(T msg)
+ {
+ if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::ToDevice) {
+ mtx::requests::ToDeviceMessages<T> body;
+ msg.transaction_id = this->transaction_id;
+ body[this->toClient][deviceId.toStdString()] = msg;
+
+ http::client()->send_to_device<T>(
+ this->transaction_id, body, [](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err)
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send verification to_device message: {} {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error,
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ });
+ } else if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::RoomMsg && model_) {
+ if constexpr (!std::is_same_v<T, mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest>) {
+ msg.relations.relations.push_back(this->relation);
+ // Set synthesized to surpress the nheko relation extensions
+ msg.relations.synthesized = true;
+ }
+ (model_)->sendMessageEvent(msg, mtx::events::to_device_content_to_type<T>);
+ }
+
+ nhlog::net()->debug("Sent verification step: {} in state: {}",
+ mtx::events::to_string(mtx::events::to_device_content_to_type<T>),
+ state().toStdString());
+ }
+};
diff --git a/src/encryption/Olm.cpp b/src/encryption/Olm.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..14c97984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/encryption/Olm.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1612 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+#include "Olm.h"
+
+#include <QObject>
+#include <QTimer>
+
+#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
+#include <variant>
+
+#include <mtx/responses/common.hpp>
+#include <mtx/secret_storage.hpp>
+
+#include "Cache.h"
+#include "Cache_p.h"
+#include "ChatPage.h"
+#include "DeviceVerificationFlow.h"
+#include "Logging.h"
+#include "MatrixClient.h"
+#include "UserSettingsPage.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+namespace {
+auto client_ = std::make_unique<mtx::crypto::OlmClient>();
+
+std::map<std::string, std::string> request_id_to_secret_name;
+
+constexpr auto MEGOLM_ALGO = "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2";
+}
+
+namespace olm {
+static void
+backup_session_key(const MegolmSessionIndex &idx,
+ const GroupSessionData &data,
+ mtx::crypto::InboundGroupSessionPtr &session);
+
+void
+from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, OlmMessage &msg)
+{
+ if (obj.at("type") != "m.room.encrypted")
+ throw std::invalid_argument("invalid type for olm message");
+
+ if (obj.at("content").at("algorithm") != OLM_ALGO)
+ throw std::invalid_argument("invalid algorithm for olm message");
+
+ msg.sender = obj.at("sender");
+ msg.sender_key = obj.at("content").at("sender_key");
+ msg.ciphertext = obj.at("content")
+ .at("ciphertext")
+ .get<std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent>>();
+}
+
+mtx::crypto::OlmClient *
+client()
+{
+ return client_.get();
+}
+
+static void
+handle_secret_request(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest> *e,
+ const std::string &sender)
+{
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+
+ if (e->content.action != mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request)
+ return;
+
+ auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
+
+ if (sender != local_user.to_string())
+ return;
+
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
+
+ if (!verificationStatus)
+ return;
+
+ auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string());
+ if (!deviceKeys)
+ return;
+
+ if (std::find(verificationStatus->verified_devices.begin(),
+ verificationStatus->verified_devices.end(),
+ e->content.requesting_device_id) == verificationStatus->verified_devices.end())
+ return;
+
+ // this is a verified device
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretSend> secretSend;
+ secretSend.type = EventType::SecretSend;
+ secretSend.content.request_id = e->content.request_id;
+
+ auto secret = cache::client()->secret(e->content.name);
+ if (!secret)
+ return;
+ secretSend.content.secret = secret.value();
+
+ send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
+ {{local_user.to_string(), {{e->content.requesting_device_id}}}}, secretSend);
+
+ nhlog::net()->info("Sent secret '{}' to ({},{})",
+ e->content.name,
+ local_user.to_string(),
+ e->content.requesting_device_id);
+}
+
+void
+handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents> &msgs)
+{
+ if (msgs.empty())
+ return;
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("received {} to_device messages", msgs.size());
+ nlohmann::json j_msg;
+
+ for (const auto &msg : msgs) {
+ j_msg = std::visit([](auto &e) { return json(e); }, std::move(msg));
+ if (j_msg.count("type") == 0) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("received message with no type field: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ std::string msg_type = j_msg.at("type");
+
+ if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomEncrypted)) {
+ try {
+ olm::OlmMessage olm_msg = j_msg;
+ cache::client()->query_keys(
+ olm_msg.sender, [olm_msg](const UserKeyCache &userKeys, mtx::http::RequestErr e) {
+ if (e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to query user keys, dropping olm "
+ "message");
+ return;
+ }
+ handle_olm_message(std::move(olm_msg), userKeys);
+ });
+ } catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn(
+ "parsing error for olm message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
+ } catch (const std::invalid_argument &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn(
+ "validation error for olm message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
+ }
+
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomKeyRequest)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("handling key request event: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
+ try {
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> req = j_msg;
+ if (req.content.action == mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request)
+ handle_key_request_message(req);
+ else
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("ignore key request (unhandled action): {}",
+ req.content.request_id);
+ } catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn(
+ "parsing error for key_request message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
+ }
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationAccept)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationAccept>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationAccept(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationRequest)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationRequest(message.content,
+ message.sender);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationCancel)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationCancel(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationKey)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationKey>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationKey(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationMac)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationMac(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationStart)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationStart(message.content, message.sender);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationReady)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationReady>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationReady(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationDone)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationDone>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(message.content);
+ } else if (auto e =
+ std::get_if<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>(&msg)) {
+ handle_secret_request(e, e->sender);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("unhandled event: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void
+handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKeys)
+{
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("sender : {}", msg.sender);
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("sender_key: {}", msg.sender_key);
+
+ if (msg.sender_key == olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Ignoring olm message from ourselves!");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const auto my_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+
+ bool failed_decryption = false;
+
+ for (const auto &cipher : msg.ciphertext) {
+ // We skip messages not meant for the current device.
+ if (cipher.first != my_key) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug(
+ "Skipping message for {} since we are {}.", cipher.first, my_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ const auto type = cipher.second.type;
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("type: {}", type == 0 ? "OLM_PRE_KEY" : "OLM_MESSAGE");
+
+ auto payload = try_olm_decryption(msg.sender_key, cipher.second);
+
+ if (payload.is_null()) {
+ // Check for PRE_KEY message
+ if (cipher.second.type == 0) {
+ payload = handle_pre_key_olm_message(msg.sender, msg.sender_key, cipher.second);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Undecryptable olm message!");
+ failed_decryption = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!payload.is_null()) {
+ mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents device_event;
+
+ // Other properties are included in order to prevent an attacker from
+ // publishing someone else's curve25519 keys as their own and subsequently
+ // claiming to have sent messages which they didn't. sender must correspond
+ // to the user who sent the event, recipient to the local user, and
+ // recipient_keys to the local ed25519 key.
+ std::string receiver_ed25519 = payload["recipient_keys"]["ed25519"];
+ if (receiver_ed25519.empty() ||
+ receiver_ed25519 != olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include our ed25519: {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+ std::string receiver = payload["recipient"];
+ if (receiver.empty() || receiver != http::client()->user_id().to_string()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include our user_id: {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Clients must confirm that the sender_key and the ed25519 field value
+ // under the keys property match the keys returned by /keys/query for the
+ // given user, and must also verify the signature of the payload. Without
+ // this check, a client cannot be sure that the sender device owns the
+ // private part of the ed25519 key it claims to have in the Olm payload.
+ // This is crucial when the ed25519 key corresponds to a verified device.
+ std::string sender_ed25519 = payload["keys"]["ed25519"];
+ if (sender_ed25519.empty()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include sender ed25519: {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bool from_their_device = false;
+ for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
+ auto c_key = key.keys.find("curve25519:" + device_id);
+ auto e_key = key.keys.find("ed25519:" + device_id);
+
+ if (c_key == key.keys.end() || e_key == key.keys.end()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping device {} as we have no keys for it.",
+ device_id);
+ } else if (c_key->second == msg.sender_key && e_key->second == sender_ed25519) {
+ from_their_device = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!from_their_device) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event isn't sent from a device "
+ "listed by that user! {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ {
+ std::string msg_type = payload["type"];
+ json event_array = json::array();
+ event_array.push_back(payload);
+
+ std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents> temp_events;
+ mtx::responses::utils::parse_device_events(event_array, temp_events);
+ if (temp_events.empty()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted unknown event: {}", payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+ device_event = temp_events.at(0);
+ }
+
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+ if (auto e1 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationAccept>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationAccept(e1->content);
+ } else if (auto e2 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationRequest>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationRequest(e2->content, e2->sender);
+ } else if (auto e3 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationCancel>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationCancel(e3->content);
+ } else if (auto e4 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationKey>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationKey(e4->content);
+ } else if (auto e5 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationMac>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationMac(e5->content);
+ } else if (auto e6 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationStart>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationStart(e6->content, e6->sender);
+ } else if (auto e7 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationReady>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationReady(e7->content);
+ } else if (auto e8 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationDone>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(e8->content);
+ } else if (auto roomKey = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::RoomKey>>(&device_event)) {
+ create_inbound_megolm_session(*roomKey, msg.sender_key, sender_ed25519);
+ } else if (auto forwardedRoomKey =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::ForwardedRoomKey>>(&device_event)) {
+ forwardedRoomKey->content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.push_back(msg.sender_key);
+ import_inbound_megolm_session(*forwardedRoomKey);
+ } else if (auto e = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretSend>>(&device_event)) {
+ auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
+
+ if (msg.sender != local_user.to_string())
+ return;
+
+ auto secret_name = request_id_to_secret_name.find(e->content.request_id);
+
+ if (secret_name != request_id_to_secret_name.end()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("Received secret: {}", secret_name->second);
+
+ mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest secretRequest{};
+ secretRequest.action = mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation;
+ secretRequest.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
+ secretRequest.request_id = e->content.request_id;
+
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
+
+ if (!verificationStatus)
+ return;
+
+ auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string());
+ std::string sender_device_id;
+ if (deviceKeys) {
+ for (auto &[dev, key] : deviceKeys->device_keys) {
+ if (key.keys["curve25519:" + dev] == msg.sender_key) {
+ sender_device_id = dev;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User,
+ std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>
+ body;
+
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id && dev != sender_device_id)
+ body[local_user][dev] = secretRequest;
+ }
+
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
+ body,
+ [name = secret_name->second](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to send request cancellation "
+ "for secrect "
+ "'{}'",
+ name);
+ }
+ });
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("Storing secret {}", secret_name->second);
+ cache::client()->storeSecret(secret_name->second, e->content.secret);
+
+ request_id_to_secret_name.erase(secret_name);
+ }
+
+ } else if (auto sec_req = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretRequest>>(&device_event)) {
+ handle_secret_request(sec_req, msg.sender);
+ }
+
+ return;
+ } else {
+ failed_decryption = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (failed_decryption) {
+ try {
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
+ for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
+ if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key)
+ targets[msg.sender].push_back(device_id);
+ }
+
+ send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
+ targets, mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::Dummy>{}, true);
+ nhlog::crypto()->info(
+ "Recovering from broken olm channel with {}:{}", msg.sender, msg.sender_key);
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to recover from broken olm sessions: {}", e.what());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+nlohmann::json
+handle_pre_key_olm_message(const std::string &sender,
+ const std::string &sender_key,
+ const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &content)
+{
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("opening olm session with {}", sender);
+
+ mtx::crypto::OlmSessionPtr inbound_session = nullptr;
+ try {
+ inbound_session = olm::client()->create_inbound_session_from(sender_key, content.body);
+
+ // We also remove the one time key used to establish that
+ // session so we'll have to update our copy of the account object.
+ cache::saveOlmAccount(olm::client()->save(cache::client()->pickleSecret()));
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to create inbound session with {}: {}", sender, e.what());
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ if (!mtx::crypto::matches_inbound_session_from(
+ inbound_session.get(), sender_key, content.body)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("inbound olm session doesn't match sender's key ({})", sender);
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ mtx::crypto::BinaryBuf output;
+ try {
+ output = olm::client()->decrypt_message(inbound_session.get(), content.type, content.body);
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to decrypt olm message {}: {}", content.body, e.what());
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ auto plaintext = json::parse(std::string((char *)output.data(), output.size()));
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("decrypted message: \n {}", plaintext.dump(2));
+
+ try {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("New olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(inbound_session.get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(
+ sender_key, std::move(inbound_session), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::db()->warn("failed to save inbound olm session from {}: {}", sender, e.what());
+ }
+
+ return plaintext;
+}
+
+mtx::events::msg::Encrypted
+encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, nlohmann::json body)
+{
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+ using namespace mtx::identifiers;
+
+ auto own_user_id = http::client()->user_id().to_string();
+
+ auto members = cache::client()->getMembersWithKeys(
+ room_id, UserSettings::instance()->onlyShareKeysWithVerifiedUsers());
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> sendSessionTo;
+ mtx::crypto::OutboundGroupSessionPtr session = nullptr;
+ GroupSessionData group_session_data;
+
+ if (cache::outboundMegolmSessionExists(room_id)) {
+ auto res = cache::getOutboundMegolmSession(room_id);
+ auto encryptionSettings = cache::client()->roomEncryptionSettings(room_id);
+ mtx::events::state::Encryption defaultSettings;
+
+ // rotate if we crossed the limits for this key
+ if (res.data.message_index <
+ encryptionSettings.value_or(defaultSettings).rotation_period_msgs &&
+ (QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch() - res.data.timestamp) <
+ encryptionSettings.value_or(defaultSettings).rotation_period_ms) {
+ auto member_it = members.begin();
+ auto session_member_it = res.data.currently.keys.begin();
+ auto session_member_it_end = res.data.currently.keys.end();
+
+ while (member_it != members.end() || session_member_it != session_member_it_end) {
+ if (member_it == members.end()) {
+ // a member left, purge session!
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Rotating megolm session because of left member");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (session_member_it == session_member_it_end) {
+ // share with all remaining members
+ while (member_it != members.end()) {
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first] = {};
+
+ if (member_it->second)
+ for (const auto &dev : member_it->second->device_keys)
+ if (member_it->first != own_user_id || dev.first != device_id)
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first].push_back(dev.first);
+
+ ++member_it;
+ }
+
+ session = std::move(res.session);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (member_it->first > session_member_it->first) {
+ // a member left, purge session
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Rotating megolm session because of left member");
+ break;
+ } else if (member_it->first < session_member_it->first) {
+ // new member, send them the session at this index
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first] = {};
+
+ if (member_it->second) {
+ for (const auto &dev : member_it->second->device_keys)
+ if (member_it->first != own_user_id || dev.first != device_id)
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first].push_back(dev.first);
+ }
+
+ ++member_it;
+ } else {
+ // compare devices
+ bool device_removed = false;
+ for (const auto &dev : session_member_it->second.deviceids) {
+ if (!member_it->second ||
+ !member_it->second->device_keys.count(dev.first)) {
+ device_removed = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (device_removed) {
+ // device removed, rotate session!
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Rotating megolm session because of removed "
+ "device of {}",
+ member_it->first);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // check for new devices to share with
+ if (member_it->second)
+ for (const auto &dev : member_it->second->device_keys)
+ if (!session_member_it->second.deviceids.count(dev.first) &&
+ (member_it->first != own_user_id || dev.first != device_id))
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first].push_back(dev.first);
+
+ ++member_it;
+ ++session_member_it;
+ if (member_it == members.end() && session_member_it == session_member_it_end) {
+ // all devices match or are newly added
+ session = std::move(res.session);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ group_session_data = std::move(res.data);
+ }
+
+ if (!session) {
+ nhlog::ui()->debug("creating new outbound megolm session");
+
+ // Create a new outbound megolm session.
+ session = olm::client()->init_outbound_group_session();
+ const auto session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
+ const auto session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
+
+ // Saving the new megolm session.
+ GroupSessionData session_data{};
+ session_data.message_index = 0;
+ session_data.timestamp = QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch();
+ session_data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519;
+
+ sendSessionTo.clear();
+
+ for (const auto &[user, devices] : members) {
+ sendSessionTo[user] = {};
+ session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
+ if (devices) {
+ for (const auto &[device_id_, key] : devices->device_keys) {
+ (void)key;
+ if (device_id != device_id_ || user != own_user_id) {
+ sendSessionTo[user].push_back(device_id_);
+ session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids[device_id_] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = room_id;
+ index.session_id = session_id;
+ index.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+ auto megolm_session = olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(session_key);
+ backup_session_key(index, session_data, megolm_session);
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), session_data);
+ }
+
+ cache::saveOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, session_data, session);
+ group_session_data = std::move(session_data);
+ }
+
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> megolm_payload{};
+ megolm_payload.content.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ megolm_payload.content.room_id = room_id;
+ megolm_payload.content.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
+ megolm_payload.content.session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
+ megolm_payload.type = mtx::events::EventType::RoomKey;
+
+ if (!sendSessionTo.empty())
+ olm::send_encrypted_to_device_messages(sendSessionTo, megolm_payload);
+
+ // relations shouldn't be encrypted...
+ mtx::common::Relations relations = mtx::common::parse_relations(body["content"]);
+
+ auto payload = olm::client()->encrypt_group_message(session.get(), body.dump());
+
+ // Prepare the m.room.encrypted event.
+ msg::Encrypted data;
+ data.ciphertext = std::string((char *)payload.data(), payload.size());
+ data.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+ data.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
+ data.device_id = device_id;
+ data.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ data.relations = relations;
+
+ group_session_data.message_index = olm_outbound_group_session_message_index(session.get());
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("next message_index {}", group_session_data.message_index);
+
+ // update current set of members for the session with the new members and that message_index
+ for (const auto &[user, devices] : sendSessionTo) {
+ if (!group_session_data.currently.keys.count(user))
+ group_session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
+
+ for (const auto &device_id_ : devices) {
+ if (!group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids.count(device_id_))
+ group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids[device_id_] =
+ group_session_data.message_index;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // We need to re-pickle the session after we send a message to save the new message_index.
+ cache::updateOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, group_session_data, session);
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+nlohmann::json
+try_olm_decryption(const std::string &sender_key, const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &msg)
+{
+ auto session_ids = cache::getOlmSessions(sender_key);
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("attempt to decrypt message with {} known session_ids",
+ session_ids.size());
+
+ for (const auto &id : session_ids) {
+ auto session = cache::getOlmSession(sender_key, id);
+
+ if (!session) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Unknown olm session: {}:{}", sender_key, id);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ mtx::crypto::BinaryBuf text;
+
+ try {
+ text = olm::client()->decrypt_message(session->get(), msg.type, msg.body);
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(session->get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(
+ id, std::move(session.value()), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("failed to decrypt olm message ({}, {}) with {}: {}",
+ msg.type,
+ sender_key,
+ id,
+ e.what());
+ continue;
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save session: {}", e.what());
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ try {
+ return json::parse(std::string_view((char *)text.data(), text.size()));
+ } catch (const json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to parse the decrypted session msg: {} {}",
+ e.what(),
+ std::string_view((char *)text.data(), text.size()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return {};
+}
+
+void
+create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> &roomKey,
+ const std::string &sender_key,
+ const std::string &sender_ed25519)
+{
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id;
+ index.session_id = roomKey.content.session_id;
+ index.sender_key = sender_key;
+
+ try {
+ GroupSessionData data{};
+ data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = {sender_key};
+ data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sender_ed25519;
+
+ auto megolm_session =
+ olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
+ backup_session_key(index, data, megolm_session);
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to create inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info(
+ "established inbound megolm session ({}, {})", roomKey.content.room_id, roomKey.sender);
+
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
+}
+
+void
+import_inbound_megolm_session(
+ const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey> &roomKey)
+{
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id;
+ index.session_id = roomKey.content.session_id;
+ index.sender_key = roomKey.content.sender_key;
+
+ try {
+ auto megolm_session =
+ olm::client()->import_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
+
+ GroupSessionData data{};
+ data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+ data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = roomKey.content.sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
+ // may have come from online key backup, so we can't trust it...
+ data.trusted = false;
+ // if we got it forwarded from the sender, assume it is trusted. They may still have
+ // used key backup, but it is unlikely.
+ if (roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.size() == 1 &&
+ roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.back() == roomKey.content.sender_key) {
+ data.trusted = true;
+ }
+
+ backup_session_key(index, data, megolm_session);
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to import inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info(
+ "established inbound megolm session ({}, {})", roomKey.content.room_id, roomKey.sender);
+
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
+}
+
+void
+backup_session_key(const MegolmSessionIndex &idx,
+ const GroupSessionData &data,
+ mtx::crypto::InboundGroupSessionPtr &session)
+{
+ try {
+ if (!UserSettings::instance()->useOnlineKeyBackup()) {
+ // Online key backup disabled
+ return;
+ }
+
+ auto backupVersion = cache::client()->backupVersion();
+ if (!backupVersion) {
+ // no trusted OKB
+ return;
+ }
+
+ using namespace mtx::crypto;
+
+ auto decryptedSecret = cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1);
+ if (!decryptedSecret) {
+ // no backup key available
+ return;
+ }
+ auto sessionDecryptionKey = to_binary_buf(base642bin(*decryptedSecret));
+
+ auto public_key = mtx::crypto::CURVE25519_public_key_from_private(sessionDecryptionKey);
+
+ mtx::responses::backup::SessionData sessionData;
+ sessionData.algorithm = mtx::crypto::MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ sessionData.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+ sessionData.sender_claimed_keys["ed25519"] = data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
+ sessionData.sender_key = idx.sender_key;
+ sessionData.session_key = mtx::crypto::export_session(session.get(), -1);
+
+ auto encrypt_session = mtx::crypto::encrypt_session(sessionData, public_key);
+
+ mtx::responses::backup::SessionBackup bk;
+ bk.first_message_index = olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(session.get());
+ bk.forwarded_count = data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.size();
+ bk.is_verified = false;
+ bk.session_data = std::move(encrypt_session);
+
+ http::client()->put_room_keys(
+ backupVersion->version,
+ idx.room_id,
+ idx.session_id,
+ bk,
+ [idx](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to backup session key ({}:{}): {} ({})",
+ idx.room_id,
+ idx.session_id,
+ err->matrix_error.error,
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug(
+ "backed up session key ({}:{})", idx.room_id, idx.session_id);
+ }
+ });
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to backup session key: {}", e.what());
+ }
+}
+
+void
+mark_keys_as_published()
+{
+ olm::client()->mark_keys_as_published();
+ cache::saveOlmAccount(olm::client()->save(cache::client()->pickleSecret()));
+}
+
+void
+lookup_keybackup(const std::string room, const std::string session_id)
+{
+ if (!UserSettings::instance()->useOnlineKeyBackup()) {
+ // Online key backup disabled
+ return;
+ }
+
+ auto backupVersion = cache::client()->backupVersion();
+ if (!backupVersion) {
+ // no trusted OKB
+ return;
+ }
+
+ using namespace mtx::crypto;
+
+ auto decryptedSecret = cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1);
+ if (!decryptedSecret) {
+ // no backup key available
+ return;
+ }
+ auto sessionDecryptionKey = to_binary_buf(base642bin(*decryptedSecret));
+
+ http::client()->room_keys(
+ backupVersion->version,
+ room,
+ session_id,
+ [room, session_id, sessionDecryptionKey](const mtx::responses::backup::SessionBackup &bk,
+ mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ if (err->status_code != 404)
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to dowload key {}:{}: {} - {}",
+ room,
+ session_id,
+ mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ return;
+ }
+ try {
+ auto session = decrypt_session(bk.session_data, sessionDecryptionKey);
+
+ if (session.algorithm != mtx::crypto::MEGOLM_ALGO)
+ // don't know this algorithm
+ return;
+
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = room;
+ index.session_id = session_id;
+ index.sender_key = session.sender_key;
+
+ GroupSessionData data{};
+ data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = session.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+ data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = session.sender_claimed_keys["ed25519"];
+ // online key backup can't be trusted, because anyone can upload to it.
+ data.trusted = false;
+
+ auto megolm_session =
+ olm::client()->import_inbound_group_session(session.session_key);
+
+ if (!cache::inboundMegolmSessionExists(index) ||
+ olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(megolm_session.get()) <
+ olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(
+ cache::getInboundMegolmSession(index).get())) {
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("imported inbound megolm session "
+ "from key backup ({}, {})",
+ room,
+ session_id);
+
+ // call on UI thread
+ QTimer::singleShot(0, ChatPage::instance(), [index] {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
+ });
+ }
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to import inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ }
+ });
+}
+
+void
+send_key_request_for(mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> e,
+ const std::string &request_id,
+ bool cancel)
+{
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("sending key request: sender_key {}, session_id {}",
+ e.content.sender_key,
+ e.content.session_id);
+
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest request;
+ request.action = cancel ? mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation
+ : mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request;
+
+ request.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ request.room_id = e.room_id;
+ request.sender_key = e.content.sender_key;
+ request.session_id = e.content.session_id;
+ request.request_id = request_id;
+ request.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("m.room_key_request: {}", json(request).dump(2));
+
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, decltype(request)>> body;
+ body[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(e.sender)][e.content.device_id] = request;
+ body[http::client()->user_id()]["*"] = request;
+
+ http::client()->send_to_device(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(), body, [e](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
+ "send_to_device "
+ "message: {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ }
+
+ nhlog::net()->info(
+ "m.room_key_request sent to {}:{} and your own devices", e.sender, e.content.device_id);
+ });
+
+ // http::client()->room_keys
+}
+
+void
+handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> &req)
+{
+ if (req.content.algorithm != MEGOLM_ALGO) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("ignoring key request {} with invalid algorithm: {}",
+ req.content.request_id,
+ req.content.algorithm);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Check if we were the sender of the session being requested (unless it is actually us
+ // requesting the session).
+ if (req.sender != http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
+ req.content.sender_key != olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug(
+ "ignoring key request {} because we did not create the requested session: "
+ "\nrequested({}) ours({})",
+ req.content.request_id,
+ req.content.sender_key,
+ olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Check that the requested session_id and the one we have saved match.
+ MegolmSessionIndex index{};
+ index.room_id = req.content.room_id;
+ index.session_id = req.content.session_id;
+ index.sender_key = req.content.sender_key;
+
+ // Check if we have the keys for the requested session.
+ auto sessionData = cache::getMegolmSessionData(index);
+ if (!sessionData) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("requested session not found in room: {}", req.content.room_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const auto session = cache::getInboundMegolmSession(index);
+ if (!session) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("No session with id {} in db", req.content.session_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!cache::isRoomMember(req.sender, req.content.room_id)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("user {} that requested the session key is not member of the room {}",
+ req.sender,
+ req.content.room_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // check if device is verified
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(req.sender);
+ bool verifiedDevice = false;
+ if (verificationStatus &&
+ // Share keys, if the option to share with trusted users is enabled or with yourself
+ (ChatPage::instance()->userSettings()->shareKeysWithTrustedUsers() ||
+ req.sender == http::client()->user_id().to_string())) {
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev == req.content.requesting_device_id) {
+ verifiedDevice = true;
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Verified device: {}", dev);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ bool shouldSeeKeys = false;
+ uint64_t minimumIndex = -1;
+ if (sessionData->currently.keys.count(req.sender)) {
+ if (sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
+ .deviceids.count(req.content.requesting_device_id)) {
+ shouldSeeKeys = true;
+ minimumIndex = sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
+ .deviceids.at(req.content.requesting_device_id);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!verifiedDevice && !shouldSeeKeys) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("ignoring key request for room {}", req.content.room_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (verifiedDevice) {
+ // share the minimum index we have
+ minimumIndex = -1;
+ }
+
+ try {
+ auto session_key = mtx::crypto::export_session(session.get(), minimumIndex);
+
+ //
+ // Prepare the m.room_key event.
+ //
+ mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey forward_key{};
+ forward_key.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ forward_key.room_id = index.room_id;
+ forward_key.session_id = index.session_id;
+ forward_key.session_key = session_key;
+ forward_key.sender_key = index.sender_key;
+
+ // TODO(Nico): Figure out if this is correct
+ forward_key.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sessionData->sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
+ forward_key.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = sessionData->forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+
+ send_megolm_key_to_device(req.sender, req.content.requesting_device_id, forward_key);
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to forward session key: {}", e.what());
+ }
+}
+
+void
+send_megolm_key_to_device(const std::string &user_id,
+ const std::string &device_id,
+ const mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey &payload)
+{
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey> room_key;
+ room_key.content = payload;
+ room_key.type = mtx::events::EventType::ForwardedRoomKey;
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
+ targets[user_id] = {device_id};
+ send_encrypted_to_device_messages(targets, room_key);
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Forwarded key to {}:{}", user_id, device_id);
+}
+
+DecryptionResult
+decryptEvent(const MegolmSessionIndex &index,
+ const mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> &event,
+ bool dont_write_db)
+{
+ try {
+ if (!cache::client()->inboundMegolmSessionExists(index)) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSession, std::nullopt, std::nullopt};
+ }
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::DbError, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Lookup index,event_id,origin_server_ts tuple for replay attack errors
+
+ std::string msg_str;
+ try {
+ auto session = cache::client()->getInboundMegolmSession(index);
+ if (!session) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSession, std::nullopt, std::nullopt};
+ }
+
+ auto sessionData =
+ cache::client()->getMegolmSessionData(index).value_or(GroupSessionData{});
+
+ auto res = olm::client()->decrypt_group_message(session.get(), event.content.ciphertext);
+ msg_str = std::string((char *)res.data.data(), res.data.size());
+
+ if (!event.event_id.empty() && event.event_id[0] == '$') {
+ auto oldIdx = sessionData.indices.find(res.message_index);
+ if (oldIdx != sessionData.indices.end()) {
+ if (oldIdx->second != event.event_id)
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::ReplayAttack, std::nullopt, std::nullopt};
+ } else if (!dont_write_db) {
+ sessionData.indices[res.message_index] = event.event_id;
+ cache::client()->saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(session), sessionData);
+ }
+ }
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::DbError, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ if (e.error_code() == mtx::crypto::OlmErrorCode::UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX)
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSessionIndex, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::DecryptionFailed, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ }
+
+ try {
+ // Add missing fields for the event.
+ json body = json::parse(msg_str);
+ body["event_id"] = event.event_id;
+ body["sender"] = event.sender;
+ body["origin_server_ts"] = event.origin_server_ts;
+ body["unsigned"] = event.unsigned_data;
+
+ // relations are unencrypted in content...
+ mtx::common::add_relations(body["content"], event.content.relations);
+
+ mtx::events::collections::TimelineEvent te;
+ mtx::events::collections::from_json(body, te);
+
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::NoError, std::nullopt, std::move(te.data)};
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::ParsingFailed, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ }
+}
+
+crypto::Trust
+calculate_trust(const std::string &user_id, const MegolmSessionIndex &index)
+{
+ auto status = cache::client()->verificationStatus(user_id);
+ auto megolmData = cache::client()->getMegolmSessionData(index);
+ crypto::Trust trustlevel = crypto::Trust::Unverified;
+
+ if (megolmData && megolmData->trusted && status.verified_device_keys.count(index.sender_key))
+ trustlevel = status.verified_device_keys.at(index.sender_key);
+
+ return trustlevel;
+}
+
+//! Send encrypted to device messages, targets is a map from userid to device ids or {} for all
+//! devices
+void
+send_encrypted_to_device_messages(const std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets,
+ const mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents &event,
+ bool force_new_session)
+{
+ static QMap<QPair<std::string, std::string>, qint64> rateLimit;
+
+ nlohmann::json ev_json = std::visit([](const auto &e) { return json(e); }, event);
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> keysToQuery;
+ mtx::requests::ClaimKeys claims;
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>>
+ messages;
+ std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, DevicePublicKeys>> pks;
+
+ auto our_curve = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+
+ for (const auto &[user, devices] : targets) {
+ auto deviceKeys = cache::client()->userKeys(user);
+
+ // no keys for user, query them
+ if (!deviceKeys) {
+ keysToQuery[user] = devices;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto deviceTargets = devices;
+ if (devices.empty()) {
+ deviceTargets.clear();
+ for (const auto &[device, keys] : deviceKeys->device_keys) {
+ (void)keys;
+ deviceTargets.push_back(device);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (const auto &device : deviceTargets) {
+ if (!deviceKeys->device_keys.count(device)) {
+ keysToQuery[user] = {};
+ break;
+ }
+
+ auto d = deviceKeys->device_keys.at(device);
+
+ if (!d.keys.count("curve25519:" + device) || !d.keys.count("ed25519:" + device)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping device {} since it has no keys!", device);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto device_curve = d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device);
+ if (device_curve == our_curve) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping our own device, since sending "
+ "ourselves olm messages makes no sense.");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto session = cache::getLatestOlmSession(device_curve);
+ if (!session || force_new_session) {
+ auto currentTime = QDateTime::currentSecsSinceEpoch();
+ if (rateLimit.value(QPair(user, device)) + 60 * 60 * 10 < currentTime) {
+ claims.one_time_keys[user][device] = mtx::crypto::SIGNED_CURVE25519;
+ pks[user][device].ed25519 = d.keys.at("ed25519:" + device);
+ pks[user][device].curve25519 = d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device);
+
+ rateLimit.insert(QPair(user, device), currentTime);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Not creating new session with {}:{} "
+ "because of rate limit",
+ user,
+ device);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ messages[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(user)][device] =
+ olm::client()
+ ->create_olm_encrypted_content(session->get(),
+ ev_json,
+ UserId(user),
+ d.keys.at("ed25519:" + device),
+ device_curve)
+ .get<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>();
+
+ try {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(session->get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device),
+ std::move(*session),
+ QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::db()->critical("failed to save outbound olm session: {}", e.what());
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to pickle outbound olm session: {}", e.what());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!messages.empty())
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(), messages, [](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
+ "send_to_device "
+ "message: {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ }
+ });
+
+ auto BindPks = [ev_json](decltype(pks) pks_temp) {
+ return [pks = pks_temp, ev_json](const mtx::responses::ClaimKeys &res,
+ mtx::http::RequestErr) {
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>>
+ messages;
+ for (const auto &[user_id, retrieved_devices] : res.one_time_keys) {
+ nhlog::net()->debug("claimed keys for {}", user_id);
+ if (retrieved_devices.size() == 0) {
+ nhlog::net()->debug("no one-time keys found for user_id: {}", user_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (const auto &rd : retrieved_devices) {
+ const auto device_id = rd.first;
+
+ nhlog::net()->debug("{} : \n {}", device_id, rd.second.dump(2));
+
+ if (rd.second.empty() || !rd.second.begin()->contains("key")) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("Skipping device {} as it has no key.", device_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto otk = rd.second.begin()->at("key");
+
+ auto sign_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).ed25519;
+ auto id_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).curve25519;
+
+ // Verify signature
+ {
+ auto signedKey = *rd.second.begin();
+ std::string signature =
+ signedKey["signatures"][user_id].value("ed25519:" + device_id, "");
+
+ if (signature.empty() || !mtx::crypto::ed25519_verify_signature(
+ sign_key, signedKey, signature)) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("Skipping device {} as its one time key "
+ "has an invalid signature.",
+ device_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ auto session = olm::client()->create_outbound_session(id_key, otk);
+
+ messages[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(user_id)][device_id] =
+ olm::client()
+ ->create_olm_encrypted_content(
+ session.get(), ev_json, UserId(user_id), sign_key, id_key)
+ .get<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>();
+
+ try {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(
+ id_key, std::move(session), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::db()->critical("failed to save outbound olm session: {}", e.what());
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to pickle outbound olm session: {}",
+ e.what());
+ }
+ }
+ nhlog::net()->info("send_to_device: {}", user_id);
+ }
+
+ if (!messages.empty())
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(), messages, [](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
+ "send_to_device "
+ "message: {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ }
+ });
+ };
+ };
+
+ if (!claims.one_time_keys.empty())
+ http::client()->claim_keys(claims, BindPks(pks));
+
+ if (!keysToQuery.empty()) {
+ mtx::requests::QueryKeys req;
+ req.device_keys = keysToQuery;
+ http::client()->query_keys(
+ req,
+ [ev_json, BindPks, our_curve](const mtx::responses::QueryKeys &res,
+ mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to query device keys: {} {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error,
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::net()->info("queried keys");
+
+ cache::client()->updateUserKeys(cache::nextBatchToken(), res);
+
+ mtx::requests::ClaimKeys claim_keys;
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, DevicePublicKeys>> deviceKeys;
+
+ for (const auto &user : res.device_keys) {
+ for (const auto &dev : user.second) {
+ const auto user_id = ::UserId(dev.second.user_id);
+ const auto device_id = DeviceId(dev.second.device_id);
+
+ if (user_id.get() == http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
+ device_id.get() == http::client()->device_id())
+ continue;
+
+ const auto device_keys = dev.second.keys;
+ const auto curveKey = "curve25519:" + device_id.get();
+ const auto edKey = "ed25519:" + device_id.get();
+
+ if ((device_keys.find(curveKey) == device_keys.end()) ||
+ (device_keys.find(edKey) == device_keys.end())) {
+ nhlog::net()->debug("ignoring malformed keys for device {}",
+ device_id.get());
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ DevicePublicKeys pks;
+ pks.ed25519 = device_keys.at(edKey);
+ pks.curve25519 = device_keys.at(curveKey);
+
+ if (pks.curve25519 == our_curve) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping our own device, since sending "
+ "ourselves olm messages makes no sense.");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ try {
+ if (!mtx::crypto::verify_identity_signature(
+ dev.second, device_id, user_id)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("failed to verify identity keys: {}",
+ json(dev.second).dump(2));
+ continue;
+ }
+ } catch (const json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("failed to parse device key json: {}", e.what());
+ continue;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("failed to verify device key json: {}", e.what());
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto currentTime = QDateTime::currentSecsSinceEpoch();
+ if (rateLimit.value(QPair(user.first, device_id.get())) + 60 * 60 * 10 <
+ currentTime) {
+ deviceKeys[user_id].emplace(device_id, pks);
+ claim_keys.one_time_keys[user.first][device_id] =
+ mtx::crypto::SIGNED_CURVE25519;
+
+ rateLimit.insert(QPair(user.first, device_id.get()), currentTime);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Not creating new session with {}:{} "
+ "because of rate limit",
+ user.first,
+ device_id.get());
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::net()->info("{}", device_id.get());
+ nhlog::net()->info(" curve25519 {}", pks.curve25519);
+ nhlog::net()->info(" ed25519 {}", pks.ed25519);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!claim_keys.one_time_keys.empty())
+ http::client()->claim_keys(claim_keys, BindPks(deviceKeys));
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+void
+request_cross_signing_keys()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest secretRequest{};
+ secretRequest.action = mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request;
+ secretRequest.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
+
+ auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
+
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
+
+ if (!verificationStatus)
+ return;
+
+ auto request = [&](std::string secretName) {
+ secretRequest.name = secretName;
+ secretRequest.request_id = "ss." + http::client()->generate_txn_id();
+
+ request_id_to_secret_name[secretRequest.request_id] = secretRequest.name;
+
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>
+ body;
+
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id)
+ body[local_user][dev] = secretRequest;
+ }
+
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
+ body,
+ [request_id = secretRequest.request_id, secretName](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to send request for secrect '{}'", secretName);
+ // Cancel request on UI thread
+ QTimer::singleShot(1, cache::client(), [request_id]() {
+ request_id_to_secret_name.erase(request_id);
+ });
+ return;
+ }
+ });
+
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id)
+ body[local_user][dev].action = mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation;
+ }
+
+ // timeout after 15 min
+ QTimer::singleShot(15 * 60 * 1000, [secretRequest, body]() {
+ if (request_id_to_secret_name.count(secretRequest.request_id)) {
+ request_id_to_secret_name.erase(secretRequest.request_id);
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
+ body,
+ [secretRequest](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to cancel request for secrect '{}'",
+ secretRequest.name);
+ return;
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ });
+ };
+
+ request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing);
+ request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing);
+ request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1);
+}
+
+namespace {
+void
+unlock_secrets(const std::string &key,
+ const std::map<std::string, mtx::secret_storage::AesHmacSha2EncryptedData> &secrets)
+{
+ http::client()->secret_storage_key(
+ key,
+ [secrets](mtx::secret_storage::AesHmacSha2KeyDescription keyDesc, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to download secret storage key");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ emit ChatPage::instance()->downloadedSecrets(keyDesc, secrets);
+ });
+}
+}
+
+void
+download_cross_signing_keys()
+{
+ using namespace mtx::secret_storage;
+ http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
+ secrets::megolm_backup_v1, [](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ std::optional<Secret> backup_key;
+ if (!err)
+ backup_key = secret;
+
+ http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
+ secrets::cross_signing_self_signing,
+ [backup_key](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ std::optional<Secret> self_signing_key;
+ if (!err)
+ self_signing_key = secret;
+
+ http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
+ secrets::cross_signing_user_signing,
+ [backup_key, self_signing_key](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ std::optional<Secret> user_signing_key;
+ if (!err)
+ user_signing_key = secret;
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, AesHmacSha2EncryptedData>>
+ secrets;
+
+ if (backup_key && !backup_key->encrypted.empty())
+ secrets[backup_key->encrypted.begin()->first][secrets::megolm_backup_v1] =
+ backup_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
+ if (self_signing_key && !self_signing_key->encrypted.empty())
+ secrets[self_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->first]
+ [secrets::cross_signing_self_signing] =
+ self_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
+ if (user_signing_key && !user_signing_key->encrypted.empty())
+ secrets[user_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->first]
+ [secrets::cross_signing_user_signing] =
+ user_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
+
+ for (const auto &[key, secrets] : secrets)
+ unlock_secrets(key, secrets);
+ });
+ });
+ });
+}
+
+} // namespace olm
diff --git a/src/encryption/Olm.h b/src/encryption/Olm.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..44e2b8ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/encryption/Olm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <mtx/events.hpp>
+#include <mtx/events/encrypted.hpp>
+#include <mtxclient/crypto/client.hpp>
+
+#include <CacheCryptoStructs.h>
+
+constexpr auto OLM_ALGO = "m.olm.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2";
+
+namespace olm {
+Q_NAMESPACE
+
+enum DecryptionErrorCode
+{
+ NoError,
+ MissingSession, // Session was not found, retrieve from backup or request from other devices
+ // and try again
+ MissingSessionIndex, // Session was found, but it does not reach back enough to this index,
+ // retrieve from backup or request from other devices and try again
+ DbError, // DB read failed
+ DecryptionFailed, // libolm error
+ ParsingFailed, // Failed to parse the actual event
+ ReplayAttack, // Megolm index reused
+};
+Q_ENUM_NS(DecryptionErrorCode)
+
+struct DecryptionResult
+{
+ DecryptionErrorCode error;
+ std::optional<std::string> error_message;
+ std::optional<mtx::events::collections::TimelineEvents> event;
+};
+
+struct OlmMessage
+{
+ std::string sender_key;
+ std::string sender;
+
+ using RecipientKey = std::string;
+ std::map<RecipientKey, mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent> ciphertext;
+};
+
+void
+from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, OlmMessage &msg);
+
+mtx::crypto::OlmClient *
+client();
+
+void
+handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents> &msgs);
+
+nlohmann::json
+try_olm_decryption(const std::string &sender_key,
+ const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &content);
+
+void
+handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKeys);
+
+//! Establish a new inbound megolm session with the decrypted payload from olm.
+void
+create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> &roomKey,
+ const std::string &sender_key,
+ const std::string &sender_ed25519);
+void
+import_inbound_megolm_session(
+ const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey> &roomKey);
+void
+lookup_keybackup(const std::string room, const std::string session_id);
+
+nlohmann::json
+handle_pre_key_olm_message(const std::string &sender,
+ const std::string &sender_key,
+ const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &content);
+
+mtx::events::msg::Encrypted
+encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id,
+ const std::string &device_id,
+ nlohmann::json body);
+
+//! Decrypt an event. Use dont_write_db to prevent db writes when already in a write transaction.
+DecryptionResult
+decryptEvent(const MegolmSessionIndex &index,
+ const mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> &event,
+ bool dont_write_db = false);
+crypto::Trust
+calculate_trust(const std::string &user_id, const MegolmSessionIndex &index);
+
+void
+mark_keys_as_published();
+
+//! Request the encryption keys from sender's device for the given event.
+void
+send_key_request_for(mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> e,
+ const std::string &request_id,
+ bool cancel = false);
+
+void
+handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> &);
+
+void
+send_megolm_key_to_device(const std::string &user_id,
+ const std::string &device_id,
+ const mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey &payload);
+
+//! Send encrypted to device messages, targets is a map from userid to device ids or {} for all
+//! devices
+void
+send_encrypted_to_device_messages(const std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets,
+ const mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents &event,
+ bool force_new_session = false);
+
+//! Request backup and signing keys and cache them locally
+void
+request_cross_signing_keys();
+//! Download backup and signing keys and cache them locally
+void
+download_cross_signing_keys();
+
+} // namespace olm
diff --git a/src/encryption/SelfVerificationStatus.cpp b/src/encryption/SelfVerificationStatus.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d75a2109
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/encryption/SelfVerificationStatus.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+#include "SelfVerificationStatus.h"
+
+#include "Cache_p.h"
+#include "Logging.h"
+#include "MainWindow.h"
+#include "MatrixClient.h"
+#include "Olm.h"
+#include "ui/UIA.h"
+
+#include <mtx/responses/common.hpp>
+
+SelfVerificationStatus::SelfVerificationStatus(QObject *o)
+ : QObject(o)
+{
+ connect(MainWindow::instance(), &MainWindow::reload, this, [this] {
+ connect(cache::client(),
+ &Cache::selfUnverified,
+ this,
+ &SelfVerificationStatus::invalidate,
+ Qt::UniqueConnection);
+ invalidate();
+ });
+}
+
+void
+SelfVerificationStatus::setupCrosssigning(bool useSSSS, QString password, bool useOnlineKeyBackup)
+{
+ nhlog::db()->info("Clicked setup crossigning");
+
+ auto xsign_keys = olm::client()->create_crosssigning_keys();
+
+ if (!xsign_keys) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("Failed to setup cross-signing keys!");
+ emit setupFailed(tr("Failed to create keys for cross-signing!"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cache::client()->storeSecret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_master,
+ xsign_keys->private_master_key);
+ cache::client()->storeSecret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing,
+ xsign_keys->private_self_signing_key);
+ cache::client()->storeSecret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing,
+ xsign_keys->private_user_signing_key);
+
+ std::optional<mtx::crypto::OlmClient::OnlineKeyBackupSetup> okb;
+ if (useOnlineKeyBackup) {
+ okb = olm::client()->create_online_key_backup(xsign_keys->private_master_key);
+ if (!okb) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("Failed to setup online key backup!");
+ emit setupFailed(tr("Failed to create keys for online key backup!"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cache::client()->storeSecret(
+ mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1,
+ mtx::crypto::bin2base64(mtx::crypto::to_string(okb->privateKey)));
+
+ http::client()->post_backup_version(
+ okb->backupVersion.algorithm,
+ okb->backupVersion.auth_data,
+ [](const mtx::responses::Version &v, mtx::http::RequestErr e) {
+ if (e) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("error setting up online key backup: {} {} {} {}",
+ e->parse_error,
+ e->status_code,
+ e->error_code,
+ e->matrix_error.error);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("Set up online key backup: '{}'", v.version);
+ }
+ });
+ }
+
+ std::optional<mtx::crypto::OlmClient::SSSSSetup> ssss;
+ if (useSSSS) {
+ ssss = olm::client()->create_ssss_key(password.toStdString());
+ if (!ssss) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("Failed to setup secure server side secret storage!");
+ emit setupFailed(tr("Failed to create keys secure server side secret storage!"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ auto master = mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(xsign_keys->private_master_key);
+ nlohmann::json j = ssss->keyDescription;
+ j.erase("signatures");
+ ssss->keyDescription
+ .signatures[http::client()->user_id().to_string()]["ed25519:" + master.public_key()] =
+ master.sign(j.dump());
+
+ http::client()->upload_secret_storage_key(
+ ssss->keyDescription.name, ssss->keyDescription, [](mtx::http::RequestErr) {});
+ http::client()->set_secret_storage_default_key(ssss->keyDescription.name,
+ [](mtx::http::RequestErr) {});
+
+ auto uploadSecret = [ssss](const std::string &key_name, const std::string &secret) {
+ mtx::secret_storage::Secret s;
+ s.encrypted[ssss->keyDescription.name] =
+ mtx::crypto::encrypt(secret, ssss->privateKey, key_name);
+ http::client()->upload_secret_storage_secret(
+ key_name, s, [key_name](mtx::http::RequestErr) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("Uploaded secret: {}", key_name);
+ });
+ };
+
+ uploadSecret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_master,
+ xsign_keys->private_master_key);
+ uploadSecret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing,
+ xsign_keys->private_self_signing_key);
+ uploadSecret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing,
+ xsign_keys->private_user_signing_key);
+
+ if (okb)
+ uploadSecret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1,
+ mtx::crypto::bin2base64(mtx::crypto::to_string(okb->privateKey)));
+ }
+
+ mtx::requests::DeviceSigningUpload device_sign{};
+ device_sign.master_key = xsign_keys->master_key;
+ device_sign.self_signing_key = xsign_keys->self_signing_key;
+ device_sign.user_signing_key = xsign_keys->user_signing_key;
+ http::client()->device_signing_upload(
+ device_sign,
+ UIA::instance()->genericHandler(tr("Encryption Setup")),
+ [this, ssss, xsign_keys](mtx::http::RequestErr e) {
+ if (e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("Failed to upload cross signing keys: {}",
+ e->matrix_error.error);
+
+ emit setupFailed(tr("Encryption setup failed: %1")
+ .arg(QString::fromStdString(e->matrix_error.error)));
+ return;
+ }
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("Crosssigning keys uploaded!");
+
+ auto deviceKeys = cache::client()->userKeys(http::client()->user_id().to_string());
+ if (deviceKeys) {
+ auto myKey = deviceKeys->device_keys.at(http::client()->device_id());
+ if (myKey.user_id == http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
+ myKey.device_id == http::client()->device_id() &&
+ myKey.keys["ed25519:" + http::client()->device_id()] ==
+ olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519 &&
+ myKey.keys["curve25519:" + http::client()->device_id()] ==
+ olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519) {
+ json j = myKey;
+ j.erase("signatures");
+ j.erase("unsigned");
+
+ auto ssk =
+ mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(xsign_keys->private_self_signing_key);
+ myKey.signatures[http::client()->user_id().to_string()]
+ ["ed25519:" + ssk.public_key()] = ssk.sign(j.dump());
+ mtx::requests::KeySignaturesUpload req;
+ req.signatures[http::client()->user_id().to_string()]
+ [http::client()->device_id()] = myKey;
+
+ http::client()->keys_signatures_upload(
+ req,
+ [](const mtx::responses::KeySignaturesUpload &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("failed to upload signatures: {},{}",
+ mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ }
+
+ for (const auto &[user_id, tmp] : res.errors)
+ for (const auto &[key_id, e] : tmp)
+ nhlog::net()->error("signature error for user {} and key "
+ "id {}: {}, {}",
+ user_id,
+ key_id,
+ mtx::errors::to_string(e.errcode),
+ e.error);
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssss) {
+ auto k = QString::fromStdString(mtx::crypto::key_to_recoverykey(ssss->privateKey));
+
+ QString r;
+ for (int i = 0; i < k.size(); i += 4)
+ r += k.mid(i, 4) + " ";
+
+ emit showRecoveryKey(r.trimmed());
+ } else {
+ emit setupCompleted();
+ }
+ });
+}
+
+void
+SelfVerificationStatus::verifyMasterKey()
+{
+ nhlog::db()->info("Clicked verify master key");
+}
+
+void
+SelfVerificationStatus::verifyUnverifiedDevices()
+{
+ nhlog::db()->info("Clicked verify unverified devices");
+}
+
+void
+SelfVerificationStatus::invalidate()
+{
+ nhlog::db()->info("Invalidating self verification status");
+ auto keys = cache::client()->userKeys(http::client()->user_id().to_string());
+ if (!keys) {
+ cache::client()->query_keys(http::client()->user_id().to_string(),
+ [](const UserKeyCache &, mtx::http::RequestErr) {});
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (keys->master_keys.keys.empty()) {
+ if (status_ != SelfVerificationStatus::NoMasterKey) {
+ this->status_ = SelfVerificationStatus::NoMasterKey;
+ emit statusChanged();
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ auto verifStatus = cache::client()->verificationStatus(http::client()->user_id().to_string());
+
+ if (!verifStatus.user_verified) {
+ if (status_ != SelfVerificationStatus::UnverifiedMasterKey) {
+ this->status_ = SelfVerificationStatus::UnverifiedMasterKey;
+ emit statusChanged();
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (verifStatus.unverified_device_count > 0) {
+ if (status_ != SelfVerificationStatus::UnverifiedDevices) {
+ this->status_ = SelfVerificationStatus::UnverifiedDevices;
+ emit statusChanged();
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (status_ != SelfVerificationStatus::AllVerified) {
+ this->status_ = SelfVerificationStatus::AllVerified;
+ emit statusChanged();
+ return;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/encryption/SelfVerificationStatus.h b/src/encryption/SelfVerificationStatus.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8cb54df6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/encryption/SelfVerificationStatus.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <QObject>
+
+class SelfVerificationStatus : public QObject
+{
+ Q_OBJECT
+
+ Q_PROPERTY(Status status READ status NOTIFY statusChanged)
+
+public:
+ SelfVerificationStatus(QObject *o = nullptr);
+ enum Status
+ {
+ AllVerified,
+ NoMasterKey,
+ UnverifiedMasterKey,
+ UnverifiedDevices,
+ };
+ Q_ENUM(Status)
+
+ Q_INVOKABLE void setupCrosssigning(bool useSSSS, QString password, bool useOnlineKeyBackup);
+ Q_INVOKABLE void verifyMasterKey();
+ Q_INVOKABLE void verifyUnverifiedDevices();
+
+ Status status() const { return status_; }
+
+signals:
+ void statusChanged();
+ void setupCompleted();
+ void showRecoveryKey(QString key);
+ void setupFailed(QString message);
+
+public slots:
+ void invalidate();
+
+private:
+ Status status_ = AllVerified;
+};
|
