diff --git a/src/encryption/Olm.cpp b/src/encryption/Olm.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..14c97984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/encryption/Olm.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1612 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+#include "Olm.h"
+
+#include <QObject>
+#include <QTimer>
+
+#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
+#include <variant>
+
+#include <mtx/responses/common.hpp>
+#include <mtx/secret_storage.hpp>
+
+#include "Cache.h"
+#include "Cache_p.h"
+#include "ChatPage.h"
+#include "DeviceVerificationFlow.h"
+#include "Logging.h"
+#include "MatrixClient.h"
+#include "UserSettingsPage.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+namespace {
+auto client_ = std::make_unique<mtx::crypto::OlmClient>();
+
+std::map<std::string, std::string> request_id_to_secret_name;
+
+constexpr auto MEGOLM_ALGO = "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2";
+}
+
+namespace olm {
+static void
+backup_session_key(const MegolmSessionIndex &idx,
+ const GroupSessionData &data,
+ mtx::crypto::InboundGroupSessionPtr &session);
+
+void
+from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, OlmMessage &msg)
+{
+ if (obj.at("type") != "m.room.encrypted")
+ throw std::invalid_argument("invalid type for olm message");
+
+ if (obj.at("content").at("algorithm") != OLM_ALGO)
+ throw std::invalid_argument("invalid algorithm for olm message");
+
+ msg.sender = obj.at("sender");
+ msg.sender_key = obj.at("content").at("sender_key");
+ msg.ciphertext = obj.at("content")
+ .at("ciphertext")
+ .get<std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent>>();
+}
+
+mtx::crypto::OlmClient *
+client()
+{
+ return client_.get();
+}
+
+static void
+handle_secret_request(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest> *e,
+ const std::string &sender)
+{
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+
+ if (e->content.action != mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request)
+ return;
+
+ auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
+
+ if (sender != local_user.to_string())
+ return;
+
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
+
+ if (!verificationStatus)
+ return;
+
+ auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string());
+ if (!deviceKeys)
+ return;
+
+ if (std::find(verificationStatus->verified_devices.begin(),
+ verificationStatus->verified_devices.end(),
+ e->content.requesting_device_id) == verificationStatus->verified_devices.end())
+ return;
+
+ // this is a verified device
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretSend> secretSend;
+ secretSend.type = EventType::SecretSend;
+ secretSend.content.request_id = e->content.request_id;
+
+ auto secret = cache::client()->secret(e->content.name);
+ if (!secret)
+ return;
+ secretSend.content.secret = secret.value();
+
+ send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
+ {{local_user.to_string(), {{e->content.requesting_device_id}}}}, secretSend);
+
+ nhlog::net()->info("Sent secret '{}' to ({},{})",
+ e->content.name,
+ local_user.to_string(),
+ e->content.requesting_device_id);
+}
+
+void
+handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents> &msgs)
+{
+ if (msgs.empty())
+ return;
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("received {} to_device messages", msgs.size());
+ nlohmann::json j_msg;
+
+ for (const auto &msg : msgs) {
+ j_msg = std::visit([](auto &e) { return json(e); }, std::move(msg));
+ if (j_msg.count("type") == 0) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("received message with no type field: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ std::string msg_type = j_msg.at("type");
+
+ if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomEncrypted)) {
+ try {
+ olm::OlmMessage olm_msg = j_msg;
+ cache::client()->query_keys(
+ olm_msg.sender, [olm_msg](const UserKeyCache &userKeys, mtx::http::RequestErr e) {
+ if (e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to query user keys, dropping olm "
+ "message");
+ return;
+ }
+ handle_olm_message(std::move(olm_msg), userKeys);
+ });
+ } catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn(
+ "parsing error for olm message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
+ } catch (const std::invalid_argument &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn(
+ "validation error for olm message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
+ }
+
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomKeyRequest)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("handling key request event: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
+ try {
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> req = j_msg;
+ if (req.content.action == mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request)
+ handle_key_request_message(req);
+ else
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("ignore key request (unhandled action): {}",
+ req.content.request_id);
+ } catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn(
+ "parsing error for key_request message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
+ }
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationAccept)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationAccept>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationAccept(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationRequest)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationRequest(message.content,
+ message.sender);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationCancel)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationCancel(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationKey)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationKey>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationKey(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationMac)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationMac(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationStart)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationStart(message.content, message.sender);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationReady)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationReady>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationReady(message.content);
+ } else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationDone)) {
+ auto message =
+ std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationDone>>(msg);
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(message.content);
+ } else if (auto e =
+ std::get_if<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>(&msg)) {
+ handle_secret_request(e, e->sender);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("unhandled event: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void
+handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKeys)
+{
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("sender : {}", msg.sender);
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("sender_key: {}", msg.sender_key);
+
+ if (msg.sender_key == olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Ignoring olm message from ourselves!");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const auto my_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+
+ bool failed_decryption = false;
+
+ for (const auto &cipher : msg.ciphertext) {
+ // We skip messages not meant for the current device.
+ if (cipher.first != my_key) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug(
+ "Skipping message for {} since we are {}.", cipher.first, my_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ const auto type = cipher.second.type;
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("type: {}", type == 0 ? "OLM_PRE_KEY" : "OLM_MESSAGE");
+
+ auto payload = try_olm_decryption(msg.sender_key, cipher.second);
+
+ if (payload.is_null()) {
+ // Check for PRE_KEY message
+ if (cipher.second.type == 0) {
+ payload = handle_pre_key_olm_message(msg.sender, msg.sender_key, cipher.second);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Undecryptable olm message!");
+ failed_decryption = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!payload.is_null()) {
+ mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents device_event;
+
+ // Other properties are included in order to prevent an attacker from
+ // publishing someone else's curve25519 keys as their own and subsequently
+ // claiming to have sent messages which they didn't. sender must correspond
+ // to the user who sent the event, recipient to the local user, and
+ // recipient_keys to the local ed25519 key.
+ std::string receiver_ed25519 = payload["recipient_keys"]["ed25519"];
+ if (receiver_ed25519.empty() ||
+ receiver_ed25519 != olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include our ed25519: {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+ std::string receiver = payload["recipient"];
+ if (receiver.empty() || receiver != http::client()->user_id().to_string()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include our user_id: {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Clients must confirm that the sender_key and the ed25519 field value
+ // under the keys property match the keys returned by /keys/query for the
+ // given user, and must also verify the signature of the payload. Without
+ // this check, a client cannot be sure that the sender device owns the
+ // private part of the ed25519 key it claims to have in the Olm payload.
+ // This is crucial when the ed25519 key corresponds to a verified device.
+ std::string sender_ed25519 = payload["keys"]["ed25519"];
+ if (sender_ed25519.empty()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include sender ed25519: {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bool from_their_device = false;
+ for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
+ auto c_key = key.keys.find("curve25519:" + device_id);
+ auto e_key = key.keys.find("ed25519:" + device_id);
+
+ if (c_key == key.keys.end() || e_key == key.keys.end()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping device {} as we have no keys for it.",
+ device_id);
+ } else if (c_key->second == msg.sender_key && e_key->second == sender_ed25519) {
+ from_their_device = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!from_their_device) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event isn't sent from a device "
+ "listed by that user! {}",
+ payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ {
+ std::string msg_type = payload["type"];
+ json event_array = json::array();
+ event_array.push_back(payload);
+
+ std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents> temp_events;
+ mtx::responses::utils::parse_device_events(event_array, temp_events);
+ if (temp_events.empty()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted unknown event: {}", payload.dump());
+ return;
+ }
+ device_event = temp_events.at(0);
+ }
+
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+ if (auto e1 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationAccept>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationAccept(e1->content);
+ } else if (auto e2 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationRequest>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationRequest(e2->content, e2->sender);
+ } else if (auto e3 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationCancel>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationCancel(e3->content);
+ } else if (auto e4 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationKey>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationKey(e4->content);
+ } else if (auto e5 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationMac>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationMac(e5->content);
+ } else if (auto e6 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationStart>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationStart(e6->content, e6->sender);
+ } else if (auto e7 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationReady>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationReady(e7->content);
+ } else if (auto e8 =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationDone>>(&device_event)) {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(e8->content);
+ } else if (auto roomKey = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::RoomKey>>(&device_event)) {
+ create_inbound_megolm_session(*roomKey, msg.sender_key, sender_ed25519);
+ } else if (auto forwardedRoomKey =
+ std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::ForwardedRoomKey>>(&device_event)) {
+ forwardedRoomKey->content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.push_back(msg.sender_key);
+ import_inbound_megolm_session(*forwardedRoomKey);
+ } else if (auto e = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretSend>>(&device_event)) {
+ auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
+
+ if (msg.sender != local_user.to_string())
+ return;
+
+ auto secret_name = request_id_to_secret_name.find(e->content.request_id);
+
+ if (secret_name != request_id_to_secret_name.end()) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("Received secret: {}", secret_name->second);
+
+ mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest secretRequest{};
+ secretRequest.action = mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation;
+ secretRequest.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
+ secretRequest.request_id = e->content.request_id;
+
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
+
+ if (!verificationStatus)
+ return;
+
+ auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string());
+ std::string sender_device_id;
+ if (deviceKeys) {
+ for (auto &[dev, key] : deviceKeys->device_keys) {
+ if (key.keys["curve25519:" + dev] == msg.sender_key) {
+ sender_device_id = dev;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User,
+ std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>
+ body;
+
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id && dev != sender_device_id)
+ body[local_user][dev] = secretRequest;
+ }
+
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
+ body,
+ [name = secret_name->second](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to send request cancellation "
+ "for secrect "
+ "'{}'",
+ name);
+ }
+ });
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("Storing secret {}", secret_name->second);
+ cache::client()->storeSecret(secret_name->second, e->content.secret);
+
+ request_id_to_secret_name.erase(secret_name);
+ }
+
+ } else if (auto sec_req = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretRequest>>(&device_event)) {
+ handle_secret_request(sec_req, msg.sender);
+ }
+
+ return;
+ } else {
+ failed_decryption = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (failed_decryption) {
+ try {
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
+ for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
+ if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key)
+ targets[msg.sender].push_back(device_id);
+ }
+
+ send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
+ targets, mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::Dummy>{}, true);
+ nhlog::crypto()->info(
+ "Recovering from broken olm channel with {}:{}", msg.sender, msg.sender_key);
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to recover from broken olm sessions: {}", e.what());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+nlohmann::json
+handle_pre_key_olm_message(const std::string &sender,
+ const std::string &sender_key,
+ const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &content)
+{
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("opening olm session with {}", sender);
+
+ mtx::crypto::OlmSessionPtr inbound_session = nullptr;
+ try {
+ inbound_session = olm::client()->create_inbound_session_from(sender_key, content.body);
+
+ // We also remove the one time key used to establish that
+ // session so we'll have to update our copy of the account object.
+ cache::saveOlmAccount(olm::client()->save(cache::client()->pickleSecret()));
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to create inbound session with {}: {}", sender, e.what());
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ if (!mtx::crypto::matches_inbound_session_from(
+ inbound_session.get(), sender_key, content.body)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("inbound olm session doesn't match sender's key ({})", sender);
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ mtx::crypto::BinaryBuf output;
+ try {
+ output = olm::client()->decrypt_message(inbound_session.get(), content.type, content.body);
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to decrypt olm message {}: {}", content.body, e.what());
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ auto plaintext = json::parse(std::string((char *)output.data(), output.size()));
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("decrypted message: \n {}", plaintext.dump(2));
+
+ try {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("New olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(inbound_session.get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(
+ sender_key, std::move(inbound_session), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::db()->warn("failed to save inbound olm session from {}: {}", sender, e.what());
+ }
+
+ return plaintext;
+}
+
+mtx::events::msg::Encrypted
+encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, nlohmann::json body)
+{
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+ using namespace mtx::identifiers;
+
+ auto own_user_id = http::client()->user_id().to_string();
+
+ auto members = cache::client()->getMembersWithKeys(
+ room_id, UserSettings::instance()->onlyShareKeysWithVerifiedUsers());
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> sendSessionTo;
+ mtx::crypto::OutboundGroupSessionPtr session = nullptr;
+ GroupSessionData group_session_data;
+
+ if (cache::outboundMegolmSessionExists(room_id)) {
+ auto res = cache::getOutboundMegolmSession(room_id);
+ auto encryptionSettings = cache::client()->roomEncryptionSettings(room_id);
+ mtx::events::state::Encryption defaultSettings;
+
+ // rotate if we crossed the limits for this key
+ if (res.data.message_index <
+ encryptionSettings.value_or(defaultSettings).rotation_period_msgs &&
+ (QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch() - res.data.timestamp) <
+ encryptionSettings.value_or(defaultSettings).rotation_period_ms) {
+ auto member_it = members.begin();
+ auto session_member_it = res.data.currently.keys.begin();
+ auto session_member_it_end = res.data.currently.keys.end();
+
+ while (member_it != members.end() || session_member_it != session_member_it_end) {
+ if (member_it == members.end()) {
+ // a member left, purge session!
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Rotating megolm session because of left member");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (session_member_it == session_member_it_end) {
+ // share with all remaining members
+ while (member_it != members.end()) {
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first] = {};
+
+ if (member_it->second)
+ for (const auto &dev : member_it->second->device_keys)
+ if (member_it->first != own_user_id || dev.first != device_id)
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first].push_back(dev.first);
+
+ ++member_it;
+ }
+
+ session = std::move(res.session);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (member_it->first > session_member_it->first) {
+ // a member left, purge session
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Rotating megolm session because of left member");
+ break;
+ } else if (member_it->first < session_member_it->first) {
+ // new member, send them the session at this index
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first] = {};
+
+ if (member_it->second) {
+ for (const auto &dev : member_it->second->device_keys)
+ if (member_it->first != own_user_id || dev.first != device_id)
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first].push_back(dev.first);
+ }
+
+ ++member_it;
+ } else {
+ // compare devices
+ bool device_removed = false;
+ for (const auto &dev : session_member_it->second.deviceids) {
+ if (!member_it->second ||
+ !member_it->second->device_keys.count(dev.first)) {
+ device_removed = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (device_removed) {
+ // device removed, rotate session!
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Rotating megolm session because of removed "
+ "device of {}",
+ member_it->first);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // check for new devices to share with
+ if (member_it->second)
+ for (const auto &dev : member_it->second->device_keys)
+ if (!session_member_it->second.deviceids.count(dev.first) &&
+ (member_it->first != own_user_id || dev.first != device_id))
+ sendSessionTo[member_it->first].push_back(dev.first);
+
+ ++member_it;
+ ++session_member_it;
+ if (member_it == members.end() && session_member_it == session_member_it_end) {
+ // all devices match or are newly added
+ session = std::move(res.session);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ group_session_data = std::move(res.data);
+ }
+
+ if (!session) {
+ nhlog::ui()->debug("creating new outbound megolm session");
+
+ // Create a new outbound megolm session.
+ session = olm::client()->init_outbound_group_session();
+ const auto session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
+ const auto session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
+
+ // Saving the new megolm session.
+ GroupSessionData session_data{};
+ session_data.message_index = 0;
+ session_data.timestamp = QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch();
+ session_data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519;
+
+ sendSessionTo.clear();
+
+ for (const auto &[user, devices] : members) {
+ sendSessionTo[user] = {};
+ session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
+ if (devices) {
+ for (const auto &[device_id_, key] : devices->device_keys) {
+ (void)key;
+ if (device_id != device_id_ || user != own_user_id) {
+ sendSessionTo[user].push_back(device_id_);
+ session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids[device_id_] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = room_id;
+ index.session_id = session_id;
+ index.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+ auto megolm_session = olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(session_key);
+ backup_session_key(index, session_data, megolm_session);
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), session_data);
+ }
+
+ cache::saveOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, session_data, session);
+ group_session_data = std::move(session_data);
+ }
+
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> megolm_payload{};
+ megolm_payload.content.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ megolm_payload.content.room_id = room_id;
+ megolm_payload.content.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
+ megolm_payload.content.session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
+ megolm_payload.type = mtx::events::EventType::RoomKey;
+
+ if (!sendSessionTo.empty())
+ olm::send_encrypted_to_device_messages(sendSessionTo, megolm_payload);
+
+ // relations shouldn't be encrypted...
+ mtx::common::Relations relations = mtx::common::parse_relations(body["content"]);
+
+ auto payload = olm::client()->encrypt_group_message(session.get(), body.dump());
+
+ // Prepare the m.room.encrypted event.
+ msg::Encrypted data;
+ data.ciphertext = std::string((char *)payload.data(), payload.size());
+ data.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+ data.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
+ data.device_id = device_id;
+ data.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ data.relations = relations;
+
+ group_session_data.message_index = olm_outbound_group_session_message_index(session.get());
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("next message_index {}", group_session_data.message_index);
+
+ // update current set of members for the session with the new members and that message_index
+ for (const auto &[user, devices] : sendSessionTo) {
+ if (!group_session_data.currently.keys.count(user))
+ group_session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
+
+ for (const auto &device_id_ : devices) {
+ if (!group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids.count(device_id_))
+ group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids[device_id_] =
+ group_session_data.message_index;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // We need to re-pickle the session after we send a message to save the new message_index.
+ cache::updateOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, group_session_data, session);
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+nlohmann::json
+try_olm_decryption(const std::string &sender_key, const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &msg)
+{
+ auto session_ids = cache::getOlmSessions(sender_key);
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("attempt to decrypt message with {} known session_ids",
+ session_ids.size());
+
+ for (const auto &id : session_ids) {
+ auto session = cache::getOlmSession(sender_key, id);
+
+ if (!session) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Unknown olm session: {}:{}", sender_key, id);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ mtx::crypto::BinaryBuf text;
+
+ try {
+ text = olm::client()->decrypt_message(session->get(), msg.type, msg.body);
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(session->get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(
+ id, std::move(session.value()), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("failed to decrypt olm message ({}, {}) with {}: {}",
+ msg.type,
+ sender_key,
+ id,
+ e.what());
+ continue;
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save session: {}", e.what());
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ try {
+ return json::parse(std::string_view((char *)text.data(), text.size()));
+ } catch (const json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to parse the decrypted session msg: {} {}",
+ e.what(),
+ std::string_view((char *)text.data(), text.size()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return {};
+}
+
+void
+create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> &roomKey,
+ const std::string &sender_key,
+ const std::string &sender_ed25519)
+{
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id;
+ index.session_id = roomKey.content.session_id;
+ index.sender_key = sender_key;
+
+ try {
+ GroupSessionData data{};
+ data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = {sender_key};
+ data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sender_ed25519;
+
+ auto megolm_session =
+ olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
+ backup_session_key(index, data, megolm_session);
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to create inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info(
+ "established inbound megolm session ({}, {})", roomKey.content.room_id, roomKey.sender);
+
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
+}
+
+void
+import_inbound_megolm_session(
+ const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey> &roomKey)
+{
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id;
+ index.session_id = roomKey.content.session_id;
+ index.sender_key = roomKey.content.sender_key;
+
+ try {
+ auto megolm_session =
+ olm::client()->import_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
+
+ GroupSessionData data{};
+ data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+ data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = roomKey.content.sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
+ // may have come from online key backup, so we can't trust it...
+ data.trusted = false;
+ // if we got it forwarded from the sender, assume it is trusted. They may still have
+ // used key backup, but it is unlikely.
+ if (roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.size() == 1 &&
+ roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.back() == roomKey.content.sender_key) {
+ data.trusted = true;
+ }
+
+ backup_session_key(index, data, megolm_session);
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to import inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info(
+ "established inbound megolm session ({}, {})", roomKey.content.room_id, roomKey.sender);
+
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
+}
+
+void
+backup_session_key(const MegolmSessionIndex &idx,
+ const GroupSessionData &data,
+ mtx::crypto::InboundGroupSessionPtr &session)
+{
+ try {
+ if (!UserSettings::instance()->useOnlineKeyBackup()) {
+ // Online key backup disabled
+ return;
+ }
+
+ auto backupVersion = cache::client()->backupVersion();
+ if (!backupVersion) {
+ // no trusted OKB
+ return;
+ }
+
+ using namespace mtx::crypto;
+
+ auto decryptedSecret = cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1);
+ if (!decryptedSecret) {
+ // no backup key available
+ return;
+ }
+ auto sessionDecryptionKey = to_binary_buf(base642bin(*decryptedSecret));
+
+ auto public_key = mtx::crypto::CURVE25519_public_key_from_private(sessionDecryptionKey);
+
+ mtx::responses::backup::SessionData sessionData;
+ sessionData.algorithm = mtx::crypto::MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ sessionData.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+ sessionData.sender_claimed_keys["ed25519"] = data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
+ sessionData.sender_key = idx.sender_key;
+ sessionData.session_key = mtx::crypto::export_session(session.get(), -1);
+
+ auto encrypt_session = mtx::crypto::encrypt_session(sessionData, public_key);
+
+ mtx::responses::backup::SessionBackup bk;
+ bk.first_message_index = olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(session.get());
+ bk.forwarded_count = data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.size();
+ bk.is_verified = false;
+ bk.session_data = std::move(encrypt_session);
+
+ http::client()->put_room_keys(
+ backupVersion->version,
+ idx.room_id,
+ idx.session_id,
+ bk,
+ [idx](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to backup session key ({}:{}): {} ({})",
+ idx.room_id,
+ idx.session_id,
+ err->matrix_error.error,
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug(
+ "backed up session key ({}:{})", idx.room_id, idx.session_id);
+ }
+ });
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to backup session key: {}", e.what());
+ }
+}
+
+void
+mark_keys_as_published()
+{
+ olm::client()->mark_keys_as_published();
+ cache::saveOlmAccount(olm::client()->save(cache::client()->pickleSecret()));
+}
+
+void
+lookup_keybackup(const std::string room, const std::string session_id)
+{
+ if (!UserSettings::instance()->useOnlineKeyBackup()) {
+ // Online key backup disabled
+ return;
+ }
+
+ auto backupVersion = cache::client()->backupVersion();
+ if (!backupVersion) {
+ // no trusted OKB
+ return;
+ }
+
+ using namespace mtx::crypto;
+
+ auto decryptedSecret = cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1);
+ if (!decryptedSecret) {
+ // no backup key available
+ return;
+ }
+ auto sessionDecryptionKey = to_binary_buf(base642bin(*decryptedSecret));
+
+ http::client()->room_keys(
+ backupVersion->version,
+ room,
+ session_id,
+ [room, session_id, sessionDecryptionKey](const mtx::responses::backup::SessionBackup &bk,
+ mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ if (err->status_code != 404)
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to dowload key {}:{}: {} - {}",
+ room,
+ session_id,
+ mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ return;
+ }
+ try {
+ auto session = decrypt_session(bk.session_data, sessionDecryptionKey);
+
+ if (session.algorithm != mtx::crypto::MEGOLM_ALGO)
+ // don't know this algorithm
+ return;
+
+ MegolmSessionIndex index;
+ index.room_id = room;
+ index.session_id = session_id;
+ index.sender_key = session.sender_key;
+
+ GroupSessionData data{};
+ data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = session.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+ data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = session.sender_claimed_keys["ed25519"];
+ // online key backup can't be trusted, because anyone can upload to it.
+ data.trusted = false;
+
+ auto megolm_session =
+ olm::client()->import_inbound_group_session(session.session_key);
+
+ if (!cache::inboundMegolmSessionExists(index) ||
+ olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(megolm_session.get()) <
+ olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(
+ cache::getInboundMegolmSession(index).get())) {
+ cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->info("imported inbound megolm session "
+ "from key backup ({}, {})",
+ room,
+ session_id);
+
+ // call on UI thread
+ QTimer::singleShot(0, ChatPage::instance(), [index] {
+ ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
+ });
+ }
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to import inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
+ return;
+ }
+ });
+}
+
+void
+send_key_request_for(mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> e,
+ const std::string &request_id,
+ bool cancel)
+{
+ using namespace mtx::events;
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("sending key request: sender_key {}, session_id {}",
+ e.content.sender_key,
+ e.content.session_id);
+
+ mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest request;
+ request.action = cancel ? mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation
+ : mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request;
+
+ request.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ request.room_id = e.room_id;
+ request.sender_key = e.content.sender_key;
+ request.session_id = e.content.session_id;
+ request.request_id = request_id;
+ request.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
+
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("m.room_key_request: {}", json(request).dump(2));
+
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, decltype(request)>> body;
+ body[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(e.sender)][e.content.device_id] = request;
+ body[http::client()->user_id()]["*"] = request;
+
+ http::client()->send_to_device(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(), body, [e](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
+ "send_to_device "
+ "message: {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ }
+
+ nhlog::net()->info(
+ "m.room_key_request sent to {}:{} and your own devices", e.sender, e.content.device_id);
+ });
+
+ // http::client()->room_keys
+}
+
+void
+handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> &req)
+{
+ if (req.content.algorithm != MEGOLM_ALGO) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("ignoring key request {} with invalid algorithm: {}",
+ req.content.request_id,
+ req.content.algorithm);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Check if we were the sender of the session being requested (unless it is actually us
+ // requesting the session).
+ if (req.sender != http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
+ req.content.sender_key != olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug(
+ "ignoring key request {} because we did not create the requested session: "
+ "\nrequested({}) ours({})",
+ req.content.request_id,
+ req.content.sender_key,
+ olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Check that the requested session_id and the one we have saved match.
+ MegolmSessionIndex index{};
+ index.room_id = req.content.room_id;
+ index.session_id = req.content.session_id;
+ index.sender_key = req.content.sender_key;
+
+ // Check if we have the keys for the requested session.
+ auto sessionData = cache::getMegolmSessionData(index);
+ if (!sessionData) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("requested session not found in room: {}", req.content.room_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const auto session = cache::getInboundMegolmSession(index);
+ if (!session) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("No session with id {} in db", req.content.session_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!cache::isRoomMember(req.sender, req.content.room_id)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("user {} that requested the session key is not member of the room {}",
+ req.sender,
+ req.content.room_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // check if device is verified
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(req.sender);
+ bool verifiedDevice = false;
+ if (verificationStatus &&
+ // Share keys, if the option to share with trusted users is enabled or with yourself
+ (ChatPage::instance()->userSettings()->shareKeysWithTrustedUsers() ||
+ req.sender == http::client()->user_id().to_string())) {
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev == req.content.requesting_device_id) {
+ verifiedDevice = true;
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Verified device: {}", dev);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ bool shouldSeeKeys = false;
+ uint64_t minimumIndex = -1;
+ if (sessionData->currently.keys.count(req.sender)) {
+ if (sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
+ .deviceids.count(req.content.requesting_device_id)) {
+ shouldSeeKeys = true;
+ minimumIndex = sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
+ .deviceids.at(req.content.requesting_device_id);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!verifiedDevice && !shouldSeeKeys) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("ignoring key request for room {}", req.content.room_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (verifiedDevice) {
+ // share the minimum index we have
+ minimumIndex = -1;
+ }
+
+ try {
+ auto session_key = mtx::crypto::export_session(session.get(), minimumIndex);
+
+ //
+ // Prepare the m.room_key event.
+ //
+ mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey forward_key{};
+ forward_key.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
+ forward_key.room_id = index.room_id;
+ forward_key.session_id = index.session_id;
+ forward_key.session_key = session_key;
+ forward_key.sender_key = index.sender_key;
+
+ // TODO(Nico): Figure out if this is correct
+ forward_key.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sessionData->sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
+ forward_key.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = sessionData->forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
+
+ send_megolm_key_to_device(req.sender, req.content.requesting_device_id, forward_key);
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to forward session key: {}", e.what());
+ }
+}
+
+void
+send_megolm_key_to_device(const std::string &user_id,
+ const std::string &device_id,
+ const mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey &payload)
+{
+ mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey> room_key;
+ room_key.content = payload;
+ room_key.type = mtx::events::EventType::ForwardedRoomKey;
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
+ targets[user_id] = {device_id};
+ send_encrypted_to_device_messages(targets, room_key);
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Forwarded key to {}:{}", user_id, device_id);
+}
+
+DecryptionResult
+decryptEvent(const MegolmSessionIndex &index,
+ const mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> &event,
+ bool dont_write_db)
+{
+ try {
+ if (!cache::client()->inboundMegolmSessionExists(index)) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSession, std::nullopt, std::nullopt};
+ }
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::DbError, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Lookup index,event_id,origin_server_ts tuple for replay attack errors
+
+ std::string msg_str;
+ try {
+ auto session = cache::client()->getInboundMegolmSession(index);
+ if (!session) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSession, std::nullopt, std::nullopt};
+ }
+
+ auto sessionData =
+ cache::client()->getMegolmSessionData(index).value_or(GroupSessionData{});
+
+ auto res = olm::client()->decrypt_group_message(session.get(), event.content.ciphertext);
+ msg_str = std::string((char *)res.data.data(), res.data.size());
+
+ if (!event.event_id.empty() && event.event_id[0] == '$') {
+ auto oldIdx = sessionData.indices.find(res.message_index);
+ if (oldIdx != sessionData.indices.end()) {
+ if (oldIdx->second != event.event_id)
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::ReplayAttack, std::nullopt, std::nullopt};
+ } else if (!dont_write_db) {
+ sessionData.indices[res.message_index] = event.event_id;
+ cache::client()->saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(session), sessionData);
+ }
+ }
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::DbError, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ if (e.error_code() == mtx::crypto::OlmErrorCode::UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX)
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSessionIndex, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::DecryptionFailed, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ }
+
+ try {
+ // Add missing fields for the event.
+ json body = json::parse(msg_str);
+ body["event_id"] = event.event_id;
+ body["sender"] = event.sender;
+ body["origin_server_ts"] = event.origin_server_ts;
+ body["unsigned"] = event.unsigned_data;
+
+ // relations are unencrypted in content...
+ mtx::common::add_relations(body["content"], event.content.relations);
+
+ mtx::events::collections::TimelineEvent te;
+ mtx::events::collections::from_json(body, te);
+
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::NoError, std::nullopt, std::move(te.data)};
+ } catch (std::exception &e) {
+ return {DecryptionErrorCode::ParsingFailed, e.what(), std::nullopt};
+ }
+}
+
+crypto::Trust
+calculate_trust(const std::string &user_id, const MegolmSessionIndex &index)
+{
+ auto status = cache::client()->verificationStatus(user_id);
+ auto megolmData = cache::client()->getMegolmSessionData(index);
+ crypto::Trust trustlevel = crypto::Trust::Unverified;
+
+ if (megolmData && megolmData->trusted && status.verified_device_keys.count(index.sender_key))
+ trustlevel = status.verified_device_keys.at(index.sender_key);
+
+ return trustlevel;
+}
+
+//! Send encrypted to device messages, targets is a map from userid to device ids or {} for all
+//! devices
+void
+send_encrypted_to_device_messages(const std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets,
+ const mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents &event,
+ bool force_new_session)
+{
+ static QMap<QPair<std::string, std::string>, qint64> rateLimit;
+
+ nlohmann::json ev_json = std::visit([](const auto &e) { return json(e); }, event);
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> keysToQuery;
+ mtx::requests::ClaimKeys claims;
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>>
+ messages;
+ std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, DevicePublicKeys>> pks;
+
+ auto our_curve = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
+
+ for (const auto &[user, devices] : targets) {
+ auto deviceKeys = cache::client()->userKeys(user);
+
+ // no keys for user, query them
+ if (!deviceKeys) {
+ keysToQuery[user] = devices;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto deviceTargets = devices;
+ if (devices.empty()) {
+ deviceTargets.clear();
+ for (const auto &[device, keys] : deviceKeys->device_keys) {
+ (void)keys;
+ deviceTargets.push_back(device);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (const auto &device : deviceTargets) {
+ if (!deviceKeys->device_keys.count(device)) {
+ keysToQuery[user] = {};
+ break;
+ }
+
+ auto d = deviceKeys->device_keys.at(device);
+
+ if (!d.keys.count("curve25519:" + device) || !d.keys.count("ed25519:" + device)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping device {} since it has no keys!", device);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto device_curve = d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device);
+ if (device_curve == our_curve) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping our own device, since sending "
+ "ourselves olm messages makes no sense.");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto session = cache::getLatestOlmSession(device_curve);
+ if (!session || force_new_session) {
+ auto currentTime = QDateTime::currentSecsSinceEpoch();
+ if (rateLimit.value(QPair(user, device)) + 60 * 60 * 10 < currentTime) {
+ claims.one_time_keys[user][device] = mtx::crypto::SIGNED_CURVE25519;
+ pks[user][device].ed25519 = d.keys.at("ed25519:" + device);
+ pks[user][device].curve25519 = d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device);
+
+ rateLimit.insert(QPair(user, device), currentTime);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Not creating new session with {}:{} "
+ "because of rate limit",
+ user,
+ device);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ messages[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(user)][device] =
+ olm::client()
+ ->create_olm_encrypted_content(session->get(),
+ ev_json,
+ UserId(user),
+ d.keys.at("ed25519:" + device),
+ device_curve)
+ .get<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>();
+
+ try {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(session->get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device),
+ std::move(*session),
+ QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::db()->critical("failed to save outbound olm session: {}", e.what());
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to pickle outbound olm session: {}", e.what());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!messages.empty())
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(), messages, [](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
+ "send_to_device "
+ "message: {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ }
+ });
+
+ auto BindPks = [ev_json](decltype(pks) pks_temp) {
+ return [pks = pks_temp, ev_json](const mtx::responses::ClaimKeys &res,
+ mtx::http::RequestErr) {
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>>
+ messages;
+ for (const auto &[user_id, retrieved_devices] : res.one_time_keys) {
+ nhlog::net()->debug("claimed keys for {}", user_id);
+ if (retrieved_devices.size() == 0) {
+ nhlog::net()->debug("no one-time keys found for user_id: {}", user_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (const auto &rd : retrieved_devices) {
+ const auto device_id = rd.first;
+
+ nhlog::net()->debug("{} : \n {}", device_id, rd.second.dump(2));
+
+ if (rd.second.empty() || !rd.second.begin()->contains("key")) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("Skipping device {} as it has no key.", device_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto otk = rd.second.begin()->at("key");
+
+ auto sign_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).ed25519;
+ auto id_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).curve25519;
+
+ // Verify signature
+ {
+ auto signedKey = *rd.second.begin();
+ std::string signature =
+ signedKey["signatures"][user_id].value("ed25519:" + device_id, "");
+
+ if (signature.empty() || !mtx::crypto::ed25519_verify_signature(
+ sign_key, signedKey, signature)) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("Skipping device {} as its one time key "
+ "has an invalid signature.",
+ device_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ auto session = olm::client()->create_outbound_session(id_key, otk);
+
+ messages[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(user_id)][device_id] =
+ olm::client()
+ ->create_olm_encrypted_content(
+ session.get(), ev_json, UserId(user_id), sign_key, id_key)
+ .get<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>();
+
+ try {
+ nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
+ mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get()));
+ cache::saveOlmSession(
+ id_key, std::move(session), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
+ } catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
+ nhlog::db()->critical("failed to save outbound olm session: {}", e.what());
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to pickle outbound olm session: {}",
+ e.what());
+ }
+ }
+ nhlog::net()->info("send_to_device: {}", user_id);
+ }
+
+ if (!messages.empty())
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(), messages, [](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
+ "send_to_device "
+ "message: {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error);
+ }
+ });
+ };
+ };
+
+ if (!claims.one_time_keys.empty())
+ http::client()->claim_keys(claims, BindPks(pks));
+
+ if (!keysToQuery.empty()) {
+ mtx::requests::QueryKeys req;
+ req.device_keys = keysToQuery;
+ http::client()->query_keys(
+ req,
+ [ev_json, BindPks, our_curve](const mtx::responses::QueryKeys &res,
+ mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->warn("failed to query device keys: {} {}",
+ err->matrix_error.error,
+ static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::net()->info("queried keys");
+
+ cache::client()->updateUserKeys(cache::nextBatchToken(), res);
+
+ mtx::requests::ClaimKeys claim_keys;
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, DevicePublicKeys>> deviceKeys;
+
+ for (const auto &user : res.device_keys) {
+ for (const auto &dev : user.second) {
+ const auto user_id = ::UserId(dev.second.user_id);
+ const auto device_id = DeviceId(dev.second.device_id);
+
+ if (user_id.get() == http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
+ device_id.get() == http::client()->device_id())
+ continue;
+
+ const auto device_keys = dev.second.keys;
+ const auto curveKey = "curve25519:" + device_id.get();
+ const auto edKey = "ed25519:" + device_id.get();
+
+ if ((device_keys.find(curveKey) == device_keys.end()) ||
+ (device_keys.find(edKey) == device_keys.end())) {
+ nhlog::net()->debug("ignoring malformed keys for device {}",
+ device_id.get());
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ DevicePublicKeys pks;
+ pks.ed25519 = device_keys.at(edKey);
+ pks.curve25519 = device_keys.at(curveKey);
+
+ if (pks.curve25519 == our_curve) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping our own device, since sending "
+ "ourselves olm messages makes no sense.");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ try {
+ if (!mtx::crypto::verify_identity_signature(
+ dev.second, device_id, user_id)) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("failed to verify identity keys: {}",
+ json(dev.second).dump(2));
+ continue;
+ }
+ } catch (const json::exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("failed to parse device key json: {}", e.what());
+ continue;
+ } catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("failed to verify device key json: {}", e.what());
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto currentTime = QDateTime::currentSecsSinceEpoch();
+ if (rateLimit.value(QPair(user.first, device_id.get())) + 60 * 60 * 10 <
+ currentTime) {
+ deviceKeys[user_id].emplace(device_id, pks);
+ claim_keys.one_time_keys[user.first][device_id] =
+ mtx::crypto::SIGNED_CURVE25519;
+
+ rateLimit.insert(QPair(user.first, device_id.get()), currentTime);
+ } else {
+ nhlog::crypto()->warn("Not creating new session with {}:{} "
+ "because of rate limit",
+ user.first,
+ device_id.get());
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ nhlog::net()->info("{}", device_id.get());
+ nhlog::net()->info(" curve25519 {}", pks.curve25519);
+ nhlog::net()->info(" ed25519 {}", pks.ed25519);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!claim_keys.one_time_keys.empty())
+ http::client()->claim_keys(claim_keys, BindPks(deviceKeys));
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+void
+request_cross_signing_keys()
+{
+ mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest secretRequest{};
+ secretRequest.action = mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request;
+ secretRequest.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
+
+ auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
+
+ auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
+
+ if (!verificationStatus)
+ return;
+
+ auto request = [&](std::string secretName) {
+ secretRequest.name = secretName;
+ secretRequest.request_id = "ss." + http::client()->generate_txn_id();
+
+ request_id_to_secret_name[secretRequest.request_id] = secretRequest.name;
+
+ std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>
+ body;
+
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id)
+ body[local_user][dev] = secretRequest;
+ }
+
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
+ body,
+ [request_id = secretRequest.request_id, secretName](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to send request for secrect '{}'", secretName);
+ // Cancel request on UI thread
+ QTimer::singleShot(1, cache::client(), [request_id]() {
+ request_id_to_secret_name.erase(request_id);
+ });
+ return;
+ }
+ });
+
+ for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
+ if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id)
+ body[local_user][dev].action = mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation;
+ }
+
+ // timeout after 15 min
+ QTimer::singleShot(15 * 60 * 1000, [secretRequest, body]() {
+ if (request_id_to_secret_name.count(secretRequest.request_id)) {
+ request_id_to_secret_name.erase(secretRequest.request_id);
+ http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
+ http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
+ body,
+ [secretRequest](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to cancel request for secrect '{}'",
+ secretRequest.name);
+ return;
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ });
+ };
+
+ request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing);
+ request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing);
+ request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1);
+}
+
+namespace {
+void
+unlock_secrets(const std::string &key,
+ const std::map<std::string, mtx::secret_storage::AesHmacSha2EncryptedData> &secrets)
+{
+ http::client()->secret_storage_key(
+ key,
+ [secrets](mtx::secret_storage::AesHmacSha2KeyDescription keyDesc, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ if (err) {
+ nhlog::net()->error("Failed to download secret storage key");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ emit ChatPage::instance()->downloadedSecrets(keyDesc, secrets);
+ });
+}
+}
+
+void
+download_cross_signing_keys()
+{
+ using namespace mtx::secret_storage;
+ http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
+ secrets::megolm_backup_v1, [](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ std::optional<Secret> backup_key;
+ if (!err)
+ backup_key = secret;
+
+ http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
+ secrets::cross_signing_self_signing,
+ [backup_key](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ std::optional<Secret> self_signing_key;
+ if (!err)
+ self_signing_key = secret;
+
+ http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
+ secrets::cross_signing_user_signing,
+ [backup_key, self_signing_key](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
+ std::optional<Secret> user_signing_key;
+ if (!err)
+ user_signing_key = secret;
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, AesHmacSha2EncryptedData>>
+ secrets;
+
+ if (backup_key && !backup_key->encrypted.empty())
+ secrets[backup_key->encrypted.begin()->first][secrets::megolm_backup_v1] =
+ backup_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
+ if (self_signing_key && !self_signing_key->encrypted.empty())
+ secrets[self_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->first]
+ [secrets::cross_signing_self_signing] =
+ self_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
+ if (user_signing_key && !user_signing_key->encrypted.empty())
+ secrets[user_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->first]
+ [secrets::cross_signing_user_signing] =
+ user_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
+
+ for (const auto &[key, secrets] : secrets)
+ unlock_secrets(key, secrets);
+ });
+ });
+ });
+}
+
+} // namespace olm
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