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-rw-r--r--synapse/api/auth.py17
-rw-r--r--synapse/api/auth_blocking.py33
-rw-r--r--synapse/api/errors.py3
3 files changed, 42 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/synapse/api/auth.py b/synapse/api/auth.py

index bfcaf68b2a..bc73982dc2 100644 --- a/synapse/api/auth.py +++ b/synapse/api/auth.py
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ class Auth: self._auth_blocking = AuthBlocking(self.hs) - self._account_validity = hs.config.account_validity + self._account_validity_enabled = hs.config.account_validity_enabled self._track_appservice_user_ips = hs.config.track_appservice_user_ips self._macaroon_secret_key = hs.config.macaroon_secret_key @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ class Auth: access_token = self.get_access_token_from_request(request) - user_id, app_service = await self._get_appservice_user_id(request) + user_id, app_service = self._get_appservice_user_id(request) if user_id: if ip_addr and self._track_appservice_user_ips: await self.store.insert_client_ip( @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ class Auth: shadow_banned = user_info.shadow_banned # Deny the request if the user account has expired. - if self._account_validity.enabled and not allow_expired: + if self._account_validity_enabled and not allow_expired: if await self.store.is_account_expired( user_info.user_id, self.clock.time_msec() ): @@ -265,10 +265,11 @@ class Auth: except KeyError: raise MissingClientTokenError() - async def _get_appservice_user_id(self, request): + def _get_appservice_user_id(self, request): app_service = self.store.get_app_service_by_token( self.get_access_token_from_request(request) ) + if app_service is None: return None, None @@ -286,8 +287,12 @@ class Auth: if not app_service.is_interested_in_user(user_id): raise AuthError(403, "Application service cannot masquerade as this user.") - if not (await self.store.get_user_by_id(user_id)): - raise AuthError(403, "Application service has not registered this user") + # Let ASes manipulate nonexistent users (e.g. to shadow-register them) + # if not (yield self.store.get_user_by_id(user_id)): + # raise AuthError( + # 403, + # "Application service has not registered this user" + # ) return user_id, app_service async def get_user_by_access_token( diff --git a/synapse/api/auth_blocking.py b/synapse/api/auth_blocking.py
index d8fafd7cb8..9c227218e0 100644 --- a/synapse/api/auth_blocking.py +++ b/synapse/api/auth_blocking.py
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ # limitations under the License. import logging +from typing import Optional from synapse.api.constants import LimitBlockingTypes, UserTypes from synapse.api.errors import Codes, ResourceLimitError from synapse.config.server import is_threepid_reserved +from synapse.types import Requester logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) @@ -33,24 +35,47 @@ class AuthBlocking: self._max_mau_value = hs.config.max_mau_value self._limit_usage_by_mau = hs.config.limit_usage_by_mau self._mau_limits_reserved_threepids = hs.config.mau_limits_reserved_threepids + self._server_name = hs.hostname - async def check_auth_blocking(self, user_id=None, threepid=None, user_type=None): + async def check_auth_blocking( + self, + user_id: Optional[str] = None, + threepid: Optional[dict] = None, + user_type: Optional[str] = None, + requester: Optional[Requester] = None, + ): """Checks if the user should be rejected for some external reason, such as monthly active user limiting or global disable flag Args: - user_id(str|None): If present, checks for presence against existing + user_id: If present, checks for presence against existing MAU cohort - threepid(dict|None): If present, checks for presence against configured + threepid: If present, checks for presence against configured reserved threepid. Used in cases where the user is trying register with a MAU blocked server, normally they would be rejected but their threepid is on the reserved list. user_id and threepid should never be set at the same time. - user_type(str|None): If present, is used to decide whether to check against + user_type: If present, is used to decide whether to check against certain blocking reasons like MAU. + + requester: If present, and the authenticated entity is a user, checks for + presence against existing MAU cohort. Passing in both a `user_id` and + `requester` is an error. """ + if requester and user_id: + raise Exception( + "Passed in both 'user_id' and 'requester' to 'check_auth_blocking'" + ) + + if requester: + if requester.authenticated_entity.startswith("@"): + user_id = requester.authenticated_entity + elif requester.authenticated_entity == self._server_name: + # We never block the server from doing actions on behalf of + # users. + return # Never fail an auth check for the server notices users or support user # This can be a problem where event creation is prohibited due to blocking diff --git a/synapse/api/errors.py b/synapse/api/errors.py
index cd6670d0a2..90bb01f414 100644 --- a/synapse/api/errors.py +++ b/synapse/api/errors.py
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # Copyright 2014-2016 OpenMarket Ltd -# Copyright 2018 New Vector Ltd +# Copyright 2017-2018 New Vector Ltd +# Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.