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@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +# Copyright 2023 The Matrix.org Foundation. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +import logging +from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, List, Optional +from urllib.parse import urlencode + +from authlib.oauth2 import ClientAuth +from authlib.oauth2.auth import encode_client_secret_basic, encode_client_secret_post +from authlib.oauth2.rfc7523 import ClientSecretJWT, PrivateKeyJWT, private_key_jwt_sign +from authlib.oauth2.rfc7662 import IntrospectionToken +from authlib.oidc.discovery import OpenIDProviderMetadata, get_well_known_url + +from twisted.web.client import readBody +from twisted.web.http_headers import Headers + +from synapse.api.auth.base import BaseAuth +from synapse.api.errors import ( + AuthError, + HttpResponseException, + InvalidClientTokenError, + OAuthInsufficientScopeError, + StoreError, + SynapseError, +) +from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest +from synapse.logging.context import make_deferred_yieldable +from synapse.types import Requester, UserID, create_requester +from synapse.util import json_decoder +from synapse.util.caches.cached_call import RetryOnExceptionCachedCall + +if TYPE_CHECKING: + from synapse.server import HomeServer + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +# Scope as defined by MSC2967 +# https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/2967 +SCOPE_MATRIX_API = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:api:*" +SCOPE_MATRIX_GUEST = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:api:guest" +SCOPE_MATRIX_DEVICE_PREFIX = "urn:matrix:org.matrix.msc2967.client:device:" + +# Scope which allows access to the Synapse admin API +SCOPE_SYNAPSE_ADMIN = "urn:synapse:admin:*" + + +def scope_to_list(scope: str) -> List[str]: + """Convert a scope string to a list of scope tokens""" + return scope.strip().split(" ") + + +class PrivateKeyJWTWithKid(PrivateKeyJWT): + """An implementation of the private_key_jwt client auth method that includes a kid header. + + This is needed because some providers (Keycloak) require the kid header to figure + out which key to use to verify the signature. + """ + + def sign(self, auth: Any, token_endpoint: str) -> bytes: + return private_key_jwt_sign( + auth.client_secret, + client_id=auth.client_id, + token_endpoint=token_endpoint, + claims=self.claims, + header={"kid": auth.client_secret["kid"]}, + ) + + +class MSC3861DelegatedAuth(BaseAuth): + AUTH_METHODS = { + "client_secret_post": encode_client_secret_post, + "client_secret_basic": encode_client_secret_basic, + "client_secret_jwt": ClientSecretJWT(), + "private_key_jwt": PrivateKeyJWTWithKid(), + } + + EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER = "oauth-delegated" + + def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"): + super().__init__(hs) + + self._config = hs.config.experimental.msc3861 + auth_method = MSC3861DelegatedAuth.AUTH_METHODS.get( + self._config.client_auth_method.value, None + ) + # Those assertions are already checked when parsing the config + assert self._config.enabled, "OAuth delegation is not enabled" + assert self._config.issuer, "No issuer provided" + assert self._config.client_id, "No client_id provided" + assert auth_method is not None, "Invalid client_auth_method provided" + + self._http_client = hs.get_proxied_http_client() + self._hostname = hs.hostname + self._admin_token = self._config.admin_token + + self._issuer_metadata = RetryOnExceptionCachedCall(self._load_metadata) + + if isinstance(auth_method, PrivateKeyJWTWithKid): + # Use the JWK as the client secret when using the private_key_jwt method + assert self._config.jwk, "No JWK provided" + self._client_auth = ClientAuth( + self._config.client_id, self._config.jwk, auth_method + ) + else: + # Else use the client secret + assert self._config.client_secret, "No client_secret provided" + self._client_auth = ClientAuth( + self._config.client_id, self._config.client_secret, auth_method + ) + + async def _load_metadata(self) -> OpenIDProviderMetadata: + if self._config.issuer_metadata is not None: + return OpenIDProviderMetadata(**self._config.issuer_metadata) + url = get_well_known_url(self._config.issuer, external=True) + response = await self._http_client.get_json(url) + metadata = OpenIDProviderMetadata(**response) + # metadata.validate_introspection_endpoint() + return metadata + + async def _introspect_token(self, token: str) -> IntrospectionToken: + """ + Send a token to the introspection endpoint and returns the introspection response + + Parameters: + token: The token to introspect + + Raises: + HttpResponseException: If the introspection endpoint returns a non-2xx response + ValueError: If the introspection endpoint returns an invalid JSON response + JSONDecodeError: If the introspection endpoint returns a non-JSON response + Exception: If the HTTP request fails + + Returns: + The introspection response + """ + metadata = await self._issuer_metadata.get() + introspection_endpoint = metadata.get("introspection_endpoint") + raw_headers: Dict[str, str] = { + "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", + "User-Agent": str(self._http_client.user_agent, "utf-8"), + "Accept": "application/json", + } + + args = {"token": token, "token_type_hint": "access_token"} + body = urlencode(args, True) + + # Fill the body/headers with credentials + uri, raw_headers, body = self._client_auth.prepare( + method="POST", uri=introspection_endpoint, headers=raw_headers, body=body + ) + headers = Headers({k: [v] for (k, v) in raw_headers.items()}) + + # Do the actual request + # We're not using the SimpleHttpClient util methods as we don't want to + # check the HTTP status code, and we do the body encoding ourselves. + response = await self._http_client.request( + method="POST", + uri=uri, + data=body.encode("utf-8"), + headers=headers, + ) + + resp_body = await make_deferred_yieldable(readBody(response)) + + if response.code < 200 or response.code >= 300: + raise HttpResponseException( + response.code, + response.phrase.decode("ascii", errors="replace"), + resp_body, + ) + + resp = json_decoder.decode(resp_body.decode("utf-8")) + + if not isinstance(resp, dict): + raise ValueError( + "The introspection endpoint returned an invalid JSON response." + ) + + return IntrospectionToken(**resp) + + async def is_server_admin(self, requester: Requester) -> bool: + return "urn:synapse:admin:*" in requester.scope + + async def get_user_by_req( + self, + request: SynapseRequest, + allow_guest: bool = False, + allow_expired: bool = False, + ) -> Requester: + access_token = self.get_access_token_from_request(request) + + requester = await self.get_appservice_user(request, access_token) + if not requester: + # TODO: we probably want to assert the allow_guest inside this call + # so that we don't provision the user if they don't have enough permission: + requester = await self.get_user_by_access_token(access_token, allow_expired) + + if not allow_guest and requester.is_guest: + raise OAuthInsufficientScopeError([SCOPE_MATRIX_API]) + + request.requester = requester + + return requester + + async def get_user_by_access_token( + self, + token: str, + allow_expired: bool = False, + ) -> Requester: + if self._admin_token is not None and token == self._admin_token: + # XXX: This is a temporary solution so that the admin API can be called by + # the OIDC provider. This will be removed once we have OIDC client + # credentials grant support in matrix-authentication-service. + logging.info("Admin toked used") + # XXX: that user doesn't exist and won't be provisioned. + # This is mostly fine for admin calls, but we should also think about doing + # requesters without a user_id. + admin_user = UserID("__oidc_admin", self._hostname) + return create_requester( + user_id=admin_user, + scope=["urn:synapse:admin:*"], + ) + + try: + introspection_result = await self._introspect_token(token) + except Exception: + logger.exception("Failed to introspect token") + raise SynapseError(503, "Unable to introspect the access token") + + logger.info(f"Introspection result: {introspection_result!r}") + + # TODO: introspection verification should be more extensive, especially: + # - verify the audience + if not introspection_result.get("active"): + raise InvalidClientTokenError("Token is not active") + + # Let's look at the scope + scope: List[str] = scope_to_list(introspection_result.get("scope", "")) + + # Determine type of user based on presence of particular scopes + has_user_scope = SCOPE_MATRIX_API in scope + has_guest_scope = SCOPE_MATRIX_GUEST in scope + + if not has_user_scope and not has_guest_scope: + raise InvalidClientTokenError("No scope in token granting user rights") + + # Match via the sub claim + sub: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("sub") + if sub is None: + raise InvalidClientTokenError( + "Invalid sub claim in the introspection result" + ) + + user_id_str = await self.store.get_user_by_external_id( + MSC3861DelegatedAuth.EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER, sub + ) + if user_id_str is None: + # If we could not find a user via the external_id, it either does not exist, + # or the external_id was never recorded + + # TODO: claim mapping should be configurable + username: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("username") + if username is None or not isinstance(username, str): + raise AuthError( + 500, + "Invalid username claim in the introspection result", + ) + user_id = UserID(username, self._hostname) + + # First try to find a user from the username claim + user_info = await self.store.get_userinfo_by_id(user_id=user_id.to_string()) + if user_info is None: + # If the user does not exist, we should create it on the fly + # TODO: we could use SCIM to provision users ahead of time and listen + # for SCIM SET events if those ever become standard: + # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 + + # TODO: claim mapping should be configurable + # If present, use the name claim as the displayname + name: Optional[str] = introspection_result.get("name") + + await self.store.register_user( + user_id=user_id.to_string(), create_profile_with_displayname=name + ) + + # And record the sub as external_id + await self.store.record_user_external_id( + MSC3861DelegatedAuth.EXTERNAL_ID_PROVIDER, sub, user_id.to_string() + ) + else: + user_id = UserID.from_string(user_id_str) + + # Find device_ids in scope + # We only allow a single device_id in the scope, so we find them all in the + # scope list, and raise if there are more than one. The OIDC server should be + # the one enforcing valid scopes, so we raise a 500 if we find an invalid scope. + device_ids = [ + tok[len(SCOPE_MATRIX_DEVICE_PREFIX) :] + for tok in scope + if tok.startswith(SCOPE_MATRIX_DEVICE_PREFIX) + ] + + if len(device_ids) > 1: + raise AuthError( + 500, + "Multiple device IDs in scope", + ) + + device_id = device_ids[0] if device_ids else None + if device_id is not None: + # Sanity check the device_id + if len(device_id) > 255 or len(device_id) < 1: + raise AuthError( + 500, + "Invalid device ID in scope", + ) + + # Create the device on the fly if it does not exist + try: + await self.store.get_device( + user_id=user_id.to_string(), device_id=device_id + ) + except StoreError: + await self.store.store_device( + user_id=user_id.to_string(), + device_id=device_id, + initial_device_display_name="OIDC-native client", + ) + + # TODO: there is a few things missing in the requester here, which still need + # to be figured out, like: + # - impersonation, with the `authenticated_entity`, which is used for + # rate-limiting, MAU limits, etc. + # - shadow-banning, with the `shadow_banned` flag + # - a proper solution for appservices, which still needs to be figured out in + # the context of MSC3861 + return create_requester( + user_id=user_id, + device_id=device_id, + scope=scope, + is_guest=(has_guest_scope and not has_user_scope), + )